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The thesis traces the development, significance and impact of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) from its early conception 
through its establishment in 1975 to its subsequent administration and 
reform. The role of regional policy and the development of the ERDF 
are assessed in the context of theories of European integration and 
academic studies of the decision-making process of the European Community,
The study of the ERDF's establishment and the subsequent first 
phase of administration (1975-79) includes an assessment of the 
Commission's behaviour vis à vis the national government representatives 
in COREPER, the Council of Ministers and the European Council. It also 
gives consideration to the influence of events external to the immediate 
forum of discussion and the role of national and European pressure 
groups. Particular attention is devoted to the role of the European 
Parliament, and especially to the nature and implications of its budget­
ary disputes with the Council of Ministers involving the ERDF.
A survey is made of the Fund's administration in various EC member 
states which draws attention to some of the general problems that have 
been faced by the Commission with regard to ERDF operations.
The debate preceding the Fund's amendment in 1979 is analysed and 
the consequences for the Fund's administration of this agreement are 
assessed.
The operations of other Community financial instruments in the EC's 
problem regions are considered in a separate chapter. The Commission's 
1981 proposals for further amendments to the Fund regulation are sur­
veyed, as are the initial Council reactions to these suggestions.
The thesis concludes that intergovemmentalist attitudes prevail 
in the Fund's operations, and demonstrates that national governments
iii
firmly control the distribution and administration of Fund aid. More­
over the size and impact of the ERDF have been restricted by limited 
resources, by national governments' suspicion of the Commission and 
reluctance to cede power, and by the anti-regional policy effects of 
the CAP. However, it is claimed that national dominance, and the con­
sequent inefficiencies in the Fund's administration, are open to 
increasing pressure from local and regional authority criticism and 
indeed from those member states who are net-contributors to the Fund, 
who wish to see their contributions disbursed in a more efficient 
manner.
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to trace the development and the 
significance of the European Regional Development Fund from its 
early conception through its establishment in 1975 to its subsequent 
administration and reform. The issues and debates surrounding the 
setting up of the ERDF will be reviewed and analysed. The role of 
regional policy and the development of the ERDF will be assessed in 
the context of theoretical and practical concepts of European integ­
ration. Finally the characteristics of the decision-making process 
evident in the treatment of the issues at stake in this policy field 
will be analysed against previous research findings published by 
authors writing about the European Community.
Sources
Owing to the ongoing nature of this study and not least to the 
fact that the issues under observation were, to a large extent, still 
in an embryonic stage during the period of research, a heavy reliance 
was placed upon primary sources of information. This necessitated 
much field-work in member state regions and capitals and in Brussels 
and Luxembourg. Moreover, many different strands of information had 
to be analysed and pieced together which at times proved a somewhat 
difficult and complicated procedure.
Officials in the European Commission's Directorate General res­
ponsible for regional policy (DG XVI) readily provided details of the 
Commission views, ideas and proposals on the issues at stake. The 
same was true of the European Parliamentary officials and of officials 
of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and European 'umbrella' 
organisations such as UNICE and ETUC. Information acquired directly
from officials in these institutions was supplemented by secondary 
sources in the form of Community documents, published by the Commission, 
Parliament and ECOSOC, readily available upon request, and by the 
reports and bulletins of Agence Europe, and the national press of the 
member states.
Primary information from the Council of Ministers was, not sur­
prisingly, less readily forthcoming since the detailed contents of 
debates and documents remain closely guarded secrets. Nevertheless, 
a vital source was provided by officials of the UK Permanent Represen­
tation in Brussels, a department of which carries out the ground-work 
before the UK ministers discuss the ERDF in the Council forum. Whilst 
remaining somewhat guarded in their revelations, an insight was pro­
vided into the views and stances adopted by all member states in the 
Council sessions and not merely that of the UK ministers and represen­
tatives . Again primary information was supplemented by the same 
secondary sources.
The views of officials at the national level in the government 
departments responsible for dealing with ERDF matters in certain member 
states were sought and provided. Less secondary documentation was 
available at this level (though the recent House of Lords Sub-Committee 
Report on the ERDF provided a notable and valuable exception).̂  How­
ever, this source also furnished details of the Fund's administration 
in the member states, though more open and illuminating information 
on the Fund's administration was provided by officials, either 
employed by regional departments of central government, or by bodies 
responsible for the economic promotion of a particular region.
Organisation of Thesis
Chapter two of this study will provide a more detailed background
to the establishment of the EEC. The Treaty of Rome will be studied, 
in particular the provisions laid down for the Community’s institu­
tions and for relationships between them. A further assessment will 
also be made of the development of inter-institutional relations, 
particularly the evolution of the Commission-Counci1 dialogue and the 
relative rise in importance of bodies such as COREPER, the European 
Council and the European Parliament.
Chapter three will provide an history of the ERDF’s establish­
ment, from the lack of firm commitment for a Community regional policy 
contained in the Treaty of Rome, through attempts to establish such 
a policy in the 1960s to the Paris Summit Meeting of 1972 and the 
subsequent Thomson Report on the EEC's regions. The reasons behind 
the failure to meet the deadline for the Fund's establishment at the 
end of 1973 (as laid down by the Paris Summit) will also be discussed 
as will the bargaining and trade-offs which took place before the 
final agreement was concluded in March 1975.
Chapter four will assess the ERDF's establishment within the 
framework of the European Community decision-making process using con­
cepts and ideas drawn from previous literature on the Community. For
example, consideration will be given to the Commission's behaviour
1
vis à vis the Council, the influence of events external to the 
immediate forum of discussion, the influence of pressure groups, 
European and national, and of Trade Unions, Employers' Federations 
and Local Authorities. The role of the European Parliament in the 
debate will also be assessed.
Chapter five will provide a survey of the first phase of adminis­
tration of the ERDF (1975-79). A description will be given of the 
mechanics laid down for the Fund's operation.. The details of the 
Fund regulation will be assessed, including the eligibility criteria.
who was to be responsible for grant applications in member states, 
who should deal with them in Brussels, who should look after payments 
and how these should be made. Moreover general problems such as that 
of additionality will be highlighted. Consideration will also be 
given to how member states deal with the Fund administration in the 
UK (North West region), France, Italy, West Germany and Ireland.
Again conclusions will be drawn about the characteristics of the 
decision-making process.
Chapter six assesses the guideline proposals produced by the 
European Commission for the renewal of the ERDF (June 1977) and the 
debate which preceded the eventual renewal of the Fund and amendments 
to the regulation which governs its operation.
The details of the guideline proposals will be described and the 
nature and implications of the amendments to the Fund regulation 
suggested by the European Commission will be considered, including an 
attempt to move towards some measure of coordination of the various 
Community financial instruments, the Ex-Quota section of the Fund and 
the new definition of eligibility criteria for infrastructure projects 
A survey will be made of the reactions to the Commission's proposals 
in the Council of Ministers, the member states and the European 
Parliament. Moreover, the way in which the size of the ERDF became 
inextricably linked with the Budgetary question and dispute between 
the Parliament and Council will be considered.
Chapter seven attempts to disentangle the controversy surrounding 
the renewal of the Fund regulation and of the Fund itself, to analyse 
the implications of the Ex-Quota section of the Fund for the ERDF's 
administration and to look at the nature of the final agreement and 
the debate which preceded it in the context of the concepts and ideas 
provided by writers on the Community process in general and surveys
that have been made of other policy-areas.’ In particular, the active 
role and influence of the European Parliament will be considered.
Chapter eight provides an updating of developments in the Fund's 
administration to mid April 1982, including the inspection of pro­
jects receiving finance from the ERDF and publicity provided in the 
EEC regions for projects benefitting from Fund aid, the drafting of 
regulations for five pilot projects proposed for the Ex-Quota section 
and the consequences of Greek entry for the ERDF. Again the European 
Parliament's role will be the focus of attention, in particular its 
rejection of the 1980 Budget and the issue made of totals set for the 
ERDF by the Council in the non-obligatory section of the budget.
Finally the new Commission Guidelines on Regional Policy will be con­
sidered as will the proposed amendments to the Fund regulation.
Chapter nine considers the effect of various EEC policies and 
financial instruments which operate in the less developed regions of 
the EEC, namely the European Investment Bank (including the New Commu­
nity Instrument), the operation of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the CAP and the Guidance Section of FEOGA, the European Social Fund, 
Competition Policy and attempts to coordinate the financial mechanisms 
of the EEC. An attempt will be made to assess the regional impact of 
these funds and policies and the scale of their activity will be com­
pared with that of the operations of the ERDF.
Chapter ten will draw together conclusions from the issues and 
debates considered in the previous chapters concerning the ERDF's 
establishment and administration. Moreover, possible developments in 
the operation of the ERDF and in the EC regional policy-area in general 
will be discussed critically. Finally, the theories and concepts used 
and developed in previous works on the Community will be applied to 
the issues of the ERDF under discussion in this study.
Review of recent general studies of the European Community
Economic literature on regional problems and policies in the
member states has provided background information about the nature
2and causes of the economic problems in certain Community regions. 
Arguments and details assimilated from these works will be included 
in the survey of the ERDF where relevant.
The most detailed account of the European Regional Development
3Fund's establishment was provided by Ross Talbot during his research 
in Brussels. The background to the Commission's attempts to estab­
lish some kind of regional policy for the Community in the 1960s, and 
the eventual agreement on the ERDF in March 1975, have been well
documented by commentators and the arguments and details put forward
4will again be highlighted during the course of the study.
Certain authors, for example Roger Morgan and Richard Mayne, have 
described the historical background to the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), EURATOM and the European 
Economic Community (EEC). They are united in the opinion that at the 
end of the Second World War in 1945, the status of the nation-state 
in Europe, as a viable and indeed desirable political entity, was at 
an all-time low ebb. Mayne^ posed the following questions of the 
nation-state:
1. Had it satisfied people's economic needs?
2. Had it provided for security against war or conflict?
3. Were the existing political leaders still credible?
4. Were the institutions of the nation-states still intact?
5. Did the state still have moral legitimacy?
He concluded that, in the continental West European states, the 
answer to all of these questions was in the negative and went on to 
trace the developments of the 1950s which resulted in the establishment
of the ECSC in 1952 and the EEC in 1958. He likened the faltering 
progress in these years to the 'Echtemach Dance' : three steps
forward and one step backwards!
Numerous other authors such as Palmer, Lambert and Robertson, 
monitored the moves towards the birth of the EEC in a mainly chrono­
logical, descriptive w a y w h i c h  concentrated on the extent of pro- 
European feeling amongst certain leading European politicians of the 
time such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer. 
Additionally, episodes such as the failure of the Pleven Plan to set
7up a European Defence Community in 1954 in response to the Cold War 
and the influence of the Americans on European integration^ are well
documented, as are comparisons between the path taken by the Six to­
wards the establishment of the EEC and that taken by the Seven towards
9the setting up of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
Comparisons were also made between the institutions of the EEC and
19those of the Council of Europe.
Chapter two of this study looks in detail at the institutional 
background of the European Community. Therefore, it is not appropriate
to dwell upon the topic at great length at this point. Nevertheless
an assessment will be made of three main streams of literature on the 
European Community and its activities.
Review of the change in the institutional balance of the EC
Authors such as Roy Pryce and David Coombes have assessed the 
institutions of the European Communities and their relationship with 
one another in a chronological manner. The starting point is the - 
Treaty of Rome and the provisions laid down for the mechanics of 
decision-making and the development of this process was followed and 
analysed. Particular emphasis was placed, in the early years, on the
Council-Commission relationship as this represented the focal point
of the national versus the supranational debate.
12Following the 'crise de la chaise vide' in 1965, when General 
de Gaulle effectively halted French participation in the European 
Community for several months over the suggested linking of majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers, increased budgetary powers for 
the European Parliament and proposals for financing the Common Agri­
cultural Policy (CAP), it was generally accepted by informed observers
13such as Karlheinz Neunreither that an end had been put to any pre­
tensions that the Commission had to becoming a supranational, federal 
executive. The trend was now to consider the Commission's role as 
becoming progressively more bureaucratic as the affairs with which 
the EEC was dealing became more complex and as the specific mandate 
for progress laid down in the Treaty of Rome, such as the setting up
of the CAP, the Common External Tariff and the Customs Union, was
14fulfilled. Dahrendorf commented:
As Europe gains in importance, so the Commission 
proportionally seems to decline in stature. The 
fiction of an uncontrolled European government 
free from national direction as well as parliamen­
tary doubts, was bearable to member states, so 
long as only very little was to be decided at the 
European level. As European matters became pro­
portionally more important to member states, so 
they proportionately withdrew these matters from 
the Commission or immediately dealt with them 
elsewhere.
As the affairs of the European Communities grew more detailed and
complex, so the relative roles and importance of the institutions
changed; academic observers such as Fitzmaurice, Herman and Lodge
began to concentrate more on bodies such as the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER)and the European Parliament, particularly
with the prospect and eventuality of direct elections, and upon the
17role played by pressure groups in the Community. Thus it was
recognised that the idea of a Commission forwarding ambitious
European proposals and a Council being pressed to accept them by
supranational forces no longer described adequately the European
Community process. A much more intricate and complicated system
was evolving, which involved inputs of pressure and resistance from
many quarters: the Commission-Council dialogue was merely the tip
of a large iceberg.
Wallace, Niblock and others have also concentrated on the
measures that had been taken in the member states, by governments,
to deal with the increased output of decisions and regulations from
Brussels and on the way in which national parliaments were dealing
18with Community affairs.
The 1969 Hague Summit brought a new initiative for European
integration: Economic and Monetary Union by 1980, embodied in the
Werner Plan. The failure to make much progress in this direction,
which led to the abandonment of the Werner Plan, along with the issue
19of enlargement of the Communities to include the UK, Ireland and
Denmark and the consequences of the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and the
energy crisis, were the objects of much attention, including a report
by Leo Tindemans (former Belgian Prime Minister) commissioned by the
Paris Summit of 1974, on the 'State of European Union'.
The evolution of summit meetings of Heads of State and Government
into three-monthly meetings known as European Council meetings and the
role of the EEC presidency were also developments which were seen to 
20be significant.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, several works were produced on 
individual policy-areas of the European Community, notably those 
under the aegis of the PEP/Chatham House series, some of which have 
already been cited. These works studied areas such as the CAP, trans-
10
port policy, regional policy and external relations. More recently
several authors like Lucas and Drew have attempted to assess a
policy-area against a background of the nature and evolution of the
21Community institutions and decision-making process. With increased 
attention being placed upon the budgetary problems of the European 
Community and the efforts being made by the European Parliament to 
increase its role in the Community budgetary process and the decision­
making process in general, an assessment of the finances of the
22European Communities has been made by Helen Wallace. Moreover with 
talk of a need to reform the CAP and to cut back the high proportion 
of the Community budget committed to agriculture, a reappraisal of
the CAP has been carried out by Marsh and Swanney.^^ fc s
Application of the tools of integration theory to the 
European Community________________________________________
The second stream of literature on the European Communities has 
been provided largely by American political scientists and concerns 
the application of the tools of integration theory to the European 
Community. The theories and concepts that have been forwarded by 
these authors needed to be appreciated and understood before a decision 
could be taken upon the appropriate research methodology for the pur­
poses of this study.
It is impossible to provide one overarching framework to discuss 
the writings of theorists on integration in the European context 
since the concept of integration means a different thing to all men.
Pentland has provided a lowest common denominator definition which
24strives to incorporate the many views held on the subject.
International political integration is *a process whereby a group 
of people, organised originally into two or more independent nation­
states, come to constitute a political whole, which can in some sense
11
be described as a Community.' However two major questions arise from 
this definition concerning firstly the dynamics of the integration 
process itself and secondly regarding the nature of the political 
whole or Community envisaged as the outcome of the integrative pro­
cess. The views forwarded by theorists can be categorised into those 
which lay stress on the indirect socio-economic and technical vari­
ables as constituting the motivating force behind integration and those 
which consider direct political variables to be of prime importance. 
Furthermore a distinction can be made between those theorists who see 
a state model as the end product of integration and those who envisage 
the development of a Community model.
Functionalist and neofunctionalist theories of integration con­
sider economic and technological factors to be of prime importance in 
the integration process.
25David Mitrany, the major proponent of the functionalist approach,
saw the concept of the nation-state as the main danger to World peace
and regarded the development of international organisations performing
human welfare tasks as a means of eroding popular support for the
nation-state, thus diminishing the risk of war. It was perceived that
in the modern political system there was a growing range of technical,
politically neutral functions which governments had to perform, for
example the control of air transport, of disease - and many of these
could not be carried out effectively at the national level, rather
they required international collaboration. Mitrany stated that the
functional approach: 'seeks, by linking authority to a specific
activity, to break away from the traditional link between authority
26and definite territory'.
Functionalists emphasised that their ideas on the integration 
process were non-political and that their strategy was to encourage
12
governments to entrust the performance of technical tasks to non­
political experts within the framework of an international organi­
sation. If tasks were carried out successfully, then governments 
might be encouraged to permit similar collaborative attempts in other 
fields and in addition general public support for such international 
collaboration would be increased. In this way a transnational web 
of international welfare organisations would gradually be created 
and nationalism would be replaced by allegiance to the World Community 
- a process which Mitrany called 'federalism by instalments'. Never­
theless, Mitrany was against a supranational European Union because: 
'experience suggests that such aggregations would be flushed with a
new sense of power, and they would be provided with a greater ability 
27to use it'.
The main neofunctionalist criticism of functionalism is that 
welfare tasks involve the allocation of scarce resources between com­
peting demands and that this process is a political one involving the 
exercise of power; power being thus inseparable from welfare. By 
contrast, the neofunctionalist argument follows the line that political 
integration comes about less through pressures arising from functional 
needs or technological change as such, and more through the inter­
action of political forces, interest groups, parties, governments and 
international agencies seeking to exploit these pressures in pursuit 
of their own interests. Thus neofunctionalists broke with the mono­
lithic view of the nation-state and perceived it as a complex of 
interests and issue-areas, some of which have more implications than 
others. Haas, a major proponent of the neofunctionalist view, des­
cribed integration as resulting from: 'An institutionalised pattern
of interest politics, played out within existing international organi- 
28sations'.
13
The concept of spillover is central to the neofunctionalist
29argument and Ernst Haas saw the integration process as involving 
the 'gradual politicization' of the actors' purposes which were 
initially considered 'technical' or 'non-controversial'. The group 
of national actors, having decided to collaborate at the international 
level to further their individual and collective interest in the per­
formance of some technical function, would then discover that the 
fulfilment of the original purpose depends on a widening of the range 
of means available to them.
If an agreement is to be reached to broaden the spectrum of 
cooperation, this will increase the 'controversial component' - that 
is the field of action requiring political choices to be made about 
the amount of national autonomy to be delegated to the international 
organisation. If such politicisation is successful and the national 
actors perceive their interest to be best served by delegation of 
national decision-making powers to the new supranational body in one 
field, then it is likely that they will apply the lesson to integra­
tion attempts in other areas. In this way, political loyalties 
following in the wake of economic interests gradually attach them­
selves to the new supranational entities.
Thus the neofunctionalists see integration on the systems level 
as the actual process of change from a rudimentary international 
political interdependence, by means of creating common institutions, 
to a 'developed' supranational political system characterised by a 
high degree of common authoritative decision-making.
The consensus amongst neofunctionalists is that the economic 
sector provides the most appropriate functional area to start the 
integration process of spillover, and that this process is most likely 
to occur in an international system characterised by a strong system-
14
wide political and bureaucratic élite, by complex, interdependent 
socio-economic structures, a stable ideological and cultural con­
sensus and by some commitment on the part of its members to common,
long-term goals.
30Lindberg, himself a neofunctionalist, defined political inte­
gration as:
... the emergence or creation over time of 
collective decision-making processes - i.e. 
political institutions to which governments 
delegate decision-making authority, and/or 
through which they decide jointly via more 
familiar intergovernmental negotiation.^^
Together with Scheingold he made an attempt to plot the future course 
of European integration; using concepts such as spillover, spillback, 
forward linkages, side-payments and output-failure, the Community's 
political system was assessed by looking at the policy areas of agri­
culture and transport, the former being 'a story of action and success'
32and the latter 'a story of inaction and failure'. The authors also 
analysed the achievement of the customs union and activities in the 
coal sector as well as the unsuccessful British attempts to join the 
European Communities in the 1960s.
Haas, having laid down his theories about the gradual and incre­
mental integration process at work in Europe in the early 1960s, was 
overtaken by events in 1965 when de Gaulle threatened to pull France 
out of the EEC over arguments concerning the CAP and other adjoining 
Commission proposals. Haas recognised that there were built-in 
limits to pragmatic interest politics concerned with economic welfare, 
that pragmatic interests, simply because they are pragmatic and not
reinforced with deep, ideological or philosophical commitment, are 
33ephemeral. Thus he concluded that a political process built on 
such interests is bound to be a frail process, susceptible to reverse, 
with integration capable of developing into disintegration.
15
It also became clear that the notion of spillover had economic 
limitations in Western Europe. Hansen^^ pointed out that economic 
developments in the EEC have shown that the Common Market operates 
so as to produce major economic gains without moving from a customs 
union to a political union. He distinguished between negative and 
positive integration. Negative integration comprised: 'The
removal of discrimination as between economic agents of the member 
countries'. Positive integration he defined as: 'the formulation
and application of coordinated and common policies on a sufficient 
scale to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives are ful­
filled' . Despite removal of trade tariffs, the achievement of a 
customs union and a common external tariff, even in the sphere of 
negative integration, he pointed out that it can still not be said 
that integration is complete. For example there are still problems 
of harmonising professional qualifications. Moreover, in terms of 
non-tariff barriers to trade, it can still not be said that no member 
state discriminates in favour of economic agents from among its own 
nationals and against those from other Community countries. Econo­
mists such as Krause have made statements on economic integration with
35implications for the logic of spillover. The latter said:
Economic integration requires coordination of many 
economic policies and this involves essentially 
political decisions, but formal political institu­
tions may not be needed to bring this about.
He added:
What is certain is that political integration 
will occur only as a result of a positive political 
decision to bring it about, not as a result of 
economic pressures alone.
36Haas eventually concluded that theories on regional integration 
were becoming obsolete. He admitted that theories describing, ex­
plaining and predicting the course of regional integration had a
16
tendency to predict events inaccurately and considered the amendment 
or formulation of better theories not to be worthwhile. The major 
reason for his final conclusion on European integration lay in what 
he termed 'turbulent forces', which he claimed were at work in the 
EC. He defined turbulence as a policy space in which confusion about 
trade-offs etc. dominates discussion and negotiation. In such a 
policy space, according to Haas, it is very difficult for organisa­
tional actors to develop stable expectations of mutual behaviour and 
performance. Moreover he claimed that, if one is unsure of one's 
own goals, then it becomes hard to adjust one's behaviour to the goals 
of negotiating partners who are ho more certain of their objectives. 
Thus it had, according to Haas, become impossible to describe, explain 
or predict the European integration process using the neofunctionalist 
concepts of regional integration, although their inherent ideas were 
still useful for analyses of the European Community.
Whereas neofunctionalist theories have been amended to take 
account of events and changes in the European Community, federalist 
concepts have remained constant. The Founding Fathers of the Commu­
nities, supported by many former resistance workers from the Second
World War, dreamt of the creation of a kind of United States of
Europe with the Commission acting as a supranational executive in the 
political system. Thus the federalist strategy entailed a decisive 
act of collective political will by the governing elites of the 
various West European states.
Central to the federalist approach to integration is the primacy 
of politics but also the notion that political consensus does not 
depend for its success upon the prior resolution of social and eco­
nomic differences; the nation-state should be accepted as a
'political given' to be accommodated rather than abolished or
17
circumvented in any scheme to reorganise World politics.
Advocates of a European federation see the coming into being 
of a constitutional arrangement of supranationalism as balancing the 
advantage of size and uniformity with those of smallness and diver­
sity, and as providing the twin criteria of efficiency in the central 
bodies and democracy in the decentralised activities.
Three events in 1952 formed what was termed by Spinelli as
37’Europe’s federalist phase’. At this time it seemed possible that 
federalism mi^t be brought about by a piece-meal strategy, starting 
with the establishment of the ECSC and then with the European Defence 
Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC). However, the 
failure of the EDC and EPC marked the end of Spinelli*s federalist 
phase and showed that if there existed a common political will in 
Europe, it was to maintain the existing framework of national govern­
ments rather than to create supranational institutions. More recently 
the same author has claimed that the EC is suffering from an insti­
tutional disease, namely the Council of Ministers' increasing laxness 
38and paralysis. He maintains that the proof of the viability of 
the Community system came after the transition period (i.e. after the 
fulfilment of specific tasks laid down by the Treaty of Rome's man­
date) . The Council and COREPER, when confronted with new propositions 
not contained in the Treaty, or contained only in vague terms, had to 
debate not just on details of a policy but on whether a major proposal 
should be accepted at all. Spinelli goes on to point out that the 
Council has developed the Conference of Ministers for political 
cooperation, the periodic organisation of summits of Heads of State 
and Government and their institutionalisation in the European Council. 
The Council, he claims, hoped that this would provide the needed 
political impulses and global programmes for the various specialised
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Councils and for the Community as a whole. This has provoked a 
worsening of the institutional crisis because of the Council of 
Ministers* tendency to transfer matters which it has difficulty in 
agreeing upon to the European Council, which sends back 'worse and 
empty commentaries with no solutions'.
Spinelli advocates a reform of the Commission and the drafting 
of a Constitution by the European Parliament to be ratified by the 
European Parliament and laid before member states. This would be a 
powerful document, according to Spinelli, since it would have the 
backing of a body which had been democratically elected by the peoples 
of the EC.
Some authors have interpreted the European Community decision­
making process in an intergovernmental framework. The incompatibility 
between neofunctionalist ideas and the growing assertiveness of 
national governments, in addition to failure to make rapid progress
in many policy areas, stimulated Hoffman to argue that national
39governments are anything other than obsolete. The views of Ralf 
Dahrendorf have also been mentioned earlier in the chapter.
Hoffman considers that national governments are the central actors
in any process of international cooperation. According to his analysis,
the EC may successfully create common procedures for resolving low
key issues between states but it has made no impression on issues and
areas of diplomacy and strategy where governments jealously guard
their sovereignty. Thus intergovemmentalism rejects the claim that
the national political, economic and social systems of the member
states are so interdependent and so penetrated by the Communities
that governments cease to be sole arbiters of their country's external
affairs. Governments carefully aggregate domestic positions at the 
40national level. In this way the Commission is faced: 'not with a
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flood of separately articulated sub-national demands but with a
well constructed dam, with the governments holding the gates between
41the Commission and their domestic politics'.
Thus the institutional evolution of the Communities has streng­
thened the role of national governments in the decision-making process; 
the Commission-Counci1 dialogue has been surrounded by a range of 
intergovernmental Committees under the overall control of COREPER and 
the Council which tend to squash ambitious Commission proposals. Most 
officials working in committees under the Council are instructed by 
their governments and cannot depart significantly from their brief.
'The process increasingly resembles a type of zero sum game with
governments inclining to the definition of their positions in rigid
. 42 terms'.
Thus when an issue is seen as vital by a government it will seek 
to prepare its internal position so as to leave no gaps which could 
be exploited and it will strive to settle any inter-departmental or 
interest group conflict at the national level. Also governments will 
try to make certain that their interest is stubbornly defended in the 
policy formation stage between national representatives and the 
Commission and in the discussion stage in COREPER. Moreover, govern­
ments may enter into bilateral discussions with another government in 
order to strengthen its position.
Stanley Hoffman^^ distinguished between 'High Politics' and 'Low 
Politics'. He used this as an argument against the neofunctionalist 
view that integration would spillover from the technical, functional 
areas, where little political conflict was stimulated,(low politics) 
into the more politically charged spheres such as foreign policy and 
defence (high politics). Hoffman claimed that this spillover effect 
would not take place and gave as evidence the jealously guarded
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national positions of most member states. Whilst this point may be 
a valid one, it is important to guard against the over-simplification 
of the process implicit in this distinction between high and low 
politics since political arguments, impasses and compromises have 
characterised many debates in supposedly low political areas such as 
transport or industrial policy.
Ideas on the European Community classed as transnationalist 
take the view that nation-states remain important but have to share 
the international arena with multinational corporations, trans­
national pressure groups, international organisations and *trans-
44governmental’ bureaucratic alliances.
The development of transnationalist perspectives stems from the 
view that increased economic and technological interdependence of 
the World, plus the increased level of global communication, transport, 
movement of finance and people, has 'increased the sensitivities of 
societies to one another and thereby altered the relationship between 
governments’.^^ Hence governments must increasingly modify their 
policy formation to take account of the views held in other states.
’... This may ... create opportunities for international organisations 
to play significant roles’.
Keohane and Nye have distinguished two areas of transnational
activity at work in the European Community; firstly the formation
of transnational, non-governmental alliances amongst interest groups,
whose sectional interests attract them to similar groups in other
member states and with whom they can identify more easily than with
rival interests in their own country. Examples of this type can be 
47found in COPA, which brings farmers together, UNICE, the industrial­
ists’ transnational federation, COrHTEXTIL, the European organi­
sation of textile producers, and the European Trade Unions.
21
The second form of transnational activity is that which brings 
sub-units of member state governments into transnational coalitions 
against their Cabinets at home in the domestic capitals. For example, 
national agricultural officials try to maximise their efforts to 
resist the attempts of their national treasuries to limit expenditure, , 
by holding down prices or by pressing for reforms in the CAP. Natur­
ally, the degree to which transnational coalitions are successful 
will depend on an awareness of common goals and a mutual sense of 
being disadvantaged by the national systems.
A transnational interpretation of the Community process suggests
that national officials working in the network of Committees in the
Community under COREPER are to a certain extent inescapably influenced,
by regular contact and communication with officials of the member
states, to modify their views. Despite pressure from the member
governments to prevent a loss of control over the views of these
officials, transnationalists would argue that it is impossible for
these efforts to be wholly successful because of the communication
required by increased economic interdependence in the EC.
Individual governments are no longer able to act 
as coordinators in sectors such as agriculture where 
the administrative centre has shifted to Brussels, 
or in managing the operation of common rules for 
competition throughout the EC. In these policy 
seçtors the Commission is able to place itself at 
the centre of an increasingly complex communications 
network with governments being able to monitor only 
a limited area.^®
Thus transnationalism implies growing decentralisation with 
national governments losing power, but without that power accumulating 
in the hands of international organisations, or for that matter in 
any one place. Moreover, it is dependent upon the existence of a 
network of transnational relations and on the presence of government 
or non government groups which are sufficiently motivated and capable
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of applying pressure upon member state governments.
A different view of integration is taken by authors who assess
the European Community in a pluralist framework. According to 
49Deutsch, what is essential for integration is not a particular
kind of formal institutional change, but the attainment of peace and
security in the international system. He defines integration as:
attainment within a territory of a sense of
Community, and of institutions and practices
strong enough and widespread enou^ to assure 
for a long time, dependable expectations of 
peaceful change among its population.®®
Thus the key to improving the system must be sought in quantitative
and qualitative changes in the interactions and communications between
a Community's units. Thus integration involves the end, not of the
states, but of the 'state of war' among them, the process therefore
involving what Deutsch calls a development of 'we-feeling* or a sense
of common-culture based on intense interactions and communications
between all levels of societies in question.
The pluraliste would advocate the examination of regions such 
as Western Europe in order to see if there existed the sort of 'core­
area' around which a process similar to the growth of nations could 
occur. This would be judged by such methods as mapping out the inten­
sity of communications by mail between member states of the European 
Communities - the greater the volume and frequency of communications 
and interactions between states, the more salient each is to the other 
(A hi^ly questionable measurement since increased mailflow between 
firms in member states could imply increased problems!) The more 
aware each member state becomes of the others' actions and interests*, 
the more that transactions are seen by each state as beneficial, 
then the more its relations with the others gain in trust and confi­
dence. In this way, economic integration, which is stressed by neo-
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functionalists as the key to political union, is judged by pluraliste 
to be effective in so far as it has a favourable influence on commu­
nication flows and hence on mutual images.
In short, for pluraliste, the progress of integration depends 
primarily on the nature, perceptions and actions of policy-makers in 
the states in the system; and according to these theorists the 
growth of a Community of states is potentially limited not only by 
political will and capacities of national governments, but by a 
significant and persistent core of national identity in each state, 
in whose service governments may feel obliged to act in ways which 
prove unproductive for integration.
The comparative case study approach
Two major works have been produced which have studied the work-
 ̂ings of the Community institutions in a comparative manner by looking
at different issues and policy-areas and their characteristics.
51Goldstone-Rosenthal surveyed the role of the European Commission 
by way of taking five case studies and using three different approaches 
to her case studies:
1. intergovernmental;
2. grass-roots, interest groups and Parliamentary pressures;
3. élite networks.
Thus she was provided with fifteen 'conceptual lenses' through which 
to assess the decision-making process. She concluded from her findings 
that there was not just one but many different processes of decision­
making at work in the EC and subseqently there was not just one method 
but many different ones of influencing decisions. Rosenthal found 
that inter alia personalities, national and European interest groups, 
small groups within the Commission and the timing of proposals all
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played a prime role in the functioning of the Commission, facts 
which have been glossed over in most of the literature on the body.
A second volume of case studies was produced by Wallace, Wallace 
52and Webb, again with the aim of plugging the gap in literature left
by generalisations about the Community procedure. Having introduced
the various theories and concepts that have been applied to analyses
of the European Community, the authors of the case studies use these
tools to assess various policy-areas before trying to come to general
conclusions about which model of integration is most apt to describe
the functioning of the Community. They end by stating:
Our own conclusion is that it is mistaken to look 
for a single theory or model to describe the com­
plex and varied reality of politics within the 
Community framework. No single model, after all, 
can encompass the full complexity of domestic 
politics within developed societies.®®
Thus it was important to analyse the mainstreams of literature 
\m the European Community, and in particular the application of 
different integration theories to the decision-making process, in 
conjunction with the research for this study. It has been shown that 
it is no longer sufficient to consider the Commission-Council dialogue. 
Other bodies must be considered as they have progressively increased 
in importance in the decision-making process, such as the European 
Parliament, COREPER, the European Council and the Council Presidency. 
Also consideration of Community affairs at the national level is 
significant. Furthermore, no single theory of European integration 
is applicable to every policy-area in the European Community, and as 
one author has pointed out: 'The rather uneven pattern and balance-
sheet of integration in the EC over the last ten years, make generali­
zations about its overall policy-making capacity extremely difficult'
Theorists have recognised the short-comings of their own predic­
tions and explanations of European integration; nevertheless, each
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theory has provided a framework against which issues and debates in 
any one Community policy-area can be assessed. Indeed this has been 
attempted in the case studies cited above.
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CHAPTER TWO ; INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In Chapter one, the development of the Community decision­
making process was described, as were the concepts considered impor­
tant by theorists for European integration. The conclusion was 
drawn that, despite it being unwise to generalise, the trend has 
been towards increased intergovemmentalism. Certainly it is no 
longer satisfactory to look at the decision-making process as a 
single Counci1-Commission dialogue: a much more intricate and com­
plicated system has evolved and the Council-Commission relationship 
is merely the tip of a large iceberg.
The aim of this Chapter is to consider more closely the insti­
tutional framework of the European Community, as provided by the 
Treaty of Rome, and the increased significance of certain bodies, 
either considered in the early years to be on the fringe of the 
decision-making process or not even recognised by the original 
Treaties. Only then will an adequate background have been provided 
for an assessment to be made of the issues surrounding the debates 
of the ERDF and for the application of the ideas of the integration 
theorists to these issues.
When the European Coal and Steel Community was established by 
the Treaty of Paris (18th April 1951), the desire was totally to 
integrate the key industries of coal and steel of the six participant 
nations (France, West Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy) so 
as to render war between France and West Germany an impossibility in 
the future:
Europe will not be made all at once or according to 
a single general plan. It will be built through 
concrete achievements which first create a de facto 
solidarity ... The pooling of coal and steel pro­
duction will immediately provide for the setting up
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of common bases for economic development as a 
first step in the federation of Europe.^
Within the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community 
an independent High Authority (the equivalent of the EEC Commission) 
was granted wide-ranging powers of decision over the affairs of the 
Coal and Steel industries of the six member states. This could have 
been seen as the first step (in neofunctionalist terms) along the 
piecemeal path towards economic and political integration, with a 
gradual spillover to other, more sensitive areas of government, 
coupled with more wide-ranging powers being granted to an independent 
European body, such as the High Authority.
Nevertheless, with the failure in 1954 of attempts to establish 
a European Defence Community, immediate hopes for a European Political 
Community were defeated. In 1955 following a conference at Messina, 
moves were made towards establishing the EEC and Euratom, the former 
organisation to involve the setting up of a Customs Union among the 
six and an eventual economic union.
Thus the Treaties of Rome (25th March 1957) established the 
European Economic Community along with EURATOM, a new organisation 
set up to develop peaceful uses for atomic energy.
Despite the fact that the system of grants and loans under the 
ECSC has had considerable regional implications, owing to the geo­
graphical concentration of the Coal and Steel industries, (see Chapter 
nine of this study), it is on the institutions and decision-making 
process of the EEC that most of this study concentrates since it is 
the Treaty of Rome and subsequent regulations agreed upon by the 
EEC’s institutions which govern the operations of the ERDF.
The Treaty of Rome provides for a dialogue between the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers, with the European Parliament 
(or Assembly) and the Economic and Social Committee being granted a
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subsidiary advisory role, with the power to pass non-binding
2decisions, opinions and resolutions on EEC matters. The Court 
of Justice was given the task of ensuring that: 'in the inter­
pretation and application of this Treaty, the law is observed'
(Art. 164, Treaty of Rome). Additionally, interest groups (at the 
European, national and local level), independent experts, individual 
industries and professions act as subsidiary arms of the decision­
making process, also providing information, opinions and resolutions 
on the Commission's draft proposals.
3The Commission was given responsibility by the Treaty of Rome 
for initiating proposals. It was also given the task of acting as 
'the conscience of the Community', a task involving 'filling out* 
the provisions of the Treaty, constantly reminding the other Community 
institutions of fundamental objectives and suggesting new paths to 
follow. Moreover, the Commission was given the function of acting 
as the 'Guardian of the Treaty* in so far as it must ensure that the 
Treaty provisions and the rules laid down by the Community institu­
tions, in accordance with it, are correctly observed.
Coombes lists the Commission's formal powers under four main 
headings, the first two being: initiative and normative (which
includes the functions of * Guardian of the Treaty* and the 'conscience 
of the Community'). Theoretically, such powers cast the Commission 
in the role of potential political leader of the Community, in con­
trast to Coombes*s final two headings: administrative (the mechanical
activity of implementing the Treaty provisions and issuing regula­
tions) and mediative function (the need to bring about agreement 
between member states).
Thus the Treaty of Rome provided the Commission with a hybrid 
mantle, embracing both goal-setting, political leadership roles and
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bureaucratie, implementative functions within its terms of reference.
The Treaty of Rome provided for a Commission of nine (which 
became fourteen in 1967 after the merger of the executives of the 
ECSC, Euratom and EEC, and then thirteen when the UK, Ireland and
4Denmark joined the Community in 1973 ). There are now two Commis­
sioners from each of West Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom and one each frcun the five small member states.^ The 
Commissioners are appointed by the governments of the member states 
for a renewable term of four years. The Treaty states that they 
should be chosen for 'general competence' and that they should take 
an oath of independence from the national governments. Commissioners 
are also required to act in: 'the general interests of the Community'
and at the same time member states must undertake not to seek to 
influence Commission members.
The Commission represents the Community at the European Parlia­
ment to which it is responsible - (the Parliament, by a two-thirds 
majority, in a censure motion, can force the Commission to resign en 
bloc). The Commission also represents the Community in negotiations 
and relations with third countries and international organisations 
and has the duty of publishing annual reports on the Community's 
activities.^ The Commission has no powers in the field of foreign 
affairs or defence and has no right to the use of force, internally 
or externally. Nevertheless, recourse can be had to the European
7Court of Justice. It should also be noted that Commission members 
are not bound together by adherence to any common mandate other than
gtheir oath of independence, and are appointed by nine different 
governments collectively. This factor has contributed to the compart- 
mentalisation of the Commission, with communication and cooperation 
between Directorates General sometimes difficult, especially given
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the fact that nine civil service traditions and six different
languages and ways of thinking are present in the Commission (seven
now that Greece has become a Community language and Greek officials
have been recruited to the Commission's ranks).
In the higher levels of the Commission's echelons there have
always been battles over the allocation of portfolios to different
nationalities at the beginning of the four year term of office, with
much political weight being placed on the appointment of Commissioners
to certain DGs, such as agriculture and industry.^
A national quota system operates for appointing Commission staff
which makes a nonsense of the original aim of recruiting people with
a firm commitment to the European idea.^^ Thus each member state is
represented by at least one man on the College of Commissioners and
each member state has a claim on a percentage of positions at the
lower level of the hierarchy. The existence of this system places
strong constraints on the staffing of the administration, a problem
which is further complicated by attempts made to appoint officials
of different nationalities to vertically adjacent ranks, particularly
in the higher echelons.
The practice, especially among the French, of seconding national
civil servants to the Commission for a limited period of time, has
hindered efforts to develop an independent body with a degree of self-
identification. Indeed, despite the supposed oath of independence,
one German author provides an example of Helmut Schmidt sending a
letter: to '... all officials and employees in Brussels, wishing them
12every success for their important work in the service of the BED'.
The Council-Commission dialogue is summed up by the maxim that 
'the Commission proposes and the Council disposes*. In other words, 
the Council acts upon the Commission's proposals. The Council of
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Ministers is composed of delegated Ministers from within the member 
states' governments, the composition varying according to the subject 
under discussion, but with Foreign, Finance and Agricultural Ministers 
playing key roles.
The Treaties of Rome do not set out a general definition of the
Council's powers : Article 145 states that: 'in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty, ... it shall ensure coordination of general
economic policies of the member states' and '... have power to take
decisions'. Certain Chapters of the Treaty, such as those dealing
with agriculture, the right of establishment or transport, lay down
that it is the Council which shall take the significant decisions.
They also specify the way in which these decisions shall be taken:
13by qualified or majority voting. (The issue of majority voting will 
be considered later in the Chapter.)
Certain developments in the Council's structure and operation
since 1965 have strengthened its position vis à vis the Commission
and have also posed questions as to the democratic accountability of
the Council of Ministers. The outcome of the Luxembourg crisis
14agreement following the crise de la chaise vide was that majority 
voting was effectively replaced by the need to search for unanimity 
in the Council before important decisions can be taken. This in turn 
has encouraged the Commission to take full account of the interests 
of all member states when drawing up proposals, rather than filing 
ambitious suggestions.
This need for unanimous decisions has obviously placed the / 2
Council under increased pressure to complete its work-load, and this, 
coupled with the rise in the number of decisions to be taken (as the 
Community completed the transition stage to a Customs Union in 1965 
and became involved in decision-making in more policy-areas) has led
/  \
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to the increased role and significance of COREPER.
In 1965, the Council’s administrative sub-structure COREPER was 
recognised for the first time by the Merger T r e a t y . C O R E P E R ’s task 
is to prepare Council decisions and to act as a link between national 
governments and the Commission. All decisions are officially taken 
at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, procedural or highly tech­
nical matters, which have been agreed between the permanent represen­
tatives, following the meetings of national experts, figure in a list 
submitted for formal approval at each ’Council’ session. (These are 
referred to as ’A’ points.) All other questions are debated by the 
ministers themseIves. ('B ' points.)
The Communique of the Paris Summit of December 1974 stated:
'... greater latitude will be given to the Permanent Representatives 
so that only the most important political problems need to be dis­
cussed in the C o u n c i l B i e b e r  and Palmer commented that this might 
give the impression that the heads of government wish to increase the 
efficiency of the decision-making process. But article four of the 
Merger Treaty of 1965 stated that COREPER was instructed to implement 
the tasks given to it by the Council of Ministers. Thus, according
to these two authors, a great deal ’of completely undefined power has
17been handed over to the permanent representatives’.
The original function of the President was seen as that of a 
chairman, with the job of convening meetings, preparing agenda and 
other such technical duties. The office of President is held in six- 
monthly rotations by the ministers of the member states.
In recent years, and notably because of the increase in the 
Council's power vis à vis the Commission, the President has gained 
in importance. The President, especially if he represents one of the 
small member states, enjoys a position of unprecedented status in
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international affairs, meeting and receiving in his capital, govern­
ment heads and representatives from the major World powers, and 
negotiating on an equal footing with them, during his six months in 
office.
The role of the President has also become more significant with
the increased number of meetings of representatives of member states
to deal with highly political and contentious issues outside the
formal structure of the Community institutions. These include the
18growth of summitry and its evolution and effective institutionali­
sation into the European Council (though there is no Treaty provision
for such a development), the regular meeting of Finance Ministers and
19the evolution of the political cooperation network. The President
has increasingly to carry out the task of coordinating Council of
Ministers and European Council initiatives and has to act as mediator 
in discussions (both, according to the Treaties of Rome, functions 
to be carried out by the Commission).
One of the reasons behind the increasingly important role of 
European Councils of Heads of State and Government is the same increased 
pressure on the Council of Ministers to achieve unanimous decisions 
that led to the establishment of COREPER. Whereas COREPER deals with 
uncontroversial, technical matters, the Council of Ministers tends to 
pass problematic issues, on which agreement is proving difficult, up to 
the European Council, in search of a statement of intent or a settle­
ment of the problem. Thus the European Council has increasingly tended 
to give a binding character to agreements reached between Heads of 
Government. For example the decisions taken at the Paria Summits of 
1972 and 1974 to create and then to activate the Regional Fund, which 
under the Treaties should have been taken by the Council (see Chapter 
three).
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The role of the European Parliament, on the other hand, is
outlined in the most general way by Article 137 of the Treaty of
20Rome: 'The Assembly, which shall consist of representatives of
the peoples of the states brought together in the Community, shall 
exercise the advisory and supervisory powers which are conferred upon 
it by this Treaty’ . Thus the main function of the European Parliament 
involves a consultative role in legislation; Article 149 of the 
Treaty of Rome permits the Commission to alter its original proposal 
on the basis of the European Parliament’s opinion, if the Council has 
not yet made a decision. However, except for budgetary matters, the 
Treaties do not oblige the Commission to amend draft legislation in 
the sense indicated by the European Parliament and furthermore amend­
ments made by the Commission to its original proposals in the light 
of consultation with the Council, do not have to be submitted to the 
Parliament (though they often are if they involve substantial changes).
I 21One author demonstrated that the Parliament gave opinions on 246 
Commission proposals, suggesting modifications in 61 cases. The 
Commission accepted 32 of the modifications (52%). In the first 
eleven months of 1977, the Parliament gave 273 opinions on Commission 
proposals. It suggested 44 modifications and the Commission accepted 
30 (68%).
The most important weakness in the European Parliament’s consul­
tative function is that there is no obligation upon the Council to 
amend legislation in conformity with Parliament’s opinion (except for 
the establishment of the non-obligatory section of the Community 
Budget - see below). The Council does not even have to explain why. 
it has not taken account of the European Parliament’s suggested 
amendments. Moreover, as more and more Community decisions come to 
be taken by COREPER (see below), or to be the result of the initiatives
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of the European Council, over which Parliament has no control, the 
consultative role seems even less significant. The European Parlia­
ment's powers of control have been described by one commentator as:
22'truly modest'. The Parliament does have the right to recommend
action or policies on its own initiative, again, however, with no
guarantee of acceptance by the Commission or more significantly the
Council of Ministers.
The European Parliament has the power to pass a censure motion
23to dismiss the European Commission. Nevertheless, no power is 
accorded for participation by the Parliament in thé appointment of 
the next Commission. The Parliament has threatened on four occasions, 
but has never yet carried a censure motion against the Commission.
The European Parliament has the right to discuss the Commission's 
annual report and to table questions both to the Council and the 
Commission, in the form of oral questions, oral questions with debate 
and written questions.
In conclusion, the European Parliament does not play a legisla­
tive role in the Community decision-making process. Except with 
regard to a relatively small part of the Budget, the Parliament does 
not make or enforce laws, it merely has the power to approve or 
criticise them; it cannot initiate and pass binding acts of Parliament. 
There have been suggestions for increasing the powers of the
European Parliament vis à vis the other institutions including the Vedel
24Report on the enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament.
This report proposed a scheme whereby Parliament's powers would be 
increased in two stages; in the first stage, the Parliament was to 
be given powers of veto (described in the report as 'co-decision') 
over a limited range of subjects, and powers of delay (described as 
'suspensory veto' over a wider range. In the second stage, Parliament’s
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suspensive powers over the latter class of subjects were to be raised 
to a power of co-decision.
The Vedel Committee thought that in the first stage, Parliament 
should be given powers of co-decision only over legislation affecting 
either the Community’s relations with other persons in international 
law, or its own constitution. These included: the revision of the
Treaties, admission of new members to the Community, ratification of 
international agreements concluded by the Community and the inter­
pretation of article 235 of the Rome Treaties which empowers the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal of the Commission, to take 
’appropriate measures' to achieve one of the objectives of the 
Community even if the Treaty has not provided the appropriate powers.
The areas in which Vedel and his colleagues thought that Parlia­
ment should have delaying powers in the first stage and powers of 
co-decision in the second stage, were measures for harmonising 
national legislation and measures dealing with questions of principle 
arising out of the common policies which might give rise to harmoni­
sation.
25In a draft report for the Political Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament in 1975, the late Sir Peter Kirk put forward two 
proposals which would have taken Parliament some way along the road 
to the destination set out in the Vedel Report.
Firstly in the legislative field, he proposed that Parliament 
could be given a power of initiative, analogous to the right of a 
British MP to bring a Private Member's Bill before Parliament; a 
Parliamentary Committee would draft legislation, if the Bureau approved, 
the draft would be voted upon in the plenary session of Parliament. If 
it was approved at this stage, it would be sent to the Commission and 
the Commission would submit it to the Council in the usual way. There-
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after, the proposal would follow the normal course of Community 
legislation.
Kirk's second suggestion was that the 'concertation procedure', 
which exists in the budgetary sphere (see below), should be extended 
to all other Community legislation. Moreover, the Council should 
sit in public when considering Parliament's amendments to Commission 
proposals.
Despite proposals for increasing the European Parliament's 
influence in the field of Community legislation and whatever the merit 
of such suggestions, the Commission and, more important, the Council 
of Ministers, is unlikely to acquiesce willingly, at least in the 
short term, to such changes. Moreover, some national parliaments 
watch jealously to ensure that the European Parliament does not gain 
power at their expense. For example, in the UK and France, the legis­
lation making it possible to hold direct elections contained explicit 
provisions to prevent the European Parliament from increasing its 
powers without the assent of the Westminster Parliament or the National 
Assembly in Paris.
26One author claims that so many decisions are now taken at the 
Community level by a process which is almost free of any Parliamentary 
scrutiny or control. He maintains that the only national Parliament 
which has more than a nominal control over its ministers' activities 
in the Council of Ministers is the Danish Folketing. Even then the 
Folketing is powerless to scrutinise them since the Market Relations 
Committee, which exercises the control function, meets in private and
27is debarred from divulging its proceedings to the Folketing at large.
Marquand goes on to claim that if the European Parliament were 
to acquire a say in the activities of the Council and establish a 
machinery by which some of those activities were opened up to public
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scrutiny, the quantum of Parliamentary power in the Community would
be increased at no cost to the power of any national Parliaments.
In conclusion, whatever the pros and cons of the arguments, the
fact is that the European Parliament is unable to express more than
a non-binding opinion on Community legislation, with the one exception
of the non-obligatory section of the Budget (see below). Thus its
legislative powers must be said to be minimal.
A characteristic of most Parliaments is that they represent the
people. Indeed Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome states that: 'The
Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal
suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all member states'
In the meantime, however, the Assembly (as it was referred to until
1962) should consist of nominated delegations from the member states'
parliaments, designated in accordance with the procedure laid down
28by each member state. These delegations formed into party groups
on a transnational basis. The major groupings consisted of Christian
Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Communists, with some independent 
29members.
The main work of examining proposals is undertaken by the speci­
alised Committees of the European Parliament. The plenary session of 
Parliament then deliberates on the report of the competent Committee, 
the Committee having appointed a rapporteur who will have drafted a 
report as the basis for discussion. The Committee is a microcosm of 
the political composition of the Parliament in order to ensure that 
the appropriate breadth of opinion is represented in discussions.
With regard to direct elections, the Assembly moved with due 
speed to take up the lead provided by Article 138 of the Rome Treaty;
in October 1958, its committee on political affairs and institutional
X 30questions set up a sub-committee (later to be termed a working party),
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under the chairmanship of Fernand Dehousse, to study the problem of 
instituting direct elections. The work was completed in January 1960 
and the plenary session of the European Parliament adopted a draft 
convention in March 1960 for submission to the Council of Ministers 
for approval.
The convention needed the approval of all member state govern­
ments and, following initial resistance by the French Government, the 
Council consistently refused even to discuss the convention.
However, at a meeting of the European Council in Brussels in 
31July 1976, the governments decided that direct elections should be
held to the Parliament in May or June 1978, and that the directly
32elected Parliament should consist of 410 members (between 1962 and 
1973 the European Parliament had 142 members, increased with enlarge­
ment to 198). The convention that was approved by the Council in 
September 1976 (in the form of a 'decision* to adopt an 'Act') was 
largely founded on a new set of proposals adopted by the European 
Parliament on the basis of a report written by Mr. Schelto Patijn. 
Because of delays in ratification and enabling legislation in the 
member states, direct elections were not held until June 1979. Due 
to the refusal of the British government to adopt a system of propor­
tional representation for the election, it was not possible to intro­
duce a uniform electoral procedure for 1979 (the first past the post 
system being used in the UK). Thus it was, for this first election, 
left to the individual member state to decide upon its voting method.
(Apart from in the UK, various kinds of proportional representation
33systems were used.)
The .Patijn Report claimed that direct elections 'would ... lend
to the exercise of power by the Communities, a legitimacy which has
34hitherto been lacking'. The Tindemans Report on European Union
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(commissioned by the Paris Summit of 1974) in 1975 said that direct
elections would ’reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the whole
35European institutional apparatus’.
Indeed, Parliament has gained legitimacy from direct elections,
but the institutions which determine what happens in the Community:
the Commission and the Council, are unaffected.
Direct elections will make a difference to the 
process of integration and to the legitimacy of 
the Community, as such, only if Parliament’s new 
weight can somehow be brought to bear in favour 
of integration and against the resistance of the 
national institutions whose positions are threat­
ened by integration.
There is no guarantee that this will happen, and it could only happen
if the present institutional structure was radically changed.
One area over which the European Parliament does have some power
37in the Community decision-making process is the Community Budget.
The Community budgetary procedure is governed by Article 203 of 
the EEC Treaty which has been significantly changed by the Budget 
Treaties of April 1970 and July 1975.
O QThe 1970 Treaty agreed in Luxembourg established the Community
39system of own resources. Thereafter, Parliament had the right to
suggest alterations to the draft budget, either as amendments in the
40case of non-compulsory expenditure, or as modifications in the case 
of compulsory expenditure. It also compelled Council to take a formal 
decision on the points made by the Parliament and to enter into a 
dialogue with it on disputed points through a concertation procedure. 
Moreover, it was the President of the Assembly who was to declare 
the adoption of the budget.
41A second Amending Treaty on finance was agreed in July 1975;
most important, it extended the role of the Parliament and created
42the Court of Auditors. Parliament was now given increased control
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over non-obligatory expenditure and accorded the right to reject the 
budget as a whole. Moreover, a joint declaration of Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council in March 1975 introduced the Conciliation 
procedure. Although this is related to the budgetary procedure it 
is not formally linked to it.
43Under the conciliation mechanism, when, concerning a Commission 
proposal of general application which has 'appreciable financial 
consequences',there is a conflict between Parliament and the Commis­
sion on one side, and Council on the other, the procedure can be 
activated by either side. It consists of a meeting between nine 
members of the appropriate specialist Council and a delegation of 
nine members from the Parliament, led by its president and including 
the relevant Committee chairman and rapporteur. A maximum of three 
months is set for agreement. The working of the conciliation pro­
cedure gives Parliament an opportunity to arrive at a compromise with 
the Council and in effect gives it a power of (to use Vedel’s termi­
nology) 'suspensive veto' for the length of the procedure. If agree­
ment is reached, a report is drawn up by the committee of Parliament 
directly concerned and this is adopted as a Parliamentary resolution 
and accepted by the Council.
Although there is no guarantee of agreement and the last word 
remains with Council, the conciliation procedure does provide the 
European Parliament with an opportunity to plead its case to try to 
convince the Council of the merits of its argument.
44The Community budget amounts to 2.5% of total national budgets 
- about £10 thousand million for 1979. The CAP accounts for over 
three-quarters of the total expenditure; the rest covers Commission 
expenditure and all other policies plus repayment to member states 
of the costs of collection of tariffs and levies on imports from non-
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Community countries and the administrative expenses of the Commission 
and the other institutions. Expenditure of the European Investment 
Bank, the European Development Fund and the European Coal and Steel 
Community, are budgeted separately.
Since direct elections in June 1979 the European Parliament has
consistently flexed its muscles over the drawing up of the Community 
45Budget. There has been pressure from the Parliament to reduce the 
budgetary allocation given over to agriculture and to increase non- 
obligatory expenditure such as on the ERDF. This attitude has provoked 
major conflicts between the Council of Ministers on the one hand and 
the European Parliament on the other with the ERDF a key issue in the 
debate (see below - Chapter eight).
Summary
From the above survey of the EEC's institutions it is obvious 
that the Community system does not conform with any standard pattern 
of democratic government; there is no clear distinction between 
executive, legislative and judiciary; the Court of Justice is given 
responsibility for ensuring that the law is observed in the inter­
pretation and implementation of the Treaty, but nobody plays a clear 
legislative role; with the exception of certain budgetary powers the 
European Parliament has no control over Community affairs and despite 
providing an air of legitimacy through its direct election in 1979, 
it exerts no control or influence over delegates of the Council of 
Ministers. The only control on these delegates is imposed by their 
own domestic Parliaments.
The European Commission has a mixture of functions, ranging from 
political executive tasks to administrative functions. It has ulti­
mate responsibility for decisions in some areas of Community policy­
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making, such as Competition Policy or Agricultural Policy and it 
also occupies the key legislative role in the Community. Neverthe­
less, its power and authority in most areas have been eroded by the 
intergovernmental arm of Community decision-making in the form of 
COHEPER, the Council of Ministers and the European Council.
Thus having provided a background to developments in the European 
Community in the form of a survey of the institutional inter­
relationships and the relative powers and functions of the decision­
making bodies, and having also analysed the developments in the 
decision-making process over the last twenty years and the concepts 
used by theorists to describe, explain and predict the course of 
European integration, the subsequent chapters of this study will con­
centrate upon the issues surrounding the establishment and operation 
of the European Regional Development Fund and seek to apply the 
aforementioned ideas and trends to these issues.
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the French Gaullist members of the European Parliament 
still term it an 'Assembly'.
21. D. Marquand, Parliament for Europe, J. Cape Ltd. (1979).
22. E. Ramussen, Symposium on the European Parliament and European
Integration, Luxembourg (1974), p. 211.
23. Article 144, Treaty of Rome: '... if the motion of censure is
passed by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, repre­
senting a majority of the members of the Assembly, the 
members of the Commission shall resign as a body'.
24. G. Vedel, 'The Role of the Parliamentary Institution in European
Integration', in Symposium on European Integration and the 
Future of Parliament in Europe, Directorate General for 
Research and Documentation of the European Parliament (eds.), 
Luxembourg, European Parliament (1975).
25. Draft Report on the powers of the European Parliament, PE 37065/
rev.
26. D. Marquand, Parliament for Europe, Cape (1979) in chapter on
the institutional imbalances of the EC.
27. For an account of Danish Parliamentary control of Community
affairs see: J. Fitzmaurice, 'National Parliaments and
European Policy-making: the case of Denmark', Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (Summer 1976).
28. For details of the structure of the European Parliament and the
formation of party groups and specialised groups, see:
J. Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups and the European Parliament, 
Saxon House (1975).
29. For the exact distribution of seats between political groups of
the European Parliament since direct elections, see:
M. Palmer, The European Parliament: what it is, what it 
does, how it works, Pergamon Press (1981).
30. See M. Steed, 'The European Parliament and the Significance of
direct elections'. Government and Opposition (1977).
31. See M. Palmer, ibid, p. 23.
32. Since Greek membership of the EEC the number of MEPs-has
increased to 434 (with 24 Greeks taking their seats.)
51
33. Appendix B: R. Jackson and J. Fitzmaurice, The European
Parliament: a guide to direct elections, Penguin (1979).
34. Quoted in D. Marquand, Parliament for Europe, Cape (1979),
p. 78.
35. Quoted in V. Herman and J. Lodge, The European Parliament and
the European Community, Saxon House (1978), p. 75.
36. Ibid, p. 78.
37. For a Community publication providing details of the Budget,
see: Purse Strings of Europe, Secretariat of the Parlia­
ment's Committee on Budgets, Information Office of the 
European Parliament (1979).
38. O.J. L2, 2nd January 1971.
39. Initially, the system of financing Community expenditure was by
national contributions. This has been replaced progress­
ively since 1970 by a system of self-financing, known as 
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provided by the common external tariff and from levies on 
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1%) of VAT. To simplify the calculation of the Community 
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ating rates of exchange between member states. Hence 'the 
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APPENDIX 2.1
The main stages of the budgetary procedure
1. In the early months of the calendar year a preliminary
draft budget for the next year is drawn up by the Commission 
on the basis of estimates made by the different institutions.
2. There is an initial discussion in April by the Council of
Ministers (Foreign and Finance) on the strategy for next year 
with a paper from the Commission. Also around this time the 
Parliament's Committee on Budgets names its rapporteur on the 
budget who is responsible for coordinating Parliament's work 
on the budget.
3. During the spring the Commission establishes the 'maximum
rate' and informs the other institutions. Thus it is the rate 
at which 'non-compulsory' expenditure can be increased. This 
is worked out from consideration of matters such as increases 
in national budgets and in the cost of living and trends in the 
Community G.D.P.
4. The preliminary draft budget is sent by the Commission to
the Parliament in June and Parliament holds a debate on guide­
lines for the budget in July.
5. The Commission sends the same draft to the Council in June,
and the Council starts to draw up the draft budget itself.
6. Before the draft budget is finalised by the Budget Council,
a meeting is held with a Parliamentary delegation, led by its 
President and composed of members of its Committee oh Budgets.
7. Before the end of August, the Council sends the draft
budget to Parliament, whose rapporteur and Committee on Budgets 
start work on the preparation of draft amendments.
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8. After several meetings of the committee, the rapporteur
tables 'preliminary draft amendments'. Parliament's other 
Committees examine their part of the draft budget and table 
their own amendments.
9. In October, the Committee on Budgets considers amendments
that have been tabled. The Budget Minister of the country
holding the Council chair and the Budget Commissioner attend 
this meeting. Also in October Parliament holds the 'first 
reading' of the budget and votes on amendments and modifications. 
For amendments to items of compulsory expenditure to be adopted
a majority of those voting is required. For non-compulsory 
items, an amendment needs a majority of all Parliament's members 
for adoption.
10. In November, the Budget Council starts its second exam­
ination of the Budget. Council's Budgetary Committee and 
COREPER study Parliament's amendments. Around 20th November the 
Budget Council meets Parliament's delegation for an exchange
of views and then the Council takes its final decision on the 
budget. Where Parliament's modification of a compulsory item 
suggests a decrease or no increase in expenditure, the Council 
can only reject or alter the change by a qualified majority vote 
Where Parliament's amendments to compulsory expenditure aim at 
increasing expenditure the Council can only agree to them by a 
qualified majority vote. Where Parliament has amended non- 
compulsory expenditure (upwards or downwards) the Council 
requires a qualified majority to reject or change these amend­
ments. After taking its decisions on Parliament's amendments 
the Council sends the amended budget back to Parliament.
11. At the end of November and in early December meetings are
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held between the Committee on Budgets and other Committees of 
Parliament to consider Council's decisions and to decide whether 
to re-table amendments to non-compulsory expenditure. Parlia­
ment's delegation and the Budget Council meet now to try to 
reach agreement on as many of the remaining problems as possible 
(the concertation procedure), particularly on any proposals to 
exceed the maximum rate. (These require the joint agreement of 
Parliament and Council.)
Parliament's 'second reading' of the budget takes place in 
the December session. After the Committee on Budgets has adop­
ted its final report a major plenary debate is held where the 
President of the Council and the Parliament's rapporteur defend 
their respective positions. The vote on amendments concerns 
only items of non-compulsory expenditure. Parliament cannot 
make further changes to compulsory expenditure. Parliament 
can amend the changes made by Council for non-obligatory expen­
diture by a vote of a majority of all its members and three- 
fifths of the votes cast.
The Parliament finally adopts the budget by giving 'the 
last word' on the whole of the Community budget.
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CHAPTER THREE : THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE E.R.D.F.
1. Treaty Framework
The authors of the Treaties of Rome recognised the evident dis­
parities between the regions of the Community of six (the regional 
GDP in Hamburg was five times greater in 1958 than in Calabria). 
Indeed economists such as Herbert Giersch^ and Maurice Byé argued 
that by reason of agglomeration economies, the abolition of restric­
tions on trade and factor movements would strengthen the attractive­
ness of highly industrialised centres for both labour and capital.
Similar views found expression in the publications of the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Europe. Using Italian unification as an 
example, the Commission argued that 'in the absence of positive
intervention .. disparities in income levels, once established, have
2a vicious tendency to become more pronounced'. With regard to 
European integration plans the ECE concluded that: '... this is 
tantamount to saying that the gap between levels of development in 
the high income and low income areas of Europe would continue to 
widen which could hardly be regarded as an achievement in economic
3integration'.
However, the Treaty of Rome contained no chapter or title of 
specific relevance to regional policy, though several articles had 
regional implications. It was assumed that the national regional 
policies in operation in the member states combined with the benefits 
which would accrue from the larger markets and the increased competi­
tion of the EEC, would ease the problem of these disparities, to the 
benefit of all areas.
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Thus the preamble of the Treaty of Rome spoke of the need:
to strengthen the unity of their (the member 
states') economies and to ensure their harmonious 
development by reducing the differences existing 
between the various regions and the backwardness 
of the less-favoured regions.
Nevertheless, it was not made clear whether the reduction of existing
regional disparities was to be achieved by national or Community
action or a combination of both.
Moreover, Article Two of the Rome Treaty spelled out the broad 
aims of the EEC, but was, however, worded much more vaguely than the 
preamble:
The Community shall have as its task, by setting up 
a Common Market and progressively approximating the 
economic policies of member states, to promote 
throughout the Community an harmonious development 
of economic activities, a continued and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living and closer rela­
tions between the member states belonging to it.
Article Three listed specifically future policies to be developed 
by the Community (various Common policies, the establishment of 
external tariffs etc.) but made no reference to regional policy.
Several provisions in the Treaty of Rome allowed for the possible 
modification of policies to take account of regional problems, the 
most important being Article 39(2), which stated that the CAP must 
have regard to 'structural and national disparities between the various 
agricultural regions'; Article 49(1) concerned with the free movement 
of labour, which called for machinery to supply information about job 
opportunities and thus to avoid threats to living standards and 
employment in various regions, and Article 80(2) which provided for 
the possibility of allowing support tariffs on the grounds of regional 
economic policy.
A general aim of the EEC is the removal of subsidies and restric­
tions of various kinds which distort or threaten to distort competition
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between member states, thus adversely affecting trade between these 
countries. Article 92 of the Rome Treaty, however, allowed exceptions 
under certain circumstances, namely, 'aids intended to promote the 
economic development of regions where the standard of living is 
abnormally low, or where there exists serious underemployment'. Also,
'... aids intended to facilitate the development of certain activities 
or of certain economic regions, provided that such aids do not change 
trading conditions to such a degree as would be contrary to the 
Community interest'.
The regional significance of several sources of finance provided 
for in the Treaties of Paris and Rome will be assessed in Chapter 
nine of this study; these include the operations of the European 
Investment Bank and the New Community Instrument, financial assistance 
for the adaptation and conversion of areas included in the operations 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, the activities of the 
European Social Fund and the Guidance Section of F.E.O.G.A. The 
implications of the Community's competition policy for the less 
developed regions will also be discussed in Chapter nine.
2. Early Community views on regional policy
Despite the absence of a specific mandate for the development of 
a European regional policy in the Treaty of Rome, the European 
Commission claimed in 1962 that an active regional policy was necessary
4for the EEC to achieve the tasks laid down by the Treaties of Rome.
In 1959, in its second general report, the Commission had announced 
a programme of study to provide guidelines for the Community's respon­
sibility for regional action to cover:
(i) the study and analysis of economic regions in the light 
of the need for long-term harmonisation of economic
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levels and more particularly to define priority 
areas for more detailed study;
(ii) analysis of regional policies in member states so 
as to permit the Commission to study their com- 
patability with the Treaty and to suggest any 
corrective measures with a view to outlining a 
Community policy relating to regional matters.
In 1960 the European Parliament called for a common regional 
policy^ in which the respective responsibilities of the member states 
and the Community would be set out. The Report argued that harmoni­
sation of the member states' regional policies should be regarded as 
implicit in the Treaty obligations to coordinate their economic 
policies. The European Parliament thus requested that the Commission 
actively continue its inquiries into the regional structures of the 
Community.
A direct outcome of this request was the Conference on Regional 
Economies in December 1961, a conference of experts convened, by the 
Commission in Brussels. At the conference. Commissioner Robert 
Marjolin^ made a speech in which he stated that regional policy repre­
sented an ever-growing aspect of economic policy. This demanded that 
economic policy should take account of the regional perspective in 
the aim of establishing a balance between backward regions and areas 
of prosperous urban concentration. In this way the full economic 
potential of backward areas would be achieved, thereby releasing 
zones of concentration from inflationary pressure.
The conference recognised four main divisions in the Community 
economy :
(i) underdeveloped (mainly agricultural regions)
(ii) regions of basic industry in decline
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(iii) prosperous urban concentrations
(iv) frontier regions.
The Community's problem was seen to be the imbalance between the 
'golden triangle' made up of the Rhine-Rhône-Ruhr axis and the under­
developed periphery. Marjolin accepted that the role of the Community 
institutions was ancillary to that of the member states but stressed 
that there were important tasks of harmonisation to be carried out at 
the Community level.
In the 'Action Programme for the Second Stage of Integration', 
published in October 1962, the Commission emphasised the need for an
7active regional policy and the Birkelbach Report of December 1963 
stressed that unless regional disparities were reduced the idea of 
economic and political union in Europe would have no permanence.
Thus the role of regional policy was beginning to be seen as a deter­
mining factor in the general orientation of social and economic 
policies for the whole Community.
By 1965, the Commission submitted its first Comprehensive
gMemorandum on Regional Policy. Unfortunately the timing of the sub­
mission, coming as it did a few weeks before the Luxembourg Crisis 
(when the French refused to participate in Council of Ministers 
sessions for several months) meant that little was done by the Community 
institutions about the Memorandum, although the European Parliament
considered a full critique of the document in the form of the Bersani 
gReport in 1966, which largely agreed with the Memorandum but stressed 
the difficulties of formulating and coordinating regional programmes.
The Council of Ministers merely noted the Memorandum.
The Memorandum aimed to bring about agreement within the Community 
on the objectives and methods of regional policy and to coordinate 
the means of action of the member states. It stressed the need to
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promote agricultural and industrial regions suffering from structural 
difficulties and to reduce the disparities between those regions and 
the zones of industrial and urban concentration. The case of regional 
programmes for each 'ensemble socio-économique cohérent' was pressed 
on the grounds that such programmes would set out a coherent analysis 
of the economic structures of regions while promoting the necessary 
coordination of public interventions having regional effects. The 
division of the Community territory into backward areas, industrial 
areas in decline, frontier regions and congested areas was accepted 
as the basis for future action.
Finally, the Memorandum proposed that the institutions responsible 
for medium-term economic policy programmes should incorporate regional 
policy into their work.
In 1967, following the merger^^ of the executives of the three 
European Communities, the EEC, ECSC and Euratom, into one European 
Commission, a Directorate General with responsibility for regional 
policy was established headed by Commissioner Hans von der Groeben. 
Hitherto regional policy matters had been dealt with by one small divi­
sion of the EEC Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs.
In May 1968, Jean Key, President of the European Commission, 
addressed the European Parliament on the new impetus which the merger 
of the executives had provided to certain essential sectors of community 
policy:
La politique régionale doit être dans la Communauté 
ce que le coeur est dans 1'organisme humain. De 
même que le coeur pompe le sang dans toutes les parties 
du corps, de même la politique régionale doit aboutir
à ranimer la vie économique dans les régions qui en
sont trop dépourvues.
Eey saw the development of a Community regional policy as a sine qua
non of the Community's successful technical adaptation and international
competitiveness.
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In a speech also made to the European Parliament, in May 1969,
Hans von der Groeben stressed that competition and coordination alone 
were insufficient to ensure the development of the Common Market:
'... we have to recognise that the structural differences in our 
member states not only work to the detriment of the whole and the 
individual, but threaten the very development of the Common Market'. 
Therefore, he saw the establishment of a common structural and regional 
policy as essential to the Community's progress towards further integ­
ration and eventual economic union.
In a memorandum on Regional Policy in the Community in 1969^^ 
the Commission reiterated the four different types of regional problem 
which it had specified in the early 1960s and stressed once again the 
need to reduce regional disparities in order to progress towards 
economic and political union.
It was proposed that the Commission should carry out a regular 
examination with each member state of the situation of the problem 
regions and be empowered to issue non-binding opinions and recommenda­
tions to the member states. Moreover, the Commission proposed the 
coordinated use of the instruments at the disposal of the Community 
by virtue of the Treaties, the setting up of a Regional Development Rebate 
Fund to be managed by the Commission and replenished by budget contri­
butions and the establishment of a Regional Development Committee in 
order to facilitate the achievement of converging regional policy 
solutions. Also in 1969, the Hague Summit meeting in early December 
issued a communique accepting the principle of economic and monetary
V
union by 1980. This was a subject which was irrevocably linked with 
the question of regional disparities.
12In 1971 the Commission published a document in which it assessed 
the population trends, the employment trends and the income levels in
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the Community regions, in support of its demands for the establish­
ment of a Community financial mechanism specifically to aid the
regional problem. The European Parliament gave its unanimous support
13to the Commission's regional policy proposals on 16th March 1972 as 
did ECOSOC. Moreover, in answer to the Commission's repeated requests, 
the Council of Ministers passed a resolution on 21st March 1972 in 
which it undertook to come to some decision by 1st October 1972 on 
the regional policy issue. The Commission was directed to review and:
'choose between the mechanisms already advocated for regional develop-
14ment, or to advance new proposals'. By 21st June the Commission had 
reiterated its support for the 1969 and 1971 proposals as they were 
considered to be '... interconnected and therefore form a coherent 
whole'.However, French opposition to such proposals was voiced 
because of their fear of the Commission gaining any initiative in this 
area,^^ lest it provide them with a political tool for guiding and 
coordinating national regional policies. (The French favoured a con­
centration on the European Investment Bank as a purely financial and 
technical organisation.) Due to the above difficulties and because of 
the impending enlargement of the EEC to include UK, Ireland and Denmark, 
which would imply a new dimension for the regional problem, no concrete 
decision was made before the Paris Summit meeting of 19th-21st 
October 1972. Indeed, it was the Enlargement of the Community along 
with the political imperatives of Economic and Monetary Union which 
provided the impetus for progress towards the establishment of a 
Regional Development Fund. Despite the establishment of a Directorate 
General responsible specifically for regional policy matters and the 
statistics, surveys and memoranda produced by the Commission during 
the Sixties and early Seventies, no concrete advances had been made 
as a direct result of Commission initiatives.
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3. The Paris Summit and the Preparation of the Thomson Report
The Paris Summit's final declaration contained a paragraph giving
17cause for optimism in the regional policy area: 'The heads of state
or of government agree that a high priority should be given to the aim 
of correcting in the Community, the structural and regional imbalances 
which might affect the realisation of EMU'. The final Communique 
directed that the nine member states '... undertake to coodinate their 
individual regional policies and invited .... the Community institu­
tions to create a Regional Development Fund before the 31st December 
1973'.
The Commission was entrusted with the elaboration of an analysis 
of the situation of regional structures in the Community and with 
drawing up specific proposals.
With the Enlargement of the Community in 1973, the European 
Commission was re-shaped and the new Commission of thirteen established 
with the Briton George Thomson in charge of DG XVI - the Directorate 
General with the regional policy portfolio - taking over from Hans von 
der Groeben. His first task was to adhere to the Paris Summit charge 
'... to prepare without delay a report analysing the regional problems
which arise in the enlarged Community, and to put forward appropriate
1 , 18 proposals ' .
Thomson began a stock-taking operation of previous Commission 
proposals and visited the nine member state capitals to test the cli­
mate of opinion on the regional fund issue. At the same time he con­
tinually expressed the view that regional policy was crucial for the 
success of the Community as a whole and inter alia for the success of 
EMU.
The preliminary draft of the Thomson Report contained an analytical 
report of regional structures and imbalances in the EEC. Additionally,
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it contained guidelines for the Regional Development Fund and for the 
Permanent Committee for Regional Development which had been proposed 
in the 1969 memorandum (one of whose main tasks would be the coordina­
tion of regional policy). However, not all Commission members were 
happy with the eligibility criteria selected for the Regional Develop­
ment Fund in Thomson's draft based on: unemployment rates, migration
balances and per capita income levels.
No mention was made in the draft of a fixed sum for the Fund - 
the wording simply implied that the Fund would have to be large enough 
to complete the terms fixed by the Paris Summit. Moreover, the 
Commission viewed the coordination of member state regional policies 
(also advocated by the Paris Summit) to be at least as important as 
the other half of the proposals.
The final version of the Thomson Report on the regional problems
19in the Enlarged Community was presented to COREPER on 3rd May 1973.
It was a voluminous document of some 289 pages but most of the docu­
mentation was contained in its annexes which comprised three chapters.
4. The Thomson Report
Chapter one of the Report emphasised data on general demographic
considerations, the working population and regional product and
income ; Chapter two gave an explanation of the 'degree and character
20of the principal forms of disequilibria ...' and Chapter three was 
a review of the regional policies in member states. The main text of 
the report was only eighteen pages long: there was an introduction
where considerable praise was heaped on the Community's economic 
accomplishments to date including a 5.4% average annual increase in 
the GNP during the decade 1960-70. However, it was stressed that there 
had been relatively little change in the per capita income situation
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based on regional location. The wealthy regions remained some five
times as rich per person compared with those in the poorest regions.
Three types of argument for a Community regional policy were
forwarded in the Report, based on moral, environmental and economic
grounds. The moral argument was that a Community regional policy
would demonstrate a 'common will' to assist those in relatively
'poor' regions. The environmental arg^uments were based on the fact
that the 'physical poverty of the underprivileged regions (was)
matched only by the mounting environmental poverty of the areas of 
21concentration'. Finally the economic arguments were backed up by
the fact that the areas suffering from regional imbalances were in
need of reconstruction and réutilisation so as '... to enable them to
22put themselves on a footing of more equal competitiveness'.
According to Thomson the key characteristics of the regional
imbalance were an inefficient agriculture or declining industries, a
concomitant structural underemployment or unemployment, a slow rate
of economic growth and an unsatisfactory social infrastructure.
On the basis of the analysis made in the Report, the Commission
23stated its intentions to use the following guidelines as a basis for 
its specific proposals on regional policy:
(1) Community regional policy cannot be a substitute for national 
regional policies which member states have been conducting 
for many years. It must complement them with the aim of 
reducing the main disparities across the Community.
(2) Since overconcentration of economic activity in some regions 
is a major social and economic problem ... the Community as 
well as giving aid to the poorer regions, should seek ... to 
reduce concentration in the congested regions.
(3) If Community regional policy is to be successful it requires
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not only new incentives and disincentives but coordina­
tion of the various common policies and financial instru­
ments which exist at Community level with a view to their 
improved utilisation for regional objectives.
(4) It will also be essential to achieve the real coordination 
of national regional policies to which the summit confer­
ence pledged the Community. In order to facilitate this 
coordination, a Community Regional Development Committee 
should be set up.
(5) In the context of these guidelines, the proposals which the 
Commission will present at the end of June this year will 
concern mainly the Regional Development Fund and the 
Regional Development Committee to be set up by 31st December 
1973. The Commission maintains its proposal to the Council 
on the use of part of the FEOGA Guidance Section for the 
creation of industrial employment in agricultural priority 
areas. Furthermore the Commission also intends to give full 
consideration over the coming months to other useful regional 
policy instruments which have earlier been suggested such as 
the establishment of a regional development company and a 
European guarantee system for loans.
(6) The principal vehicle for mobilising Community resources as 
a complement to actions presently carried out in the member 
states should be the RDF ...
(7) The RDF must be of sufficient size to contribute effectively 
to meeting the target set by the Heads of State or of Govern­
ment ... The Commission will make its proposals to the Council 
about the size of the Fund at the appropriate time.
(3) The Fund will have to concentrate its expenditure very largely
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in those regions which are the most in need in relation • 
to the Community as a whole ... quite independent of any 
criterion of juste retour.
(9) ... a desirable flexibility in the use of the resources
of the Fund should be introduced by retaining a propor­
tion of them for financing of regional plans or projects 
by the Community concerning for example particularly 
intractable regional problems or transborder schemes 
involving more than one member state.
5. The Drafting of Specific Proposals
The major debate in the Council of Ministers would naturally follow 
the drafting of specific proposals by the Commission and it was recog­
nised that the core of the dispute would centre on the size and dis­
tribution of the ERDF along with the connected issue of the eligibility 
criteria.
The basic problem for Thomson was not to frighten the Germans
(the key financiers of the ERDF) by proposing too large a Fund. In
addition, he had to be careful not to antagonise the French by proposing 
an administrative structure with such powers as would excessively aug­
ment the Commission's authority. And finally Thomson would have to
moderate the enthusiasm of the British, Irish and Italians for a Fund
of a size likely to alleviate some of the more serious regional problems. 
The European Parliament was persistently (although not unanimously
backing the Commission) insisting that the Commission and the Council
24adhere to the deadlines set by the Paris Summit.
After much discussion in the college of Commissioners, revolving 
mainly around the size and eligibility criteria of the ERDF, and 
following a lengthy meeting, there was agreement on a series of texts
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on the 25th July 1973. These corresponded to the mandate of the 
25Paris Summit.
The size of the Fund suggested was 2.25 mua for three years - 
(500 mill, ua 1974, 750 mill, ua 1975 and 1000 mill, ua 1976 - plus 
150 mill, ua on the basis of a formal proposal retaken up by the 
Commission from the FEOGA Guidance Section for the financing of 
regional development projects in priority agricultural regions). The 
operations envisaged were of a community nature, linked with Community 
objectives and the idea of 'juste retour' was rejected. The general 
aim was to eliminate the most serious regional imbalances which were 
holding back the attainment of E.M.U.
The Commission opposed a system of national quotas for the Fund's 
distribution and they decided that the Fund should not be used in 
areas where the average income per person exceeded the average income 
for the whole Community. Moreover it should not be used in areas not 
already receiving domestic regional aid.
The Commission proposed that with respect to the seriousness of 
regional imbalances the following factors should be considered: in
priority agricultural regions considerable dependence on agricultural 
labour was taken as a yardstick, in declining industrial areas the 
dependence of employment on old industries was to be taken into account 
and in areas suffering from structural unemployment, the high rate of 
depopulation, the high rate of unemployment and low income were to be 
considered.
Once the eligible regions had been determined according to these 
indicators, the Fund would be allocated on the basis of the population 
in these eligible regions and 'national entitlements' would be cal­
culated.
The Commission proposed that once the 'objective indicators' had
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been adopted by the Council they would, by the Autumn, present in a 
draft, complementary regulation, a list of regions in the enlarged 
Community which would be eligible for assistance from the Fund.
6. Discussions and Problems Surrounding the Fund's Establishment
Following the publication of specific proposals, attempts were
made at forming a common front between the potential main recipients
from the Fund: UK, Italy and Ireland. It was going to be necessary
to establish an alliance to counter opposition in the Council of
Ministers and there were bilateral meetings between the Ministers of
26the three countries during September 1973.
The Council of Ministers' Economics questions working group began
examining the draft regulation and decision on 14th September 1973 and
thus began the most difficult part of the negotiations. Due to the
secrecy surrounding such negotiations and the closed nature of meetings
it is impossible to provide details of the deliberations. However, by
27mid-October the working group had reached the following situation:
Cl) UK, Ireland and Italy considered that the Fund should be 
larger than the Commission proposals.
(2) West Germany favoured a small Fund as did the Belgians.
(3) Several delegations were holding back concrete judgement 
on Commission proposals until they saw proposals covering 
the eligibility criteria. (These delegations included 
West Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and Luxembourg.)
(4) Luxembourg was anxious that it shouldreceive some of the 
aid.
(5) Ireland and Italy favoured a variable rate for Community 
participation (varying according to the degree of imbalance).
(6) All delegations were aware of Community regional policy
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being important for E.M.U. - Italy and Ireland considered
the elimination of regional imbalances to be a prerequisite
for EMU, whereas Denmark considered that the achivements
of EMU would contribute towards the solution of the problem .
of regional disparities.
(7) The majority of delegations accepted the principles laid
down by the Commission for the coordination of regional
policy and the complementary nature of Community action.
28On the 11th October 1973 the Commission approved and submitted 
to the Council two proposed regulations laying down:
(a) a list of regions and areas likely to benefit from FEOGA
intervention in accordance with the proposal of 12th 
December 1972 relating to the use of FEOGA Guidance Section 
in priority agricultural regions;
Cb) a list of regions and areas likely to benefit from the ERDF.
This list did not reflect the serious degree of regional
imbalance which the Fund was supposed to eliminate; it 
consisted of a maximum list of an area covering a good one- 
third of the Community's population (all the UK's Special 
Development Areas, Development Areas and Intermediate Areas:
55% of UK area).
Thomson considered it important to have a nine-nation Fund. He
considered that the German idea for a small concentrated Fund would be
damaging to the creation of a real Community whereas a nine-nation
ERDF would allow the mobilisation of opinion in all the member states.
ECOSOC and the European Parliament both called, in October and
29November 1973, for the concentration of the Fund's resources. More­
over, at subsequent Council meetings in 1973 the Irish and Italian
30delegations called for special attention and for a two-tier Fund.
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The UK however considered it to be vital to establish a Fund before 
every last detail was settled, but at the Council meeting of 4th 
December 1973 they formally proposed 3000 mill. u.a. (£1,250 mill.) 
for the first three years. No agreements were forthcoming at this 
meeting nor at the Council sessions of 17th and 18th December following 
the Copenhagen Summit, because the positions of the member states in 
the Council remained diffuse and conflicting, particularly with regard 
to the proposed size of the Fund and whether it should be concentrated 
or widely dispersed in the Community regions.
The Summit itself (14th, 15th December 1973) was dominated by the
OPEC boycott of oil shipments to the Dutch and the decrease of oil
exports to the other eight member states. Additionally, five Arab oil
Ministers descended 'without formal invitation' on the meeting and
asked to be heard (it was rumoured that Jobert, the French foreign
31minister, invited them ). Consequently, the regional policy debate 
was overshadowed.
Nevertheless the communique from the.Summit confirmed an agreement 
that a Fund 'should' be set up on 1st January 1974 and stated that 
'Heads of State would recommend to their Foreign Ministers that the 
Council should take the necessary decisions for doing so at the next 
meeting in Brussels the following week'.
Thus there was total deadlock in the Council of Ministers on the 
17th December and it was decided to 'stop the clock' and draw up the 
Community timetable in the hope of a solution being found by the 7th 
January at the latest. The UK proposal for 3000 mill, ua (£1,250 mill.) 
was backed by the Italians and the Irish, whereas the West Germans 
proposed 600 mill, ua (£250 mill.) for three years (adding two sets 
of 150 mill, ua for hill-farming) and a concentration of aid on UK, 
Ireland and Italy. There was some support for the German proposal
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from the Benelux but it was rejected, not surprisingly, by the UK, 
Ireland and Italy because of its small size.
1974 was a year of further obstacles largely external to the
EEC:
(1) The Washington Energy Conference demonstrated the lack of
unity amongst EEC member states: the French favoured an
effort to confer and hopefully conciliate and cooperate
with the oil-producing states and to formulate a 'European
stance' vis à vis the Arabs. Indeed, they were largely
supported by the other EEC members at an EEC foreign
32ministers' meeting on 5th February 1974.
However, this apparent unity dissolved at the Washington
33Energy Conference. The Germans, supported by the 
Benelux and Denmark, now adopted a position of support 
for cooperation with the United States and for the 
establishment of an International Energy Agency. These 
polarised opinions of the French on the one hand and the 
Germans, Benelux and Danes on the other, led to complete 
disunity at the Conference.
(2) The two British General Elections in 1974, in February and 
October, and the subsequent renegotiation issue, diverted 
UK and indeed European attention away from issues such as 
the Regional Fund. The Labour government was brought to 
power with a mandate and commitment to renegotiate the 
terms of British membership of the European Community. The 
Labour Party did not share the Conservatives' enthusiasm 
for the ERDF as a financial recompense for UK contributions 
to the CAP.^^ It was far more concerned with securing major 
concessions on the whole Budget and with guarding against
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any Community interference with UK sovereignty and 
domestic economic management. Thus the ERDF discussions 
lost a major backer, leaving the Irish and Italians to 
battle alone for the Fund's establishment.
(3) In May 1974 Giscard d'Estaing was elected President of 
France following the death of Georges Pompidou, and 
Schmidt became Chancellor of West Germany in the same 
month following Willy Brandt's resignation as a result 
of a spy scandal. The tougher attitude which Schmidt 
adopted towards the EEC coincided with the period of 
erosion of the myth of the 'guilt complex' which meant 
that West German ministers became tougher bargaining 
partners in Community discussions.
At a meeting of the full Council of Ministers on 14th January 1974
there was still no agreement and a special ministerial meeting was
fixed for 30th January, to be solely devoted to the Regional Fund.
However, there were signs that more flexibility was being shown in the
Council. For example. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the UK Foreign Minister,
was reported to have acknowledged that the Commission's proposal rep-
35resented a 'substantial' starting point (2,400 mill, ua) - in other 
words, he put aside the original UK idea of a Fund of 3,000 mill, ua - 
and the Germans did not repeat a figure of 600 mill, ua for three years 
At the 30th January meeting, the Germans proposed to double their 
contribution to the Fund which would enable a Fund worth 1,250 mill, 
ua (1,400 mill, ua with guidance section money). There was French 
opposition to this because they would be net debtors (200 mill, ua 
over three years) to the Fund (c.f. under the original Commission pro­
posal they would have had a zero balance). Thus the French reverted 
to supporting the original Commission proposal.
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The Commission began drawing up a draft solution somewhere 
between its original proposal and the compromise suggested by the 
Germans. The next full Council session of 18th February was can­
celled because of the UK election and following the full Council 
meeting of 4th March (where no progress was made) the regional Fund 
issue was pushed into the background by the renegotiation issue which 
paralysed any hope of progress. By October 1974 there had been no 
further progress and in the build up to the Paris Summit (9th-10th 
December 1974) the Italians and the Irish issued an ultimatum to the 
other member states, in November 1974, to the tune that if an agreement 
on the Regional Fund was not promised at the Summit meeting then 
there would be no Summit at all.
It became apparent that the size of the Fund or its duration were 
not the subject of much argument. The most controversial issue was 
still that of the Fund’s distribution and the eligibility criteria.
At the full Council meeting of 3rd December 1974, there was a 
general consensus that a reasonable certainty should be in evidence 
for agreement on the Regional Fund before the Summit began.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West Germany’s Foreign Minister, favoured 
the Commission proposal for making the Fund operational from 1st 
January 1975 for an experimental period of three years and involving 
around 1,400 mill. ua.
There would be three net beneficiary states: UK, Italy and Ireland,
and six net deficit countries with the possibility of regions in the 
latter states being eligible for aid. Additionally, the Commission's 
proposals for allocating Fund aid according to entitlements calculated 
by its 'objective indicators' should be substituted by a system of 
fixed national quotas.
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7. The Final Agreement
It was the Heads of State and Government meeting at the Paris 
Summit of 9th-10th December 1974 who worked out the final agreement 
on the European Regional Development Fund. It was agreed to set up 
a Fund of 1,300 million ua for three years (1975-77); 300 million for 
1975, 500 million for both 1976 and 1977, and of the 1,300 million ua 
150 million ua was to be financed from FEOGA*s Guidance Section. The 











Ireland was allotted an additional 6 million ua to be subtracted 
from the other member states except Italy. According to the communique, 
the Fund was '... designed to correct the principal regional imbalances 
in the Community resulting notably from agricultural predominance, 
industrial change and structural underemployment'.
Nevertheless, agreement on the implementing regulations proved 
to be less than a foregone conclusion. There were three drafts sub­
mitted to the Council:
(1) regulation for the ERDF;
(2) particular provisions to be introduced in the financial 
regulations of the Communities for the ERDF;
(3) the decision to set up the Regional Policy Committee.
One problem concerned the wording 'experimental' nature which was
37used to describe the Fund's status in the draft Regulations: Italy
and Ireland insisted that this did not refer to the existence of the
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Fund itself but to the method by which it functioned. On the other
hand, the French insisted that the Fund itself was experimental.
38There was also a problem concerning the British objection to
the section in the draft Regulation which ruled that EEC aids should
either help to maintain present jobs or create ten more new ones.
The UE raised an objection because this particular link did not exist
in national regional policy in the UE.
However, the major difficulty for the Commission had much wider
implications for EEC decision-making in general and surrounded the
budgetary powers of the European Parliament: Parliament claimed that
the ERDF should be categorised as 'non-obligatory* expenditure as
opposed to 'obligatory' since it did not emanate from within the
Treaty of Rome mandate. Classification under the non-obligatory
heading would mean that the European Parliament would have the last
say on the budgetary allocation, and discussions on this point were
to prove significant in future debates on the ERDF's renewal (see
Chapter 8). Nevertheless, despite disagreement at this stage, the
European Parliament did not want to hold up the establishment of the
ERDF and having opened up conciliation procedures with the Council
over the budgetary powers it raised no objection to the Commission's
texts at its March 1975 session.
Therefore the Council of Ministers was able to agree on the three
implementing regulations at its session on 3rd and 4th March and these
39were formally adopted on 18th March 1975.
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CHAPTER FOUR ; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE E.R.Q.f: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE DEBATE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
1. Introduction
This chapter aims to analyse the debate which led to the estab­
lishment of the European Regional Development Fund, as described in 
Chapter Three. The tactics and stances of the Commission and the 
member states during discussions on the Fund issue will be assessed 
against claims that intergovernmentalist attitudes and agreement now 
dominate Community decision-making. In addition, attention will be 
focussed upon the importance of events external to the immediate 
issue under discussion. Finally the rôle and influence of the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and other 
European pressure groups on the fringe of the decision-making process 
will be considered.
2. Background
Commission documents and proposals^ in favour of the establish­
ment of a financial instrument, designed specifically to assist member 
states with their domestic regional policies, had experienced no con­
crete success during the 1960s and early 1970s. The Council had 
failed to agree upon the principles, let alone the details, of a 
regional fund, no specific mandate having been provided for the estab­
lishment of such a mechanism by the Treaty of Rome.
Therefore, it was not surprising, given the aim of Economic and 
Monetary Union by 1930, and with British and Irish accession providing 
increased pressure amongst the member states, that the move which 
finally set the wheels in motion for the setting up of the European 
Regional Development Fund, was provided by the Heads of State and
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Government at the Paris Summit meeting of October 1972, whose final 
2communiqué instructed the Commission to take the necessary steps to 
create a Regional Development Fund before 31st December 1973. It 
was decreed that the Commission should carry out an analysis of the 
situation of regional structures in the Community (which was pro­
duced by the Commission in the form of the Thomson Report in 1973) 
and then draw up proposals for the establishment of the R.D.F.
3. Commission Tactics
The responsibility for preparing this analysis of the regional
3problems of the enlarged Community fell upon George Thomson,
Commissioner at the helm of DG XVI.
Thomson toured the nine capitals during the preparation of his
report, to hear as many views as possible on the issue, and he and his
director-general, Renato Ruggiero, also received deputations in 
4Brussels. Furthermore, consultations were held with European organi­
sations such as the Standing Conference of the Community's Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, the European Parliament's Committee of 
Regional Policy and Transport, and the European Trade Union and 
Employers’ Organisations.
The College of Commissioners made a first reading of the Thomson 
Report on 11th April 1973;^ there was a general acceptance of its 
statements of principles and aims, but disagreements did arise over 
the criteria to be used in the determination of eligibility for 
funding regional projects.^ However, on 3rd May 1973, the Commission
7approved the Thomson Report,
From the outset Thomson had realised, when drawing up his Report, 
that because financial contributions on the part of the member states 
would be at stake, along with increased Community activity and
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influence on the running of member state economies, tht, debate on 
the establishment of the Regional Development Fund would be elevated 
into the realms of 'high politics', despite the supposedly economic, 
technical and thus non-controversial issues at stake. Therefore 
Thomson was aware that the size of the Fund, its distribution and
eligibility criteria, would be key issues in the debate.
The Thomson Report however, as published in May 1973, contained 
no specific proposals; it merely stated that the Fund would need to 
be of sufficient size to contribute effectively to meeting the target 
set by Heads of State and Government. In addition, there were vague 
statements of the necessity of concentrating the Fund's resources in
the regions most in need in the Community as a whole.
Thomson made no pretence that Community regional policy would be 
a substitute for national policies; it was merely to act to comple­
ment them. The implication was, therefore, that the European Regional 
Fund would be nothing more than an additional bonus to member states; 
there were no aspirations, on the part of the Commission, to take over 
the running of national regional policy.
In the period between the publication of the Thomson Report in 
May 1973 and the submission by the Commission to the Council of 
Ministers of specific proposals appertaining to the Regional Fund on 
25th July 1973, Thomson continued his efforts to cultivate support 
for Community regional policy. On 4th July the European Parliament
9debated an 'interim report' produced by its Committee on Regional 
Policy and Transport. The report was based largely on an evaluation 
of the Thomson Report. Despite criticism being raised during the 
debate over the Commission's failure to understand the importance of 
the rôle of infrastructure in regional development, the vote was 
unanimously in favour of the Thomson Report, though the Italian
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Communist delegation abstained.
Thomson developed further contacts in the national capitals and 
consulted with UNICE and representatives of the Community trade 
unions. There was continued positive support from these channels 
for Thomson's policy.Moreover, in July 1973, the Permanent Confer­
ence of the Community's Chambers of Trade and Industry stressed its 
continued support for a Community regional policy.
It was also vital for Thomson to gain the support of the 
'college' of Commissioners for Commission specific proposals on
12regional policy; differences of opinion within the 'college' centred
around the issues of eligibility criteria, the principle of juste
retour for the Regional Development Fund (a system whereby member
states would receive an amount of money from the Fund equal to the sum
contributed by them) and the size of the Fund. Nevertheless, following
13a marathon session of Commissioners, when the 'college' was in session
from 9.00 a.m., 25th July 1973, until 4.00 a.m. the following morning,
unanimous agreement was reached on specific proposals concerning the
size of the Regional Fund, the eligibility criteria and the Committee
for Regional Policy, whose functions were to include overseeing the
14policy implications of the administration of the Fund.
Thus, during the drafting of the specific proposals for setting 
up a European Regional Development Fund, Thomson had adopted tactics 
and faced constraints common to those inherent in many Commission 
decisions: firstly he had pursued a policy of openness to opinions
from many quarters, in an attempt to mediate between differing points 
of view and to compromise disagreements. In this respect Thomson 
attempted to present proposals to the representatives of the member 
states, in the Council of Ministers, which incorporated the ideas of 
organisations and bodies based both at the European level in Brussels
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and at the national level in the member countries themselves.
Secondly, however, Thomson realised that with financial contri­
butions and Commission involvement in domestic economic policies at 
stake, he would have to steer a cautious path between the aims and 
aspirations of the poorer member states and the reticence shown by 
potential net-paymasters, in the face of a sizeable Fund. Hence, in 
addition to adopting a Commission policy of taking account of as many 
shades of opinion as possible, Thomson had to beware of the con­
straints imposed upon his proposals by the vested interests of the 
member states.
Thus (see Chapter Three), Thomson had to provide proposals which, 
while not seeming too ambitious, did not signify a pitifully small 
Fund of no benefit to any member state. Therefore, it proved neces­
sary for him to court the alliance of three potential net-recipients 
from the Fund, namely UK, Italy and Ireland, whilst showing caution 
vis à vis the West German paymasters. At the same time, the addi­
tional constraint had to be faced of not antagonising the French by 
proposing an administrative structure for the Fund which would exces­
sively increase Commission authority towards which the French showed 
unequivocal hostility.
Hence, the situation facing Thomson represented the kind of 
position in which the Commission increasingly finds itself with regard 
to Community decisions; a situation which leads often to a watered- 
down, least common-denominator, decision after a lengthy, arduous, 
haggling process in the Council.
This Council haggling process was initiated by the submission of 
the Commission's proposals for the Regional Fund in July 1973. The 
details of these proposals were described in the previous chapter: 
these included the proposal for a Fund consisting of 2.4 billion units
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of account for three years, the rejection of the principle of juste 
retour, and equally the rejection of a national quota system of 
distribution. Additionally, the Commission proposed that the Fund 
should not intervene in areas not receiving national aid from domestic 
governments. However, it was rumoured that there had been a 'secret 
map'^^ in circulation at the Commission marathon-session on 25th 
July 1973, which specified the favoured regions and it was claimed 
that there had also been an agreement reached, whereby the Council 
could impose a national quota system for the Fund's distribution with­
out much of a fight from the Commission. Therefore, the Commission 
had laid down proposals which left much leeway for discussion but 
which provided an acceptable starting point for debate for the member 
states. The figure proposed for the Fund was larger than some member 
states would be willing to accept and the proposals were not suffici­
ently detailed to suggest that the Commission was confident of a 
smooth passage through the Cquncil. Furthermore, the gradualist 
policy adopted by Thomson, whereby no list of eligible regions was 
published, implied that the Commissioner himself preferred to win 
agreement on his proposed eligibility criteria before generating more 
conflict in the Council by producing a map of eligible areas: a
policy of building-up of a final package by hammering out agreement 
stage by stage on various aspects of the Fund.
When the map was published on 11th October 1973, it covered 52% 
of the Community's territory and included 32% of the Community popu­
lation. Thus the Fund's meagre resources were to be spread thinly 
over the Community's area with each member state having at least one 
eligible region. This Commission proposal made the aim of eliminating 
the most serious regional imbalances, which were holding back the 
attainment of Economic and Monetary Union (the aim expressed in the
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Thomson Report ), even more overambitious.
The funds requested for the RDF did not match the problem to be 
solved, especially given the proposed widespread distribution of the 
meagre resources. This suggests that the Commission was willing to 
pursue the tactic of winning stage-by-stage agreements one step fur­
ther, in that they would consider it better to establish some kind of 
fund, even if compromises had to be made, so that once the fund had 
been established the Commission would be able to set about improving 
it.
4. Member State Attitudes
The views expressed by the member state governments in the 
Council of Ministers were described in Chapter Three. The general 
positions can be divided into those who favoured a large fund, endowed 
with greater resources than those proposed by the Commission, namely 
UE, Italy and Ireland, and those who favoured a figure lower than the
17proposed 2.4 billion u.a., namely West Germany, France and Netherlands.
The above positions were further complicated by views expressed on how
the Fund's resources should be distributed. It would appear that the
balance of opinion favoured a concentration of RDF spending in a small
number of Community regions. However, the reasons for adopting this
viewpoint, as opposed to the alternative suggested by the Commission,
of a wider distribution, were diffuse: West Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands, as potential net-payers into the Fund's coffers, held the
view that, if the established eligibility criteria for the Fund were
sufficiently rigorous, then the Fund might be reduced to as little as 
18100 million u.a. for each of the three years to be covered by the 
initial agreement. On the other hand, Italy and Ireland adopted the 
'concentrationist' viewpoint but demanded a larger Fund than the
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Commission was proposing. Finally the UK favoured a large Fund but 
adopted a flexible attitude on eligibility criteria, provided at least 
25% of RDF resources were concentrated in their regions.
Thus the size and distribution of the Fund were to remain the 
key issues of the debate and the major sources of disagreement, parti­
cularly between the member states with a vested interest in the out­
come of the matter in hand. The latter numbered, for the most part, 
five: the UK, Italy and Ireland pushing for aid for their backward
and depressed regions. West Germany as the paymaster and France 
opposing any excessive contribution to the Fund on their part and 
excessive Commission interference in domestic economic policies.
The British premier, Edward Heath, had negotiated British terms 
of entry to the Community during 1972 on the basis that the establish­
ment of a Regional Development Fund, from which the British would 
visibly gain, would be a good selling-point to the public in Britain, 
who were already well aware and sceptical of the extent of British 
net-contributions to the CAP. Thus, the RDF was seen by the British 
government as a counterbalance to the high levels of expenditure on 
the CAP.
At the other end of the scale, the West Germans, by the start of 
the 1970s,were gradually outgrowing their 'guilt-complex' from World 
War Two, which had made them soft bargaining-partners during the early 
years of the Community's life. Thus the German government, especially 
Hans Apel (who stood in for the ill Foreign Minister Walter Scheel as 
German representative in many of the Council of Ministers meetings 
which discussed the RDF), and the then Economics Minister Helmut 
Schmidt, adopted a very tough stance towards the Fund, in that they 
insisted on the size of the Fund being restricted and being distributed 
in the most economic and concentrated manner nossible.
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The above extreme positions highlight the complexity of the 
Community's decision-making process; in order to reach some form of 
agreement such contrasting positions must be compromised. Moreover, 
the process becomes even more complicated when it is realised that 
beneath the tip of Community politics lies the iceberg of domestic 
political climates and opinions in the member states; in the same 
way that Mr. Heath saw the setting up of the Regional Fund as a pro­
vider of good press at home, so the German ministers were sensitive 
to the potential adverse reaction in their country to yet more German 
taxpayers' money being spent in the peripheral regions of the 
Community, mainly outside the borders of the Federal Republic.
The influence of events external to the debate on the RDF, both 
in other policy-areas, and outside the direct Community policy-making 
arena, will be considered below. However, this additional compli­
cating factor to an already complex decision-making procedure made 
the fact that the Commission had been obliged to wait until the Paris 
Summit meetings of Heads of State and Government of October 1972 for 
guidelines on the Regional Fund issue all the more understandable; 
the Commission's task of providing viable initiatives, which stood a 
chance of working their way through the Community decision-making 
machinery, had been rendered impossible. Indeed, the same willing­
ness to pass matters on to the shoulders of the Heads of State and 
Government during Summit meetings was in evidence in the Council of 
Ministers at the end of 1973. The Fund was due to become operational, 
according to the Communique of the 1972 Paris Summit meeting, not 
later than the beginning of 1974. Thus, with no sign of.agreement at 
the Council of Foreign Ministers on 4th and 5th December 1973, the 
matter was to be passed on to the Copenhagen Summit meeting ten days 
later on 15th December 1973.
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19At the Council of Ministers meeting in early December the 
polarised stances remained unchanged. The British still claimed 3 
billion u.a. for the Fund for three years and were backed by Italy 
and Ireland. The Belgians and Luxembourg favoured the Commission 
proposals but Hans Apel (still sitting in for the ill Foreign 
Minister, Walter Scheel) stressed that the Germans considered the 
figure too large. However, the German minister did moot the possi­
bility of a two-part fund: one section for the regions with the 
severest imbalances (in Ireland, Greenland, Mezzogiorno and parts of 
the UK) and the rest of the fund to be distributed on a juste retour 
principle. Hence, the Germans were still stressing that they favoured 
a concentration of the Fund, but with an eye to as small a Fund as 
possible, in order to cut back their own losses. The Dutch and the 
Danes showed some support for this idea; they stood neither to gain 
nor lose much from the outcome. Moreover, as the Germans made no 
mention of the size of the Fund involved, the Irish and Italians 
hinted at possible support for the proposal. Nevertheless, the British 
opposed the idea as they did not, in their eyes, stand to gain suffici­
ently, the French were opposed to it because they would be net- 
contributors and the Commission did not favour any suggestion which 
would lead to a small non-Communautaire and divisive Fund. Thus, the 
Commission was still left with the task of appeasing the expectations 
of the major recipients, of satisfying the Germans and appeasing the 
French, and the matter was passed on to the Copenhagen Summit.
The failure of this Summit meeting (14th-15th December 1973) to 
make any headway on the issue of the Regional Development Fund was 
largely due to the predominant shadow of the OPEC oil embargo crisis 
(see below). However, this failure meant that the matter had to go 
before the meeting of the Foreign, Economic and Financial Council of
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20Ministers on 17th-18th December 1973, with little hope of agreement 
before the end of year deadline. Not surprisingly, the unwillingness 
of the major actors to compromise, plus the fact that no initiative 
or agreement had been forthcoming from the Copenhagen Summit, pro­
duced a void in the search for progress.
At the Council meeting (of 17th-18th December 1973) the Germans
countered the UK proposal of 3 billion u.a. for three years with a
suggestion, made by Hans Apel, of 600 million u.a. for three years
with an additional 150 million u.a. to be dedicated to the Guidance
Section of FEOGA and the Hill Farming Directive. According to the
proposal, only regions with an average Gross Domestic Product of 10%
or more below the Community average GDP would be eligible for Fund aid
The outcome was to be expected: support from the Benelux countries
and opposition from the UK, Italy and Ireland because of the paucity
of the suggested resources. In addition, the French and Danes were
against the proposal because they would be net-contributors. The 
21Economist made the sarcastic comment that 'it is a mortal sin of EEC 
life to turn France into a net payer for anything...'.
As is often the case^^ in difficult situations in the Council of
Ministers, the Council President, the Danish Foreign Minister, attemp­
ted to gain acceptance for a compromise proposal. This consisted of 
a three year Fund of 800 million u.a. (including 150 million u.a. for 
the FEOGA Guidance Section), with 400 million u.a. to be allocated in
the first year. Additionally, it was suggested that the Council
should review the situation around mid-1975. This package was accep­
table to five Foreign Ministers but not to the UK, Italy.or Ireland.
It is also characteristic of Community decision-making for one 
of the small member states with no vested interest in the issue to 
attempt to mediate between the conflicting viewpoints of the major
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actors when the decision-making machinery is confronted with such
rigid, uncompromising viewpoints. Thus at this stage in the debate
23the Luxembourgers strove to act as mediators. The Luxembourg 
government had no vital interest at stake, except for the wish to 
see one of their regions eligible for Fund aid. They favoured the 
German proposal but suggested a two year Fund which was to be re­
viewed in 1975. This proposal received even less support than the 
Danish President's/*^ Sir Alec Douglas-Home insisted that the British 
had accepted, with enthusiasm, the Paris Summit agreement in 1972, 
and he made the UE intention of linking progress on the RDF issue to 
any agreement on Community energy policy quite clear.
Hans Apel countered the British arguments by claiming that the 
British were trying to buy friendship, and he compared the Community 
to a marriage-contract, in which neither partner should expect payment
for one's faithfulness. He stated: 'it is like paying my wife to be 
25faithful,,.!'.
Therefore, it was inevitable that by the end of 1973 no agree­
ment on the Fund's establishment had been reached and in traditional 
fashion the clocks were 'stopped'.
On 1st January 1974 the Germans took over the Council Presidency 
from the Danes. There were unfruitful bilateral meetings between Hans 
Apel and Sir Alec Douglas-Home on 3rd January, and Thomson met with
Scheel and Apel in Bonn in early January and found them in an uncom- 
26promising mood.
Moreover, no agreement was reached on the Fund at the Council 
session of 14th-15th January 1974 involving foreign ministers and 
ministers responsible for regional policy. Nevertheless, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home did concede some ground by stating that the proposed 
Commission figure for the RDF of 2.4 billion u.a. represented a
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27'substantial starting point'. However, the UK should not receive
less than 25% and the British Government still maintained their link
between the Regional Fund and energy policy.
At the other end of the scale, the German cabinet-meeting of 
2823rd January 1974 announced that they would be willing to double 
their offer on the ERDF to 1.25 billion u.a. over three years with 
150 million u.a. in addition, for the FEOGA Guidance Section. Under 
this new proposal, the most depressed and backward regions would re­
ceive almost the same amount as under the Commission's proposal but 
only the regions whose GDP was at least 10% below the Community aver­
age would be funded. Under this system the net-contributors to the 
RDF over the three years would be: West Germany 300 million u.a.,
France 200 million u.a., Netherlands 100 million u.a. and Belgium 70 
29million u.a.
The Germans declared this latest concession as their last word,
but despite the lifting of the UK link between energy and the Regional 
30Fund the following week, no agreement had been concluded by the end
of January. The French, in particular, opposed the latest German
31suggestion because they would be heavy net-contributors. They now 
expressed support for the Commission's original proposal of 2.4 
billion u.a., a demonstration of the perversities of the Community 
bargaining process. The French had a net-payments' balance of zero 
under the Commission proposal and thus, although their new position 
implied support for a larger Fund than the Germans were proposing, at 
least the French would be cutting back their losses!
5. Significance of Events External to the Immediate ERDF Issue
As explained above, events external to the immediate debate on 
an issue in a particular Community policy-area often exert a significant
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influence on the course and outcome of the matter; they may have 
both a push and a drag effect upon the progress of discussions.
Indeed the former was true of the link made between the achieve­
ment of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community and the pre­
requisite of reducing regional disparities.
It has been argued above that hopes were high at the end of the
sixties, in the EEC, for the achievement of Economic and Monetary
Union. This was seen as the natural progression from the customs'
union stage of integration. However, it was also recognised that the
achievement of total economic integration would be rendered impossible
unless the regional disparities existing in the Community were 
32reduced. Thus, there was a strong push for the establishment of 
a Community regional policy from a separate and distinct, if closely 
linked, policy-area.
In addition, fuel was added to the arguments in favour of Community 
regional policy by the imminent enlargement of the EEC to include UK, 
Ireland and Denmark (and prior to their negative referendum, Norway), 
all countries with problem-regions and peripheral to the main bloc of 
EEC countries. Moreover, the British negotiations concerning their 
terms of entry had proved problematic in the vital area of agricul­
ture: the idea of a Regional Development Fund of net-benefit to the
UK provided a strong selling-point in Britain for Prime Minister 
Edward Heath, striving to convince a sceptical British public about 
the merits of UK membership of the EEC.
In contrast to the above push-factor, events during 1974 had the 
opposite effect of rendering agreement on the Fund issue impossible 
until the Paris Summit meeting at the end of the year. The energy 
issue which began with the OPEC boycott of oil shipments to the Dutch 
and a reduction in oil exports to the other eight member states was
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of prime significance. This issue had dominated the Copenhagen 
Summit of 14th-15th December 1973 and tension had been heightened by 
the unexpected appearance of the five Arab foreign ministers at the 
Summit meeting (see Chapter Three). The disunity shown by the nine 
member states in the ensuing months and at the Washington Energy 
Conferencewas described by the Economist^^ as 'the worst Community 
crisis since the EEC began*. There is no doubt that this issue 
adversely affected the Commission's attempts to achieve agreement on 
the Regional Development Fund.
In addition to the energy issue, the RDF debate was clouded by 
the two British General Elections of 1974 and the subsequent renego­
tiation of the Terms of Entry, as pledged by the Labour Government
35on assuming power in February 1974. In Britain, Community politics 
were pushed into the background by the elections and moreover the 
very essence of British membership was challenged by the Labour Party's 
commitment to renegotiation. In addition, the change of personnel at 
the helm of French and German politics was of great signifiance for 
the Community decision-making process; the election of Giscard 
Destaing as President of France in May 1974, following the death of 
Georges Pompidou, and the election by the German Bundestag of Helmut 
Schmidt (the former Economics Minister, who had already driven some 
hard bargains in the Regional Fund debate) after Willy Brandt's resig­
nation on 6th May 1974, distracted the attention of the Council of
Ministers in Brussels, and member state governments at home, away from
35the problem of setting up the ERDF. According to the Economist,
'Herr Schmidt has much about him of a modern Bismarck. But so far he 
has used Germany's financial power only to reject what Germany will 
not pay for'.
The issues and events described above cannot be separated from
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the intricate web of conflict and disagreement which had been spun 
around the Commission proposal to establish a Regional Development 
Fund during Council of Ministers' debates in 1973. Furthermore, the 
drag factors contributed to the situation where, prior to the Paris 
Summit (9th-10th December 1974), the Italian and Irish governments 
took the drastic measure of issuing an ultimatum: no Fund, no Paris
Summit meeting! This proved to be the final impetus for agreements 
on the outstanding points of contention, which centred mainly upon 
the distribution of the Fund's resources.
37As described in the previous chapter the agreement at the 
Paris Summit distributed the RDF widely over the Community regions, 
with relatively larger shares provided for Ireland, Italy and the UK.
6. The Rôle of the European Parliament and Other Bodies
on the Fringe of the Decision-making Process________
The Commission policy of openness to the opinions of all, during 
the drafting of proposals, meant that Thomson consulted with organi­
sations and bodies in the member state capitals and at the European 
level before submitting his Report and later his proposals on the 
Regional Development Fund. Thus (see above), he sought the viewpoints 
of bodies such as the Standing Conference of the Community's Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, the European Trade Unions, UNICE and, at 
the national level, the various equivalents of the CBI and TUC. How­
ever, most vociferous and influential of the organisations and insti­
tutions consulted were the Economic and Social Committee and the 
European Parliament.
The above bodies, without exception, expressed unanimous support 
for the Commission's proposals and for the idea of a European Regional 
Development Fund. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether their backing 
of the Commission made much impact either upon the bargaining-stances
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of the member state governments or the development of the debate.
Thus, the Commission consulted the national and European organisations 
but was well aware that their specific proposals had to be tuned to 
the sensitivities of the Council of Ministers.
The exception to the above situation was provided by the European 
Parliament with its institutionalised status in the Community decision­
making arena. Although this status involved merely an obligation, on 
the part of the Council and the Commission, to seek non-binding 
advice and opinions, the European Parliament was composed of repre­
sentatives from the member state Parliaments and was pushing for 
increased budgetary powers vis à vis the Council of Ministers - an 
issue with which the RDF was to become inextricably linked (see below), 
Thus the European Parliament's voice carried more weight than that of 
the other subsidiary bodies but even so probably had little effect on 
the fixed viewpoints of member state representatives in the Council 
of Ministers.
Nevertheless, the European Parliament had been a source of steady
support for the Commission during the 1960s. For example, the Motte 
38Report, issued by the Parliament's Economic and Financial Committee,
stressed the need for harmonisation of Community regional policies
with those of the member states. Moreover, in 1963 the Birkelbach
Report again emphasised the urgent need for a Community-wide regional
policy: 'Unless the individual areas share equally in its accomplish-
39ments ... an economic and political union will have no permanence'.
40In 1966 the Bersani Report on the Commission's 1965 regional
policy memorandum gave full support to the Commission proposals. In
addition. Parliament provided unanimous backing for the Commission's 
411971 document.
In the same vein, there was overwhelming Parliamentary support
96
for Community regional policy and for the general features of the 
Thomson Report, expressed on 4th July 1973^^ despite certain dis­
agreements and criticism on points of detail, such as the rôle of 
infrastructure in regional policy. Furthermore the European Parli­
ament also unanimously supported the Commission's specific proposals 
43for the RDF.
However, once the debate proper, between the member state rep­
resentatives on the Council of Ministers and the Commission, began, 
after the submission of specific proposals, the European Parliament 
had little impact on the proceedings though events were followed 
closely, and criticisms voiced about delays in the Fund's establish­
ment; the nature of the Community decision-making process is such 
that, once the real debates between the Council and Commission have 
begun, no accommodation is made for a Parliamentary input.
The same was true of other organisations which had expressed 
support for the Commission's proposals; these included the Permanent 
Conference of Community Chambers of Trade and Industry who added
their support for Community regional policy in late July and November 
441973. ECOSOC and the CBI also stressed their support for Thomson
in 1973^^ and pressed for an annual Fund of 500 million u.a. In
October 1973, ECOSOC gave full endorsement to the regional policy pro-
46posais by a vote of 67-0 (2 abstentions).
Thus there was considerable evidence of support by interest
47groups. In addition to those cited above, the Federation of German 
Industries, the Young European Left, the Conference of Local Authori­
ties, the European Movement, the EEC Savings Banks' Group and COPA 
expressed support for the Fund. However, this support was lacking in 
intensity and audacity. In contrast to the agricultural policy-area, 
no 1500 farmers 'besieged' the European Parliament building in support
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of the Regional Fund.
In conclusion, therefore, the Commission gained the support and 
opinions of many organisations and bodies but the latter exerted 
minimal influence upon the outcome of the debate on the specific 
Regional Fund proposals.
The European Parliament had constantly urged the Commission and 
Council to establish the RDF and became involved again with debate 
after agreement on the Fund; in the context of the RDF's status in 
the Community Budget, the Parliament claimed that the Fund should be 
categorised as non-obligatory expenditure, since it did not emanate 
from within the Treaty of Rome mandate. (This would mean that the 
Parliament would have the last say on the budgetary allocation.) 
Nevertheless, the Parliament did not want to hold up the establishment 
of the ERDF and, having opened up conciliation procedures with the 
Council over budgetary powers, raised no objection to the Commission's 
texts at its March 1975 session. Thus, the Parliament, like the 
Commission, considered the Fund's establishment per se to be of prime 
importance ; once the RDF was operational it could push and gnaw away 
at the Council's powers, particularly in the budgetary sphere, to 
increase its own influence in the policy-area.
7. Conclusions
The Regional Development Fund was established in March 1975, some 
fifteen months late. The 1,300 million units of account allocated 
for the first three years of the Fund amounted to a figure approxi­
mately half of that originally proposed by the Commission. The Fund 
was widely distributed over the Community regions whereas the majority 
of member states had favoured a concentration of resources in the 
worst-off areas, by a system of national quotas.
98
Thus, once again, failure to agree in Council had produced a 
watered-down decision, providing a paltry Fund whose thin resources 
were sprinkled over the member state regions. Moreover, the agree­
ment had been reached only after the threat to boycott the Paris 
Summit of 1974 by the Italians and the Irish. The agreement made a 
mockery of the Commission's original aspirations, as laid down in 
the Thomson Report, of solving regional disparities which were block­
ing Economic and Monetary Union. In no way could this Fund correct 
the Community's principal regional imbalances; it could, at best, 
alleviate them slightly.
Nevertheless, in the eyes of the European Commission and indeed 
the European Parliament, the most important step of all had been taken, 
namely a Fund had been established and a foundation provided upon which 
the Commission and Parliament could build and seek improvements.
Thus, the Commission contented itself with the setting up of the 
Fund, which was, despite its watered-down size, based largely on 
Thomson's original proposals.This was in spite of the fact that 
the debate in the Council of Ministers had been dominated by the sen­
sitivity shown in those member states with a vested interest in the 
final decision. The major actors had adopted rigid and uncompromising 
stances vis à vis each other and the Commission's proposals. Therefore, 
the Commission had to content itself with the fact that, albeit long 
overdue and watered-down, a Fund had been established at all.
The West Germans had given way on their original proposal of a 
small concentrated fund and settled for a fairly small, widely distri­
buted fund with some German regions eligible for aid. During 1975,
49the Germans would pay 84 million u.a. into the Fund and receive 19 
million u.a. Therefore, West Germany was indeed the paymaster of the 
new Fund.
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The French did well from the Fund. They had, throughout the 
debate and discussions, insisted on a decent share of the Fund and 
had stressed their aversion to being net-payers. Despite France 
being slightly out of pocket, according to the agreed figures (they 
were to contribute 69 million u.a.^^ in 1975 and receive 45 million), 
their 15% share of the Fund's resources was better than their 
relatively strong economic position in the Community should have 
permitted.
The British share of the Fund was 28% which was more than the 
25% figure on which they had insisted. Nevertheless, the size of the 
Fund was considerably less than the original British demand of 3 
billion u.a., though the UK stood to gain a considerable net-benefit 
from the RDF:^^ it would pay 41 million u.a. into the Fund and 
receive 84 million u.a. from the RDF coffers during the first year of 
Fund operations.
The Italians and the Irish, the other two main beneficiaries 
from the RDF, received 40% and 6% of Fund resources respectively.
In addition, the Irish received an extra 6 million u.a. to be sub­
tracted from the other member-states, except Italy. Relatively 
speaking, these two countries did well from the final decision although 
the size of the Fund was smaller than they would have wished and the 
distribution of resources was far too wide.
In conclusion, the intergovemmentalist aspects of Community 
decision-making had predominated. The conflicts in the Council of 
Ministers and the uncompromising attitudes of the major actors, had 
swamped Commission attempts to mediate between differing viewpoints 
and to achieve agreement on the Fund issue. At no time in the debate 
did Thomson strive to exert Commission authority; he pursued a 
gradualist policy of trying to appease the member states stage by stage
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The European Parliament, ECOSOC and other European and national 
organisations and bodies, backed the Commission and voiced their 
support for the establishment of a Regional Development Fund. Their 
influence, however, was negligible.
The debates and discussions between member state representatives,
both inside and outside the forum of the Council of Ministers, were
hard and uncompromising. Finally, they were overtaken by events
external to the immediate RDF issue. Thus a final initiative and
agreement was required by the body which had initiated the debate in
October 1972. The Paris Summit meeting in December 1974 provided the
details of the RDF which was to be established three months later after
even more disagreement between the Commission and European Parliament
on the one hand, and the Council of Ministers on the other, over the
details of draft regulations for the Fund and of the RDF's status in
52Community politics.
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CHAPTER FIVE : EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
FUND OPERATIONS 1975-79
Introduction
This chapter surveys the first period of the ERDF's adminis­
tration between 1975 and 1979 as agreed by the Council of Ministers 
in March 1975.
The framework for the Fund's operations was laid down in the 
Council Regulation of 18th March 1975,^ the main details of which are 
described below. An analysis is made of ERDF administration at the 
national level, in the U.K., France, Ireland, Italy and West Germany. 
The details of this section were gathered, in the main, during inter­
views conducted in Brussels and the member state capitals and regions, 
between 1977 and 1979 and, where possible, the date and place of the 
meetings are cited.
The final section of this chapter attempts to draw conclusions 
about the general features of ERDF administration during the period 
in question.
Following the establishment of the ERDF on 18th March 1975, the
responsibility of administering the Fund fell upon the Commission.
It was to be assisted by two Committees: the Regional Policy Committee
was given the task of considering applications for infrastructure aid
2of a cost exceeding 10 million u.a. However, the Committee’s main
role was to be that of encouraging and examining ways of coordinating
member state regional policies.
It is important to ensure that the measures envisaged 
by Member States in regional policy matters are in 
accordance with the Community's objectives, and that 
options are selected and priorities established, in a 
manner compatible with the gradual alignment of the 
economic policies of Member States.3
The aim was also expressed of progressively setting up Regional
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Development Programmer for member state regions which would eventually
constitute the framework for ERDF intervention.
A further task of the Regional Policy Committee was that of
providing information about development prospects in priority regions
and the aids available to them.
The Regional Policy Committee was to be composed of two appointed
members from each member state selected from among senior officials
4responsible for regional policy and two Commission appointees. The 
European Investment Bank was to appoint an observer to the Committee. 
The Committee was to be served by a secretariat provided by the 
Commission and to elect its Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among its 
members by majority vote for a period of two years.^ Finally, the 
Committee was empowered, in pursuit of its tasks, to take evidence 
from interested parties from the regions and from trade union and 
business organisations.^
7Article 15 of the Council Regulation establishing the ERDF set 
up the Fund Management Committee. It was to be composed of represen­
tatives of the member states and chaired by a representative of the 
Commission. The votes of the Committee were weighted according to
gthe provisions laid down in the Treaty of Rome. The Chairman was not
given the right of voting.
It is the responsibility of the Commission representative on the
Committee to submit drafts of documents to be taken on Fund aid and
the Committee must deliver its opinion (adopted by the above voting
procedure) within the time-limit specified by the Chairman.
The Commission adopts Committee decisions which apply immedi- 
gately. However, if these decisions are not in accordance with the 
opinion of the Committee, they are sent to the Council of Ministers.
In these cases the Commission defers application of the decisions
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which it has adopted for two months and the Council has the right to 
take a different decision within this period.
Thus the main task of the Fund Management Committee is to formu­
late opinions on the Commission's draft decisions to grant aid from 
the ERDF. In this respect it examines all applications for Fund 
assistance from member states. However, it is also empowered to dis­
cuss any other matters connected with the management of the Fund.
The Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy and his senior 
officials were to hold regular meetings with the European Parliament's 
Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport, to 
discuss the operations of the Fund. In addition, the Commissioner was 
to hold consultative meetings with the Economic and Social Committee, 
the E.T.U.C., UNICE and the Standing Conference of European Chambers 
of Commerce.
The Regulation stipulated that the Fund could only intervene in 
areas benefitting from domestic regional aids within the framework of 
national regional policies and which were accorded the status of 
priority regions under these domestic policies. Thus a close coordi­
nation was foreseen between the operations of the ERDF and national 
regional aids,^^ an aim which was to be furthered by the Regional 
Policy Committee (see above).
Article 4^^ of the Fund Regulation listed the types of projects 
eligible for assistance and stated that the Fund could contribute to 
the financing of investments which individually exceeded 50,000 u.a. 
provided they could be classified under one of the following categories
(i) Industrial, handicraft or service activities which 
are economically sound and which benefit from state 
regional aids, provided that at least ten new jobs 
are created or that existing jobs are maintained.
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(il) Service activities qualifying for assistance shall 
be those concerned with tourism and those which 
have a choice of location. Such activities should 
have a direct impact on the development of the 
region and on the level of employment.
(iii) Investments in infrastructure directly linked with 
the development of activities under categories (i) 
and (ii) and totally or partially financed by public 
authorities or by any other agency responsible, on a 
similar basis as a public authority, for the creation 
of infrastructures.
Article 4 also designated the amount of the Fund's contribution:
(i) Industrial projects. 20% of the investment cost, 
without, however, exceeding 50% of the aid accorded 
to each investment by public authorities.
(ii) Infrastructure projects. 30% of expenditure incurred 
by public authorities when the investment is less 
than 10 million u.a. and between 10% - 30% maximum 
for investments of 10 million u.a. or more.
Article 6 of the Fund Regulation stressed the importance of 
Regional Development Programmes and the need to develop them into a 
frame of reference for project selection. This was consistent with 
the Regional Policy Committee's specified role and aim of achieving 
the maximum consistency between Community and national assistance and 
the most rational use of resources. The Fund Regulation stated that 
a standard outline for Regional Development Programmes was to be drawn 
up by 31st December 1975.
The Programmes, covering all the regions eligible for Fund aid, 
had to be notified to the Commission by the end of 1977. Meanwhile,
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annual information sheets were to take their place.
According to the Fund Regulation applications could only be sub­
mitted by the member states. This was clearly necessary as it would 
have been impossible, given the Commission's limited resources, to 
examine ab initio, thousands of projects. Thus, the Commission 
decided on Fund aid grants on the basis of applications sent in peri­
odically by the relevant government department in the member states.
The Commissioner responsible for regional policy was authorised to 
approve, for the Commission as a whole, the draft decisions submitted 
to the Fund Management Committee.
Within the Community Budget, the Fund's resources were divided 
into Commitment and Payment appropriations: for example, the Commit­
ment appropriations of the Fund for 1975 amounted (in conformity with 
the Fund Regulation) to 300 million u.a. The estimated 1975 payments 
provided for were, however, only 150 million u.a. This discrepancy 
occurred because payments from the Fund were linked to patterns of 
national public expenditure on the projects approved by the Fund, 
domestic payments being made in stages over a period of time.
Authorities or organisations likely to benefit directly from the 
ERDF's contribution to investment in member state regions will be 
surveyed by considering the way in which certain member states have 
dealt with the task of administering the Régional Development Fund. 
Since the Regulation provided for close cooperation between Community 
and national officials on matters such as eligibility criteria, appli­
cations for aid and the distribution of Fund aid, then the role played 
by potential beneficiaries of the Fund will vary.
Since the Regional Policy Committee and Fund Management Committee 
had the tasks of coordinating member state regional aids and monitoring 
requests for ERDF assistance, member states' methods of implementing
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national regional policies would be under constant review as would 
their administration of Fund quotas in the regions eligible for aid.
Local and regional authorities will only have the scope to play 
an active role in Regional Fund matters to the extent permitted by 
their member state's system of government and according to the 
general attitude shown by the national government towards the European 
Commission and EEC affairs.
The problem of additionality has dogged the administration of
the ERDF since its inception; the preamble to the Fund Regulation
stated that: 'the Fund's assistance should not lead member states to
reduce their own regional development efforts, but should complement 
12these efforts'. This is of obvious importance to authorities and 
organisations likely to receive Fund aid: whether they are in fact
receiving additional aid, over and above what would have been spent 
anyway, by the national government on regional policy, in the absence 
of the Fund.
There has been, since the Fund's establishment, much questioning 
of whether member states adhere to their commitment to the Council 
Regulation, or whether they merely use the Fund's resources to reduce 
their own financial burden in the regions. It is almost impossible 
to prove the matter one way or the other, but officials in the regions 
of at least one member state are, to say the least, dubious about 
their national government's commitment to the principle of addition­
ality.
Administration of the ERDF in its first phase: 
the UK and the North West Region______________
In the UK, applications for Fund aid for infrastructure projects 
are dealt with by the Department of the Environment, as are appli­
cations concerning infrastructure projects linked with tourism though
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with the participation of the Department of Trade. On the other hand, 
industrial project applications pass through the hands of the Depart­
ment of Industry. Industrial or infrastructure projects must be 
sited within the boundaries of the UK's domestic Development Areas 
to be eligible for aid from Brussels and in this respect, projects in 
Special Development Areas have priority over Development Areas whose - 
projects in turn have priority over Intermediate Areas.
It is very difficult to assess the activities of regional autho­
rities, organisations or industries in receipt of Fund aid for indus­
trial projects because this section of ERDF financial assistance is 
paid directly into the Treasury's coffers and used (theoretically, at 
least) to 'top up' the amount of money available for financing Regional 
Development in the UK. There has been a widely-publicised questioning 
of whether the British Government does in fact use money from the
ERDF in Brussels additionally to the amount that would otherwise have 
13been spent; whatever the case, there is no distinction made be­
tween Regional Fund money and domestic resources when projects are 
being financed by the Department of Industry.
A different system operates, however, for infrastructure projects 
which have been put forward for ERDF assistance. Infrastructure aid, 
moreover, accounted for 65% of the Fund's resources in the first 
phase (1975-77).
Local authorities or sectoral bodies such as the Gas and Elec­
tricity Boards and Water Authorities put forward projects as candi­
dates for Fund aid. Clf the project is sited in a Special Development 
Area (SDA) or a Development Area (DA) and meets the eligibility 
criteria then it is likely to be accepted; the procedure followed 
is that local authorities submit their project applications to the 
appropriate regional office of the Department of the Environment, for
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example the North West Economic Planning Board in Manchester, from 
where they are sent on to the Department of the Environment in London, 
if it is considered that they are likely to be accepted there for 
submission to the European Commission in Brussels.
Before submitting project applications to the regional office, 
local authorities will try to ensure that their proposals satisfy the 
Regulation's requirements, and may possibly seek the advice of bodies 
such as the North-West Industrial Development Association, which act 
as 'information banks' on EEC matters, in the context of their 
expressed aim of developing industry in the regions.
When project proposals reach the regional office they are assessed 
to ascertain that they conform to the eligibility criteria. With this 
purpose in mind, regional officials seek out the opinions of people 
in various ministries, for example the Department of Industry, Employ­
ment or Environment. Eligible projects are then submitted to the 
Department of the Environment in London along with a back-up case for 
the project, through which the regional office attempts to strengthen 
the case for Fund aid as much as possible.
The regional offices do not like to see themselves as the 
'regional arm' of the Department of the Environment in London,but  
rather prefer to be seen by local authorities as a projection of them­
selves. Thus, the regional offices prefer to be considered distinct 
from their head office in London and have developed a close working 
relationship with the local authorities. This attempt to work closely 
with local authorities has, according to sources in the Department of 
the Environment in London, been particularly successful in the 
North West of England, where local authorities do in fact need as much 
backing as possible for their projects, given that most of the Planning 
Region is designated as an Intermediate Area, and thus at the bottom
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|f the priority rankings for Fund aid.
The regional office has encouraged local authorities to see the 
RDF as an 'on-going' concern; they tried, during the first phase 
►f Fund administration, to acquire a pool of projects in the form of 
chemes which could be sent to London in the form of a package to 
lemonstrate how they promote the region. This was in preparation for 
:he production of Regional Development Programmes which had to be 
jlrawn up and submitted to Brussels by the end of 1977 and which would 
require the future linking of eligible projects to a specific pro­
gramme for the region.
The procedure is different for project applications from 
ectoral bodies such as the Water Boards, who submit their applica­
tions directly to London. They first forward a preliminary group of 
project-proposals, then receive a reply from the Department of the 
Environment, (thus bypassing the regional level), which expresses an 
jopinion on the suitability of the various projects, or criticises them 
y pointing out, for example, any gaps in the information provided on
the application form.
A final amended block of applications is then sent back to London
for consideration in Brussels. It is interesting to note the tactics
sometimes employed by the Department of the Environment, when for
some reason they do not view a particular project favourably; the
North West Water Authority, for example, applied for Fund aid for a 
: 17sewerage project in Lancashire on the standard application form, 
whereupon they received a reply from London stating that inadequate 
information had been supplied. The omissions were rectified and the 
project was sent back to London with the Water Authority's next pack­
age of proposals. However, the response of the Department of the 
Environment was that the project was now 'too retrospective to
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justify application for a grant’!
The Department of the Environment draws up a package of projects 
which it considers suitable for submission to Brussels, and submits 
them every three months to the European Commission. It judges the 
suitability of projects very much upon ideas gained, and precedents 
that have been set- from past experience; if a particular type of 
project has found favour in Brussels in the past, then it is likely 
to be a good candidate for future applications. However, the Depart­
ment does also submit 'test cases' in fields which have not been 
viewed too kindly by the Commission, the Regional Policy Committee 
and the Fund Management Committee in the past. For example they were 
successful in being granted aid for two such applications in the 
field of tourism, which were sent to 'test the water' for future 
applications. These two projects involved requests for aid for two 
projects in the North West and concerned a leisure centre in Morecambe 
and a museum in Lancaster.
Once the Commission receives the packages of projects, they are 
studied and a draft decision is drawn up before the projects are put 
before the Committees.
Large projects (total expenditure exceeding 10 million u.a.,
£4.2 million) are sent to the Regional Policy Committee, which gives 
an opinion, whereas all projects, large and small, go before the Fund 
Management Committee (see above).
If a project is approved by the Commission then the appropriate 
sum of money is paid to the Department of the Environment which passes 
this on to the local authorities or sectoral bodies; money from the 
ERDF is intended for part cancellation of funds already borrowed by 
these authorities for infrastructure projects, thus it cancels out 
part of the original debt incurred for the project.
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Project-applications emanating from Wales and Scotland are not
tendered via the Department of the Environment in London but are
sent directly from the Welsh and Scottish Offices to the Department
of Industry before being submitted to Brussels. Sources in Welsh
and Scottish Offices claim that their countries have done well in
18terms of Fund aid which they have received. They make claims of
being much more active and aware of the Fund and the eligibility
19criteria than their counterparts in the English regions. Whether 
this claim is justified or not, the Scottish Office apparently caused 
considerable embarrassment within the Department of the Environment 
in London in 1976 by issuing a guideline document to the Scottish 
local authorities, informing them how the Regional Fund operated and 
about its eligibility provisions. At this time London had made no 
moves at all in this direction and thus the Scottish Office provided 
its regions with a head start in terms of information on how to sub­
mit projects in the form of proposals for Fund aid. Indeed, as the 
above figures show, the Scottish Office spent 25.54% of the total UK 
allocation during the ERDF's first phase.
The Scots and Welsh also claim to enjoy a more informal relation­
ship with their local authorities and they endeavour to operate an 
informal submission of applications, meeting and exchanging ideas with 
local officials about possible projects. The Scottish Office have 
developed the viewpoint that it is beneficial (particularly under the 
new Regional Fund criteria (see below) to submit large sections of 
local authorities' programmes, rather than merely operating on a 
scheme by scheme basis. Indeed one such programme has received ERDF 
aid in Scotland: the Rural Electrification Programme, which has
linked up small groups of houses to the national electricity grid.
Officials at the Department of the Environment when questioned
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thought it to be a wasted exercise for local authorities to lobby the
European Commission in Brussels on the subject of Regional Fund aid
and indeed they admitted to discouraging such liaisons. By contrast
Commission officials stated that they were only too pleased to see
local authority representatives visiting their offices to discuss the
Regional Fund and various projects. Nevertheless, it was also
20admitted by Commission officials that it was in London, at the 
Department of the Environment, where local authorities needed to apply 
pressure if they were demanding increased aid, since it was the 
national department which manipulated the character and shape of the 
English quota by their decisions on whether or not to submit a project 
to Brussels. Thus the Commission had no jurisdiction over decisions 
taken on a project at this crucial initial stage. Therefore, the 
main purpose of regional and local authority visits to Brussels seems 
to be for gaining information on the operations of the Fund and the 
general work of the European Community. Furthermore, Commission 
officials frequently visit the UK regions to attend seminars or con­
ferences on the ERDF and its operation, in this way again serving an 
educational function.
In so far as authorities and organisations need to focus their 
attention upon the national level, namely Whitehall or the regional 
offices of the Department of the Environment, this is largely con­
stricted by the Fund Regulation and by the geographical position of 
the local authority: whether it is situated in a Special Development,
Development or Intermediate Area under the provisions of domestic 
regional policy.
The UK's Fund allocation for the first phase (28% of the total 
Fund resources) was oversubscribed. Given the increasingly tight 
financial strait-jacket in which local authorities are finding them­
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selves, any source of finance available takes on an increasing impor­
tance. Thus it is not necessarily the fact that the ERDF provides 
a source of finance from Brussels which stimulates interest in the 
Fund, but, to an ever-increasing extent, a lack of funds from other 
domestic sources due to cut-backs in public expenditure.
French administration of the Fund
Whereas two separate government departments are responsible for
administering the UK quota of the ERDF, the French share is handled 
21by D.A.T.A.R. in Paris, the institution responsible for Regional 
Development ("L'Aménagement du Territoire") in France. The method 
of Fund administration typifies the centralist system of French 
government, with the regions having no powers or choice in matters 
concerning the destination of ERDF aid.
Officials in the French regions are forbidden any direct contact 
with the European Commission, and if a representative from Brussels 
visits a French region, he must be accompanied by a central govern­
ment official, such is the French mistrust of the Brussels "Eurocrats'" 
interference.
22Sources in the Conseil Régional in Lille (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) 
provided an example of an attempt and a failure by regional officials 
to intervene, at the level of the French government, to obtain aid 
from Brussels; the Conseil Régional endeavoured to get aid for tex­
tiles, steel, and more recently for a large project involving the 
transportation of ethylene. The latter project (for which the decision 
to invest was made in 1973-74 in Dunkirk) posed the question of how 
best to transport the ethylene to Rotterdam - either direct from 
Dunkirk to Antwerp, or alternatively taking a route through Valenciennes 
on the Franco-Belgian border. The Conseil Régional naturally favoured
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the second alternative, but because the matter is of an international 
nature involving the Belgians, Dutch and French the interests of the 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais region may well not equal those of the French 
government in Paris, which is suspicious of such trans-border projects 
because of the fear of any infringement on their own domestic policies 
by the European Commission.
It would appear that the French government is loth to publicise 
any direct benefits accruing to France from European Community initi­
atives, and despite the fact that a breakdown of the Fund's expenditure 
in the French regions is provided, it is asserted, both by officials 
in the French regions and by Commission officials in DG XVI, that the 
government produces the list of projects, according to Commission 
requirements, but constructs this list so as to correspond to the 
French quota allotment. In other words, it is claimed that this list 
does not necessarily reveal the actual destination of ERDF aid which 
acts as a reimbursement for money spent on regional development in
France and is placed on the receipt side of the French budget. More-
23over the Commission pointed out that officials carrying out on-the- 
spot checks of ERDF assisted projects in France had been refused 
permission to visit the industrial projects concerned. They had 
thus been limited to an examination of documents held by the respon­
sible authorities.
The crux of the French problem, in terms of interest articulation 
by potential beneficiaries of the Fund, is that this articulation is 
throttled by the centralist attitudes of the French government, by 
the all-pervading powers of DATAR in matters of regional policy, and 
by the fact that the Fund regulation relies on Community aid being 
complementary to, and working in close liaison with, national regional 
policy. Officials in regional government, for example in the Conseil
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Régional in Lille, placed great hopes on direct elections to the
European Parliament for encouraging direct contact between the French
24regions and the EEC institutions and in this way perhaps loosening 
the stranglehold of the central government in Paris over EEC affairs.
25Ireland's Fund Administration
The Irish Republic, which is treated as one region for ERDF 
administration purposes, also operates a centralised system for dis­
tributing its quota of the Fund. During the Fund's first phase the 
Irish government added the money likely to be paid each year from 
Brussels to the amount available from domestic resources for bodies 
like the Irish Development Authority, Gaeltarra Eireann and the local 
authorities, before arriving at the Public Capital Programme (whose 
level is set in the annual budget).
The funds paid from Brussels had to be related to projects 
financed from domestic resources in earlier years, as against those
projects financed in the particular year in question. This was due
26to the requirement in the original Fund Regulation that a project 
be initiated (and in some cases completed) before becoming eligible 
for submission for ERDF assistance. Thus as the level of the Irish 
Public Capital Programme was set annually, the concept of 'addition­
ality' became obscured.
The Department of the Environment in Dublin is responsible for 
vetting projects that have been submitted by local authorities or by 
bodies such as I.D.A. for government aid; it submits projects eligible 
under the Fund Regulation for consideration by DG XVI of the Commission 
in Brussels, and the aid made available for those projects accepted 
by the Commission is paid into the Public Capital Programme, thus 
increasing the absolute amount of funds available to the Irish government
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Despite the centralised system and the lack of clarity on the 
notion of additionality, caused by topping up the PCP with Regional 
Fund resources, government officials are adamant that the aid from 
Brussels is used ’additionally' to its own money; moreover, although 
projects are not submitted to Dublin with the specific aim of apply­
ing to the European Commission for aid, since the Department of the 
Environment chooses from its pool of projects which ones are most 
eligible for ERDF assistance, it is the policy of the Irish government 
to inform the local authority or public agency concerned that their 
project is receiving aid from the ERDF, and indeed a policy of public 
advertisement of this fact was introduced on the sites of these pro­
jects from the outset of Fund payments in support of projects in 
Ireland.
In sum, it can be said that because of the centralised system in 
operation in Eire, there is little scope for interest articulation by 
those likely to benefit directly from the Fund. Nevertheless, this 
is not due to an unwillingness on the part of the Irish government to 
publicise the benefits accruing to particular projects from ERDF 
assistance, and there are strong signs to suggest that the principle 
of additionality is being adhered to in the Irish Republic.
Italian Fund Administration
Italy is the major recipient of the ERDF quota allocations and 
received 40 per cent of total resources during the first phase. More­
over, the Fund's assistance is further concentrated, namely in the 
South of Italy (Mezzogiorno) following an agreement concluded by the 
Interministerial Committee for Economic Problems, composed of the 
Presidents of the Italian regions.
The responsibility for the administration of the Italian 40 per
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27cent fell upon two bodies: the 'Cassa per il Mezzogiorno' is the
technical organisation responsible for the Fund's administration, 
while the political responsibility lies with the Ministry for Extra­
ordinary Interventions in the Mezzogiorno. The two bodies work 
together on the preparation of dossiers for Brussels, with the 
Ministry having the responsibility of drawing these up and submitting 
them to the European Commission. A separate heading is provided for 
ERDF aid in the Italian Budget, an innovation which was demanded by 
the Italian Treasury, in order to show where the Regional Fund was 
being spent. However, although this is a move in the right direction, 
in terms of demonstrating adherence to the principle of additionality, 
it does not provide a water-tight guarantee, since there is no proof 
that the government would not have invested an amount of domestic 
resources, equal to the total ERDF resources, in the absence of the 
Regional Fund.
On the other hand the Italians advertise on bill-boards on the 
site of projects receiving aid from the ERDF, thus informing the pub­
lic of the benefit derived from the EEC's Regional Fund.
The 'Cassa per il Mezzogiorno' is responsible for the technical 
elements of the Fund's administration within the context of its pro­
gramme for the development of Southern Italy. In line with the element 
of regional autonomy in the Italian system of government (for example, 
the regions have powers in areas such as land use, including matters 
such as anti-pollution measures in the Bay of Naples), the Cassa 
cooperates with the regions in an attempt to harmonise its own pro­
gramme with those of the regional governments.
Cassa projects are almost entirely covered by the national finance 
budget and ERDF aid is placed in a special fund to build up 'additional 
projects'. This ERDF money is used in two ways :
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(1) to provide money for Cassa projects that would 
otherwise have no financial means ;
(2) to finance projects proposed by certain of the 
most depressed regions, which are placed under 
a Special Cassa Programme.
The Cassa is still responsible for the execution of these projects. 
These regional projects accounted for about 10 per cent of total pro­
jects aided during the ERDF's first phase.
There seems to exist a 'gentlemen’s agreement' between the Italian 
regions and the Cassa, regarding the submission of projects to the 
European Commission. Thus the 10 per cent of projects supported by 
ERDF aid, during the first phase of administration, and initiated by 
the regions themselves, were still included in the Cassa's programme, 
albeit under a special section. It would therefore appear that the 
regional governments entrust the task of furthering their claims in 
Brussels to the Cassa and ultimately to the Ministry for Extraordinary 
Interventions in the Mezzogiomo.
Representatives of the regional governments do visit Brussels, 
like their British and Irish counterparts,on an informal basis to find
out more about the workings of DG XVI and of the Commission in general.
28Moreover, the Italian section of the Council of European Communes 
CCEM) sponsors regional civil servants, who spend one month working 
as stagiaires at the European Commission in Brussels (working on 
either the ERDF, FEOGA or European Social Fund) and when these civil 
servants return from Brussels, the CEM keeps in touch with them and 
aims to ensure that they are deployed in a department where they can 
use their acquired knowledge of the EEC, to the best of their ability.
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West Germany's Administration of the ERDE
The West German case provides a view of the Fund's administration 
from the opposite end of the spectrum, in so far as West Germany is 
the major 'paymaster' of the ERDF in its first phase, providing 30 per 
cent of the total resources, while receiving 6 per cent of the Fund 
money for payment to its own regions under the national quota system.
Due to the federal structure of the West German government, 
there is a complex administrative framework for the distribution of 
the West German 6 per cent of the ERDF resources. Regional policy is 
classed as a 'Gemeinschaftsaufgabe' in the Federal Republic and res­
ponsibility for its administration falls upon two ministries at the 
Bund (Federal) level, and two ministries at the Land (regional) level: 
the Federal Economics Ministry and the Ministry of Regional Planning, 
Building and Urban Development and the equivalent ministries at the
Land level. Projects are financed 50 per cent by the Federal level
29and 50 per cent by the regional level.
The West German share of 6 per cent of the ERDF, in the first 
phase of its administration, was distributed throughout the Lander, 
according to the ratios used for the distribution of aid under the 
'Gemeinschaftsaufgabe' of domestic regional policy. For example, 
Bavaria received 22.8 per cent of aid under the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
and was thus entitled to 22.8 per cent of West Germany's 6 per cent 
share of the ERDF. Projects falling within the framework of domestic 
regional policy are passed on from Munich (in the case of Bavaria) to 
the Federal Economics Ministry in Bonn; if they are approved at this 
stage, as being appropriate for ERDF aid, then they are forwarded to 
Brussels, to DG XVI of the European Commission.
The West German government does not apply the principle of 'addi­
tionality' but merely uses its receipts from the ERDF to reduce the
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financial burden falling upon the Federal and regional governments.
For example, if an infrastructure project in Bavaria receives 30 per 
cent rate funding from the ERDF, when the benefit has been allocated 
between Bund and Land, both levels of government have additional 
resources at their disposal, which could be used to help finance more 
projects. Indeed the Lander governments have expressed a willingness 
to use their extra financial resources additionally but have met with 
refusal on the part of the Federal Government. Thus, since projects 
are financed 50 per cent - 50 per cent by the two tiers of government, 
the Lander are powerless to carry out their expressed wishes without 
Federal support.
30The consensus in the Lander seems to be that, given the adminis­
trative complexities involved in distributing the Regional Fund aid, 
especially since the 6 per cent of 1300 million ua for three years is 
such a small figure, the ERDF is more trouble than the value of the 
derived benefits. Indeed one official in the Bavarian Economics 
Ministry suggested that it might be better for the Federal Government 
to receive no aid from the ERDF and pay proportionately less into the 
Fund’s i.e. West Germany should contribute 30 per cent - 6 per
cent = 24 per cent of total Fund resources and thus the problems of 
administration would be eradicated. Nevertheless, for political 
reasons, the Federal Government must be seen to be returning from 
debates in the Council of Ministers with some tangible reward to 
offer to its electorate, and is hence unlikely to agree to this sugges­
tion. Moreover it is politically important, not just for the West 
German government, but for the EEC as well, to support the ’Zonen- 
randgebiet' - the Border Area of the Federal Republic, which consti­
tutes the area up to 40 kilometres from the boundaries with the East 
European states: an area which has lost its economic hinterland due
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to the division of Europe into two blocs.
Interest which is articulated on the Regional Development Fund 
in the German regional governments tends to be of a negative nature; 
given the insignificant figures involved and the Federal government's 
views on additionality, the Fund is seen to be more trouble than it 
is worth.
Analysis and Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion of 
the ERDF's administration in the first phase between 1975-77: firstly
the principle of additionality was open to question in all member 
states. Adherence to this principle implies that Community contri­
butions to projects in the member states should be added to and not 
substituted for what member states would have spent anyway. Thus, the 
purpose of additionality is to ensure that Community funds are used 
to further the aims of the Community and that they can be considered 
as a genuine Community contribution.
The Fund Regulation specifically states that the ERDF contri­
butions 'may ... either supplement aid granted to the relevant invest­
ment by public authorities or remain credited to those authorities and
31considered as a partial repayment of such aid’. Nevertheless, the 
preamble to the Fund Regulation states that: 'the Fund's assistance
should not lead member states to reduce their own regional development 
efforts, but should complement those efforts'.
However, even when the additionality principle is adhered to it 
is hard to prove because it is the national governments, for.the most 
part, who receive the Community assistance in the first instance before 
disbursing it to firms, local or public authorities by the system 
relevant to the member state in question.
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The second conclusion to be drawn is that although local and 
regional authorities are actively involved in the Fund's adminis­
tration in some member states during the drafting of eligible project 
proposals, especially with regard to infrastructure aid, this is not 
always the case in France, with its highly centralised system of 
government which is most suspicious of Commission interference in 
domestic regional policy. All decisions are taken in Paris, leaving 
little or no scope for interest-articulation.
Even where local and regional authorities do play an active role, 
namely in the UK and to a lesser extent in Italy, it is acknowledged 
that it is the role of national government, or more specifically, of 
the relevant Ministry or Department, to decide upon projects suitable 
for submission to the Commission. Thus, it is these ministries and 
departments which become involved in direct contact with Commission 
officials on individual project décisions.
Those local and regional authorities in the member states, whose 
system permits the articulation of interest on EEC affairs, recognise 
that they are circumscribed by the Fund Regulation and its provisions 
which call for close cooperation between the Community and national 
authorities, another factor enhancing the power of the national govern­
ments vis à vis the Commission and the local and regional authorities.
The European Commission, whilst welcoming direct contact with 
local and regional officials from all member states, also recognises 
that its main function in this respect is to provide information. The 
Commission strives to make local and regional officials aware of the 
scope of the Fund Regulation and of the mechanisms by which the ERDF, 
and the Community in general, operates.
In France, where the centralist attitude of the national govern­
ment permits little or no interest-articulation, and also in the
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regions of other member states, great hopes were placed on direct 
elections to the European Parliament and on the mandate given to the 
directly elected MEPs by the Community regions. It was felt that 
these representatives would feel duty-bound to give absolute priority 
to serving the interests of the region which they represented.
Hence, direct elections to the European Parliament would poten­
tially increase direct contact between the regions and Brussels, 
especially since the directly elected Parliament would inevitably 
press for a more influential role in the Community decision-making 
process and since it had already expressed a keen interest in the ERDF 
during the debates preceding the Fund's establishment. Since Direct 
Elections in 1979 the European Parliament has indeed been active in 
matters concerning the operations of the ERDF and in particular on 
the annual issue of the size of the ERDF allocation in the Community 
Budget (see Chapters 8 and 10).
Consideration must also be given to those bodies which have 
expressed interest in, and promoted the broader aim of, establishing 
an active regional policy at the EEC level, in an attempt to reduce 
regional disparities in the European Community.
The Economic and Social Committee issued several statements and
opinions expressing support during the debates which preceded the
Fund's establishment (see Chapter 4). Additionally, several other
bodies expressed their support for the Regional Fund, including UNICE
32which published a memorandum in 1973, following its examination of 
Commissioner Thomson's proposals for the ERDF, which were at the time 
before the Council of Ministers. In the memorandum UNICE insisted 
upon the need for a Community regional policy, a need which they con­
sidered to be all the more important because of the need for further 
progress towards achieving Economic and Monetary Union, 'to which
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regional policy is closely linked and appears more than ever to be an
33indispensable factor thereof .. . ' . It also stated that UNICE did
not intend to take a stand as regards the amount of money to be allo­
cated to the ERDF since in its view 'this is essentially a political 
m a t t e r ' T h u s  UNICE expressed support for the principle of the 
Commission's proposals and went so far as to support the idea of con­
centrating the Fund's resources in the most backward regions, as 
against spreading the resources thinly. However, the smaller details, 
in other words the individual bargaining points, were 'political 
issues' not to be commented upon by UNICE but rather to be decided 
upon by debates in the Council of Ministers.
Following the establishment of the Regional Fund in March 1975,
nothing was published by UNICE on the subject until December 1978,
when the Fund was due to be reviewed and renewed, and the Commission's
Guidelines were before the Council. A declaration was produced in 
35December 1978 whose contents were once again general in nature :
UNICE welcomed the Commission's acknowledgement that the two most 
important aims of Community regional policy must be the reduction of 
existing regional disequilibria and the prevention of new disequilibria 
Once more, UNICE favoured the broad outlines of the Commission's new 
proposals but refrained from detailed comments on individual clauses 
in the proposals. Thus UNICE supported the broad aims of a Community 
regional policy, whilst simultaneously avoiding any involvement in the 
finer details of debates between the Council and the Commission.
One of the major problems facing a body such as UNICE is that it 
is composed of representatives from nine national Employers' Federa­
tions, all of which have their own viewpoint, seen through the eyes 
of their domestic situations. Hence, it is often difficult to com­
promise the nine views and produce a bold statement at the European
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level. Indeed officials in the CBI, for example, considered their 
own contacts with the European Commission, both directly and via the 
Department of Industry, to be more significant than representation 
through UNICE. The CBI has a Regional Development Committee which, 
according to officials within the organisation, has become increas­
ingly European-orientated since UK entry into the Common Market, and 
the establishment of the ERDF. In an aide-memoire published in 
September 1977, in response to the publication of the Commission's
Guideline proposals and in preparation for a meeting with Commissioner 
36Giolitti, the operations of the ERDF during the first phase were 
assessed, and an expression of general approval was made for the 
proposed amendments to the Fund's Regulation. Naturally, the document 
presented a British point of view, in that proposed amendments to the 
Fund Regulation, such as the broadening of the eligibility criteria 
for infrastructure aid, were assessed against a background of benefits 
likely to accrue to the UK regions.
Since Employers' Federations, both at the national and European
level, represent industrialists, who do not receive ERDF aid directly,
but through government departments, their interest in the Fund is not
stimulated to any great extent and the comments of such bodies are
bound to be general in nature and limited to experessions of support
for the ERDF and statements stressing its importance in the context
37of Economic and Monetary Union.
Trade Union representation at the European level in the form of 
the ETUC is faced with the same problem as the employers' organisation 
UNICE, in so far as it is difficult to achieve a cohesive viewpoint 
from the nine different opinions of national trade union representa­
tives meeting together in the Brussels umbrella organisation. The 
national unions consider issues in the light of the benefits from the
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ERDF likely to accrue to the workers in their country. Naturally, 
union representatives from member states which are net-payers into 
the Fund will see little benefit from such a system and may even oppose 
it; moreover, the unions representing workers in the net-recipient 
member states view the matter from the angle of how much benefit their 
particular country's workers are extracting from the Fund vis à vis 
the other Fund beneficiaries. The British TUC, for example, considers 
the Regional Fund to be a political matter, in that it balances out 
to some extent the UK's net contribution to the CAP in the Community 
Budget. Thus, to ensure that the UK receives a fixed percentage of 
Fund aid from the ERDF, the TUC favours the retention of the national 
quota system of distributing the Fund's resources. Therefore, again 
in such a situation it is difficult to achieve anything more than a 
broad, general statement on an issue such as the ERDF from a European 
organisation such as the ETUC.
Organisations other than those representing the Social Partners
have expressed a broad interest in a Community level regional policy.
For example, the EEC Savings Bank Group came out in strong support
of the ERDF during the debates leading up to the Fund's establishment.
The Group produced memoranda urging that top priority be given to the
establishment of a financial instrument in the EEC, with the specific
aim of counteracting regional disparities. In its annual report of
1975-76, the Savings Bank Group welcomed the establishment of the ERDF
and stressed the need for using the Fund's resources in an efficient
38manner by integrating them into a regional development plan.
The Chambers of Commerce of the Nine, both at the national and 
European level, have also shown an interest in the activities of the 
European Regional Development Fund. The Chambers of Commerce exert 
varying degrees of influence in the different member states of the
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Commiunity. For example in France, they enjoy a statutory status in 
contrast to the weak position in the UK where membership is voluntary 
for* industrialists. The difference in status and relative strength 
of Chambers in the UK and France means that, while both show an 
interest in EEC activities and in the ERDF, the French Chambers have 
the resources to deal effectively with EEC affairs and have specialist 
departments studying different Community policy-areas. In contrast 
to this, the UK Chambers have to 'contract out' to experts to keep 
themselves abreast of EEC affairs.
An example of the efficiency with which the French Chambers of
Commerce deal with Community matters is provided by the Regional
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region,
which in March 1977 produced a comprehensive document assessing the
39impact of the Common Market on their region. In this document, the 
importance of the ERDF for French industrialists in the North of France 
was stressed and the centralist attitude of the French Government in 
Paris deplored. The question was posed to the central government: 
'Pourquoi ne pas donner au Nord-Pas-de-Calais les moyens de tenter 
avec la Belgique une expérience de politique bi-frontalière, d'harmo­
nisation des lois et des normes: en un mot de préfigurer l'Europe de
40demain?'.
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the North of France thus 
expressed its support for increased European integration, for a 
strengthening of the ERDF and for more freedom to enjoy direct contact 
with the European Commission and with its Community neighbours. In 
this way, it was criticising its national government for its excesses 
of centralism in any matters concerning the EEC.
At the European level the Permanent Conference of European 
Chambers of Commerce was set up to act as a consultant to the Commission
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Its structure Includes specialist committees, including one dealing 
with regional policy, which studies Commission proposals and draft 
regulations and comments upon them. However, it does not comment on 
specific project decisions such as Commission approval or rejection 
of member state project-submissions: comments are limited to the
system in general, for example, opinions have been passed on the 
question of additionality, on the distribution of aid between indust­
rial and infrastructure projects or on the Commission proposals for 
a certain percentage of ERDF resources being used to establish an 
'ex-quota' section of Fund aid.
Therefore, the European representative of the Chambers of Commerce 
limits itself to broad statements of a general nature, while its 
national counterparts tend to aim their opinions at their own parti­
cular domestic situation.
Finally, it should be remembered that the Council of Europe, 
although composed of a membership extending much wider than the boun­
daries of the Nine, has also continually pressed for the establishment 
of some kind of regional policy at the Community level. The Council 
has, since the mid-GOs, produced numerous documents and organised 
conventions on the subject of regional problems, in particular in the 
peripheral areas of Europe, and in this way has made an important con­
tribution to the debate at the Community level. However, once more, 
the comments made in the Council of Europe's documentation on regional 
policy in the EEC have tended to be of a general nature, exposing for
example the various kinds of regional problems in the Nine, the lack
41of Fund resources and the problem of additionality.
A distinction must be made between the aforementioned bodies, 
interested in promoting the broad aims of a European Regional Policy, 
and the final two organisations, motivated by self-interest, in that
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they aim to use the issue to further their own cause.
The Council of European Munipicalities is an organisation of 
local authorities in Europe and represents 50,000 communes. It was 
established in 1951 and has national sections in all the member states 
of the EEC except Denmark. The organisation is centred in Luxembourg 
lith its secretariat based in Paris. The Council is a federation of 
national associations which all have their own status and governing 
bodies.
The Council of European Municipalities has, since the first 
debates in the EEC on regional policy, pressed the Commission, the 
national governments and the European Parliament to take action. How­
ever, it has framed its wishes in broad terms, such as the need to 
reduce regional disparities, and has produced no detailed ideas on 
the specific innovations required. The ultimate aim of the Council 
of European Municipalities, in conjunction with the International 
Inion of Local Authorities (lULA) , is to be granted formal status 
rithin the Community decision-making process, and thus be in a position 
to defend the interests of local authorities. Thus, the Regional Fund 
bas been one of the issues used as a lever to further the cause of 
this aim. In December 1976, the Council organised the first Confer­
ence of Presidents of the Regions of the EEC. The Conference was 
dedicated to the examination of Community regional policy at a time 
fhen negotiations were about to begin for the renewal of the ERDF. 
baa result of the Conference, the Consultative Committee of Local and 
Begional Institutions in the EEC was established jointly with lULA.
The Conference has been accorded informal status by the Commission, 
ihich means that there is no obligation on the part of the Commission 
to consult it, when drawing up proposals. The Conference's estab­
lishment and the granting of information status is, however, a move
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1
in the right direction, given its ultimate aim of formal status in 
the decision-making process, on the lines of that accorded to ECOSOC.
The European Parliament enjoys consultative status within the 
framework of the Community Budget in that it has the final say on 
non-obligatory expenditure (expenditure not emanating from a mandate 
set by the Treaty of Rome) . The European Parliament has also been 
seen to support the Commission's attempts to establish a regional 
1 fund at the Community level, and has published documents, statements 
and opinions expressing this support since the early 1960s (see 
Chapter 3) .
However, in addition to its genuine support for Community regional 
policy, the European Parliament has used ERDF issues as 'test cases' 
in its attempts to increase its budgetary influence vis à vis the 
Council of Ministers and to increase its role and importance in the 
Community decision-making process. These issues form an integral 
part of the ensuing chapters of this study.
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CHAPTER 6 : ERDF : MOVES TOWARDS THE SECOND PHASE
This Chapter assesses the Commission's proposals for the second 
phase of ERDF operations as embodied in the 'Guidelines for Community 
Regional Policy' published in June 1977.^ Having surveyed the aims 
expressed by the Commission for ERDF operations and the ensuing pro­
posed modifications to the Fund's Regulation, the subsequent debates 
and disagreements in the Council of Ministers will be analysed. 
Finally the budgetary dispute arising from the Fund's renewal will 
be considered.
1. The Commission's Guidelines
The Commission, in its 'Guidelines for Community Regional Policy' 
2of June 1977, expressed concern that the progressive establishment 
of the Common Market had not achieved the positive results expected 
in terms of a better distribution of economic activity throughout the 
Community's territory. Moreover, the Commission also accepted that 
despite increased efforts by the member states and the Community to 
aid the development of their least favoured regions there had been no 
fundamental change for the better. Thus the imbalances between
3Community-regions remained excessive.
The above problem had been enhanced by the economic crisis of 
1973: the increased cost of raw materials, reduction in investment
and the subsequent slower growth rates of Community economies had 
seriously affected the development of the weaker regions less able to 
combat such difficulties.
The Commission stressed that the persistence of such regional 
imbalances seriously threatened the proper functioning of the Common 
Market and emphasised the need for Community regional policy to become
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4more ambitious and to operate within a framework providing a compre­
hensive policy of structural change. The establishment of such a 
policy which would aid both regions which were underdeveloped before 
the establishment of the Common Market and regions experiencing 
difficulties in restructuring their economies because of the function­
ing of the Common Market, would be a pre-condition of continued 
European economic integration.
Thus the Commission, through the implementation of its new pro­
posals for regional policy, aimed to reduce existing regional problems 
in the less-developed regions and in regions experiencing the process 
of industrial or agricultural reconversion. Moreover, it aimed to 
help prevent new regional imbalances arising from the changed world 
economic climate of the late 1970s or as a consequence of measures 
adopted within the framework of Community policies.^
According to the Commission, the above task involved the assess­
ment of trends in the regional economies of the Community, an increased 
coordination of Community policies and financial instruments, increased 
coordination in the regional policies of the member states and 
increased resources for the European Regional Development Fund.^
Within the context of its expressed aim to strengthen the system 
of analysis and assessment of the regional economies of the Community 
the Commission undertook to present to the Council a draft report on 
the social and economic development of Community regions every two
7years starting in 1979. The aim of this document would be to indi­
cate the principal regional problems, to assess the results achieved 
by the joint actions of the member states and the Community and to 
assist in the establishment of an effective coordination of the 
regional policies of the member states.
In addition, the Guidelines expressed the Commission view that a
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systematic assessment of the regional consequences of Community 
policies was required whenever significant new measures were being
gcontemplated:
The Commission believes it indispensable that from 
now on the spatial dimension be assessed or taken 
into account in the formulation and implementation
of major Community policies .... The harmonious
development of economic activity over the whole 
Community territory also requires the coordination 
of the various Community policies and financial 
instruments and the corresponding coordination of 
the policies of member states.
In the pursuit of the latter aim the Commission accorded an important
grole to the Regional Development Programmes of the member states.
In order to play an effective role in solving the 
different types of regional problem, the Community 
will finance priority projects or groups of projects 
which contribute most to development or reconversion; 
these priorities will be set by region on the basis 
of regional development programmes.
Commissioner Giolitti was given responsibility for the coordination 
of the various Community funds and a task-force was set up for tackling 
this job. The aim of this task-force was to ensure that the expendi­
ture of the Community funds and financial instruments was complementary 
and took account of the aims of regional policy.
The Commission proposed that the Regional Policy Committee be
consulted on the draft two-yearly report (see above) prepared by the
Commission, before its presentation to the Council of Ministers. This
would reinforce the Regional Policy Committee's mandate to study the
development of the economic and social situation in the Community 
10regions. Moreover the Committee would be informed of the conclusions 
of the main reports analysing the Regional Impact Assessment of 
Community policies. This would enable the Committee to make a more 
detailed study of the implications of the geographical dimensions of 
these policies.
Perhaps the most controversial of the Commission's proposals was
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the suggestion that ERDF assistance should be made available both to 
support the regional development measures of member states and for 
specific actions in order to take account of the regional effects of 
existing and future Community policies. This would involve dividing 
the ERDF's resources into a quota section and a non-quota section for 
specific actions. The latter would represent the expression by the 
Community of its responsibility for correcting regional imbalances. 
'These actions are primarily regional policy measures intended to 
supplement or to strengthen the application of other Community policies,
or to correct any adverse regional effects they may have.'
12The Commission highlighted four types of regional problem 
including firstly the underdevelopment of regions, secondly those 
regions experiencing industrial or agricultural change and conse­
quently problems of reconversion and redevelopment, thirdly those 
regions suffering from current or expected problems caused by changes 
in world economic structures or by existing or Community policies, and 
finally those regions which were situated geographically close to a 
frontier and therefore experienced special problems. The latter 
classification applied particularly to the regions of Vest Germany 
which border East Germany.
The Commission viewed the first two types of regional problem as 
medium or long-term situations and thus saw the quota section of the 
Fund as relevant to assist their needs. On the other hand the third 
and fourth types of problem were specific in nature and thus relevant 
to the terms of reference mapped out for the Ex-Quota section of the 
ERDF.
Finally, the Commission expressed a wish, which had been previously
13recorded by the European Parliament to see the regions concerned and 
their representatives associated with the preparation of Community
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14regional policy. It went on to state that the size of the task 
involved in identifying regional problems in all their aspects and in 
indicating the guidelines for coordinated joint-action by the member 
states and the Community required a consultation between the insti­
tutions of the Community, the member states, the Social Partners and 
the regional and local representatives. The Commission undertook to 
make proposals on this during Council discussions.
The Commission's proposed amendments 
to the Fund Regulation______________
In pursuit of the above aims the Commission proposed certain
^amendments to the original Fund Regulation of 1975.
Whereas the annual size of the Fund had been fixed for the three
pear period at the beginning of the ERDF's operations in 1975, Article
2 paragraph 1 of the amended Regulation stated that: 'As from the
budgetary year of 1978 the allocation for the Fund shall be determined
annually by the budget of the E C T h u s  the annual appropriations
yould be fixed each year instead of every three years, when the gene-
|ral budget of the EC was adopted. Moreover, the Commission noted that
ps a result of the conciliation procedure of 1975, the Parliament had
agreed that Fund expenditure after 1977 would be non-obligatory.
The above finances were to be made with a view to achieving the
16pbjective laid down in Article 1 of the proposed amended Regulation:
FThe ERDF ... is intended to correct the principal imbalances within 
the Community'.
The main proposed amendments concerned the differentiation of the 
Kinds of assistance provided by the Fund, the rules governing Fund 
assistance and procedural rules.
Article 2 paragraph 3 of the proposed Regulation divided the Fund
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into two sections, the first section financed by pre-established 
national quotas would support regional policy measures adopted by the 
member states. On the other hand specific Community regional develop­
ment measures would be financed from a non-quota section. Article 
1713 of the proposed Council Regulation dealt with the latter ex­
quota section and elucidated the types of measures that the Commission
18envisaged would be appropriate for this kind of support (see above 
for details).
The Commission proposed changes in the nature of infrastructure 
projects eligible for Fund assistance. It referred to Article 
4(i)(b) of the 1975 Regulation which stipulated that only infrastruc­
ture investments directly linked to the development of industrial, 
artisan or service activities qualified for Fund support. The 
Commission stressed that ERDF operations during its first phase had 
shown that the concept of infrastructure ’directly linked* to industry 
was not always easy to define. Moreover, it was pointed out that the 
basic infrastructure requirements of the Community’s various regions 
were not comparable and that they varied widely from one region to 
another. Thus, the basic infrastructure needs of underdeveloped 
economies or regions such as Ireland and the Mezzogiomo differed 
entirely from those of a decaying economic region suffering structural 
problems, such as the North of England, the Belgian coal-fields or 
the North of France. Likewise, both the former regions differed in 
their requirements from the advanced and relatively prosperous economic 
regions such as those of Vest Germany.
Therefore the Commission proposed that more flexibility be intro­
duced into the definition of eligible infrastructure; for this pur­
pose it suggested that the concept of infrastructure ’directly linked* 
to the development of productive activities be replaced (in Article
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4(1)(b)) by that of infrastructure 'which contributes to the develop­
ment of the region in which it is located, financed wholly or in part
by public authorities or by any other agency responsible, on a similar
19basis as a public authority, for the creation of infrastructure'.
20The Commission also proposed that Article 4(2)(b) of the 1975 
Regulation be amended so that the rate of Fund participation in the 
financing of infrastructure projects of special relevance to the 
development of the region in which they are located could be as much 
as 50%. It added that this facility would be confined to Greenland, 
the Overseas French Departments, Ireland, the Mezzogiomo and Northern 
Ireland, these being the Community regions which had the most serious 
difficulties to contend with.
Certain amendments were proposed by the Commission to Article 
215(2) of the original Regulation with the aim of simplifying pro­
cedures for granting Fund assistance for small projects. Experience 
during the Fund's first phase had shown that hardly any of the small 
projects had raised great difficulties for the Fund's Management 
Committee. In the Commission's view the 10 million eua threshold 
above which projects were the subject of detailed examination, was too 
high for certain regions which did not have the potential to justify 
the location of very large investments. Therefore, it was proposed 
that the threshold beyond which projects were examined and were the 
subject of a case-by-case decision, should be lowered from 10 million 
eua to 5 million eua, and that in order to relieve the heavy adminis­
trative burden on the Commission, only draft decisions relating to 
investments of more than 5 million eua should go to the Fund Manage­
ment Committee for an opinion; only follow-up information would go 
to the Fund Committee on decisions for assistance relating to invest­
ments of less than 5 million eua.
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The Commission incorporated amendments into its proposed
Regulation to cover the adaptation of Fund operation procedures
relating to regional development programmes, annual information, and
22statistical summaries. Article 6 read:
Investments may benefit from the Fund's assistance 
only if they are part of a regional development 
programme the implementation of which is likely to 
contribute to the correction of the main regional 
imbalances within the Community which may impair 
the proper working of the Common Market and the 
converging trend of the Member States' economies, 
with a view, in particular, to the attainment of 
economic and monetary union.
Finally, the Commission aimed to contribute towards the increased 
effectiveness of the ERDF's role in regional development by ensuring 
that payments should be made promptly. In this respect it was pro­
posed that, in certain circumstances, a scheme for advance payments
should be introduced which would ensure a regular and prompt flow of
23funds to the eligible regions.
3. European Parliamentary opinions and activity
The opinion of the European Parliament on the future course of
European regional policy was embodied in its resolution of 21 April
1977.^^ Moreover, on the basis of the publication of the Commission's
Guideline proposals and their subsequent discussion in the Council of
Ministers, the Parliament's Committee of Regional Policy, Regional
25Planning and Transport drafted a Report. In this Report it was
noted that the Commission had largely taken account of the Parliament's
proposals laid down in the Resolution of April 1977.
In its Resolution the European Parliament had demanded that the
27Commission adopt an overall approach to regional policy, provide a
28broader interpretation of the notion of infrastructure, stress the
importance of the coordination of Community policies and financial 
29instruments and reiterate the significant role of regional develop-
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30ment programmes. The Report drafted by Monsieur L. Noé in October 
1977 congratulated the Commission for having adhered to the voice of 
the•European Parliament.
However, the Report stressed the need to increase the number of 
officials in the Directorate-General for Regional Policy of thei
Commission (DG XVI) to enable the thorough examination of regional
I  3 1development programmes due to be consulsory from 1st January 1978
and the thorough implementation of the Regional Impact Assessment.
The European Parliament approved the proposal to establish an
ex-quota section for the ERDF and also the fact that specific Community
projects were to be based on Community criteria. Neverthless it
requested that these projects should not be linked to the Council's
approval on a case-by-case basis, so as to enable the Fund to inter-
32vene more rapidly.
The European Parliament favoured a broadening of the eligibility 
criteria relevant for aid to infrastructure projects (see above). The 
Commission had incorporated the views of the Parliament in its Guide­
lines which stated: 'ERDF assistance is for both investments in infra­
structures which can contribute to regional economic development and
33to improving the quality of life of the population concerned'.
Moreover, the Parliament noted that the Commission communication had
repeated almost ad verbatim a further Parliamentary point on infra- 
34structure aid, namely that:
The Community ought to be in a position to assist 
those regions in the provision of social infrastructure, 
education and vocational training, in so far as these 
contribute directly to regional development, since the 
high cost and lack of immediate return is a heavy charge 
on the member-states concerned.
The new wording of Article 4(1)(b) of the Fund Regulation accordingly
took account of this view with the provision that projects would.be
eligible if they 'contributed to the development of the region in
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which they were located* (see above). The European Parliament had
35proposed such criteria as early as 1973 during the discussions
which preceded the Fund's establishment.
In its Report of October 1977, the European Parliament stressed
again the need for local and regional authorities to play a key role
in ERDF operations and also expressed a wish to see more publicity
36given to projects receiving Fund aid.
Moreover it reaffirmed the requirement that the Fund's resources
be used additionally to national-aid and not merely to top-up
37domestic resources.
With reference to budgetary matters and to the question of
budgetary allocations for the ERDF, the European Parliament's Committee
on Budgets submitted a written opinion on the Commission's Guidelines
38for Regional Policy.
This stressed that henceforth the annual financial endowment of
the Regional Fund must be determined in accordance with the budgetary
procedure. In addition the Committee considered it essential that a
mechanism was established to reassess Fund appropriations in order to
protect the real value of resources in future years.
The Committee criticised the Commission for making no attempt to
forecast how the financial volume of the Fund would develop in the 
39medium term. It pointed out that in the triennial financial esti­
mates accompanying the preliminary draft budget for 1978, the Commis­
sion submitted estimates of expenditure for the years 1978/79 but did
40not provide any explanation for the amounts quoted.
Finally the Committee on Budgets welcomed the introduction of 
the system of advance payments for Fund operations but stressed that 
this should be accompanied by a system of supervision enabling the 
Commission to ensure that the advances be passed on to the final
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beneficiary as soon as possible and that they could be recovered if
41the initial project is abandoned or radically altered.
After the publication of the Commission's Guidelines and amidst 
its activity on the issue of the ERDF Regulation amendments, the 
European Parliament also became deeply involved in a conflict sur­
rounding the 1978 budgetary allocation for the ERDF.
The European Commission proposed, in its first draft of the 1978 
Community Budget (presented to the European Parliament on 7th July
1977), that the ERDF be allocated 750 million ua in budgetary com­
mitments (650 million ua for the national quotas and 100 million ua 
for the new Ex-Quota system) and 600 million ua in payment appropri­
ations. Additionally, it provided for 1000 million ua and 1250 
million ua for 1979 and 1980 respectively.
In its version of the 1978 budget in August 1977, the Council of 
Ministers reduced these figures to 398 million ua in budgetary com­
mitments. However, the European Parliament re-established the 
original appropriations provided for by the Commission in its first 
reading of the budget on 12-16th September 1977. This meant that a 
qualified majority vote would be necessary in the Council before the
Parliament's amendments could be rejected, given the 'non-obligatory'
42nature of the ERDF in the Community budget.
One possible problem which could arise from the exchanges on the 
budgetary issue was that, if the Council of Ministers accepted the 
increase in appropriations, it would 'break' the ceiling agreed by the 
European Parliament. (The European Parliament's Margin of Monoeuvre.)^^ 
In addition, Ireland and Italy were likely to vote in favour of the 
Parliamentary increases when the issue was put to the vote in the 
Council session (since they stood to gain most) and therefore it 
would be possible, if another country voted with them, to force the
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Council into accepting the increased appropriations.
Thus the main bone of contention at the Joint Budget and Foreign 
Affairs Council of Ministers Meeting (21st-23rd November 1977) was 
the question of the ERDF's appropriations for 1978, with a possibility 
of the Council revocation of the European Parliament's increase for 
the ERDF being defeated by the qualified majority voting procedure.
Nevertheless, the Council's amendment was carried in the vote in
which Italy abstained. In the Communique following the Council
meeting, it was stated that:
the Council has, in the context of the budgetary 
procedure, and in order that this may continue to 
progress in the normal manner, rejected the amend­
ment by the Assembly aimed at re-establishing the 
Commitment appropriations of 750 million eua, 
originally proposed by the Commission, the effect 
of which will be the re-establishment of the Commit­
ment appropriations of 398 million eua which it had 
included in the draft budget ... the Council under­
takes to re-examine this question during a concili­
ation procedure to be held with the Assembly on 7th 
December with a view to reaching an agreement with
the latter on a figure which will represent a sub­
stantial real increase in the activity of the F u n d . ^ 4
The Communique added that 'the provisions were taken in order to permit
the European Council to pronounce on the key questions in the matter'.
4. Renewal of the Fund Regulation:
Initial Reactions in the Council of Ministers
Parallel to the dispute between the Council and the European 
Parliament over the ERDF's budgetary appropriations, disagreements 
arose in the Council of Ministers during discussions on the Commis­
sion's proposed amendments to the Fund Regulation; the majority of
member states opposed any changes in the distribution of the Fund's 
national quotas, though the Netherlands expressed support for a 
genuine Community regional policy without any national share system.
On the other hand, the French wanted a larger share of the Fund because
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they claimed that some of their Overseas Departments were not taken
46into account in the original calculations. Indeed during the
47Council meeting on the budgetary issue, the French set as a pre­
condition for their approval on the matters at stake, the promise that 
they would receive an increase in their present share of quota allo­
cations . The Irish too stated that they would also have something to 
say on the matter should the problem of shares be raised.
Reaction to the Commission's proposals for the establishment of 
an Ex-Quota section for the ERDF ranged from the unreserved support 
expressed by the Netherlands, to conditional acceptance and to total 
hostility shown by the French who considered regional policy a domestic 
economic matter. Italy, after some initial opposition to the system, 
was, by the time of the November Council session, in favour of the 
innovation, as was Ireland. Luxembourg considered that the system 
must make it possible to offset any disadvantages shown in the quota 
section. West Germany would only accept the ex-quota if its scope and 
methods were precisely defined.
Certain members, including Italy, were in favour of the more flex­
ible definition proposed by the Commission for infrastructure project- 
eligibility. On the other hand, fears were expressed that this 
flexibility might relax the link with genuine regional action. For 
example. West Germany would only accept the Commission proposal if the 
infrastructure projects were linked to productive investments.
Thus, the problems of the Regional Fund were passed over to the 
European Council meeting of 5th and 6th December 1977 by the Council 
of Ministers session of mid-November (see above). Commissioner 
Giolitti considered that the decision taken by the Council on the 
commitments for 1978 at the aforementioned Council meeting was the 
only possible solution, given the deadlock that had arisen. He parti­
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cularly stressed that the fact that there was talk of a 'real*
increase in the volume of the Fund for 1978 meant that it would at
49least have to be up-dated compared with 1977. (Appropriations for 
1977 totalled 500 million ua which corresponded to 398 million eua.)
On the wider issue of the Fund Regulation, Giolitti considered
that the situation did not merit calling into question the difficult 
political compromise reached three years before on the national quota 
issue. He also pointed out to the French that a re-examination of 
the shares of each country might well yield less favourable results 
for those who called for such a revision, especially as the regional 
imbalances had increased rather than declined. This matter was 
referred to COREPER though there was little hope of agreement because 
of the entrenched positions of the member states. This meant that it 
would be the responsibility of the European Council to reach a deci­
sion. The other main points of contention had also been referred to 
COREPER by the Council of Ministers though again, for the same reason, 
with little chance of agreement and a high probability that they too 
would come before the European Council. (These points included:
Fund appropriations for 1978, distribution of national shares, the 
question of regular reports, which the Commission would have to draw 
up on regional policy and the follow-up that the Council would have 
to give them, the question of the ex-quota section, and that of the 
definition of eligible infrastructure projects.)
5. The European Council (5th, 6th December 1977) and
the Continued Debate on the Fund Regulation's Amendments
As expected, the European Council meeting on 5th, 6th December 
1977 took a decision on the Regional Fund's appropriations and on the 
method of distributing Fund aid: the European Council approved an
149
overall budgetary commitment of 1,850 million eua^^ (£1,234 million) 
for three years 1978-80, to be divided up into allocations of 580 
million eua (£386m) for 1978, 620 million eua (£414m) for 1979 and 
650 million eua (£434m) for 1980. It was decided that the system of 
national quotas that had been used in the Fund's first phase should 
be continued, though the distribution differed slightly from the 
previous three years to take into account a 2% increase accorded to 
France for her Overseas Departments. Percentage-wise the new allo­
cations were to be:
Belgium 1.39 Italy 39.39
Denmark 1.20 Luxembourg 0.09
West Germany 6.00 Netherlands 1.58
France 16.86 U.K. 27.03
Ireland 6.46
The European Parliament's reaction to the Council's endowment of 
1,850 million eua for the period 1978-80 was that it considered the 
figure to indicate that the Council possibly viewed the Fund as being 
less than a permanent feature of Community policy. A clear majority 
of members of the European Parliament (consisting of members of all 
the political groups) wished the institution to use its power of last 
word to impose a figure higher than 580 million eua. However, a 
minority large enough, at the last stage of the procedure, to prevent 
the amendment being adopted, felt that, although an increase in 
Regional Fund spending was necessary, the over-riding of Council by 
Parliament would result in no budget being adopted by the end of the 
financial year.
The amendments to the Regional Fund Regulation of 1975 should 
have come into effect on 1st January 1978. However, it was only at 
the meetings of 6th, 26th and 27th June 1978 that the Council of 
Ministers agreed in principle to all the points under discussion. At 
these June meetings, the Council agreed to the setting-up of an
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Ex-Quota section for the ERDF, amounting to 5% of the total Fund 
resources. The French, who had throughout the debate led the oppo­
sition to the Ex-Quota section, finally acquiesced, on condition 
that it was fixed at 5% and not 8% as the Commission's final proposal 
suggested. The UK fell in conveniently behind the French in the 
debates and kept a very low profile, although they considered that 
the ex-quota section should be small rather than large. The UK was 
never very enthusiastic about the innovation but decided early on in 
the discussions not to black the idea and thus risk isolation.
Nevertheless, despite agreement in principle on the ex-quota 
section, the unanimous decision of the Council was required before 
aid could be granted under this scheme. The Commission saw the 
£20,000,000 per annum for three years that it had been given as a pilot 
scheme for the future and as an opportunity to demonstrate to the 
Council that the ex-quota section could be beneficial to the regions.
During discussion on the Commission's infrastructure project 
proposals, the main points of contention centred upon the percentages 
of funding available from the Commission and the proposed wider defi­
nition of eligibility put forward by the Commission for infrastructure 
aid. The final agreement on the first of these points meant that aid 
of up to 40% could be provided for some regions. The French objected 
to the differentiation caused by the naming of specific regions eli­
gible for this aid; they thought that it should be applicable to 
special projects everywhere.
A position was reached where 50% for all areas was suggested but 
the Germans objected to this and held out for a figure of 30%. The 
issue then became caught up with simultaneous discussions on FEOGA: 
the Agricultural Council encountered difficulties on Agricultural 
Infrastructure rates of grant, and as a compromise, it was agreed that
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whatever rate was fixed for Regional Infrastructure special areas 
would also apply to FEOGA. This meant that the issue took on a new 
Importance because FEOGA does not operate under a quota-system.
Eventually, a figure of 40% was agreed upon: the UK was satisfied
with this since it does not benefit greatly from FEOGA money for 
infrastructure (it was mainly Italy who would benefit from this).
On the second point, that of defining eligible projects, the 
wider definition laid down in the Commission's proposal was accepted 
for the Regulation. Thus the clause: 'projects which aid the develop­
ment of the regions' was to replace the old wording 'of direct link 
to industry'.
The West Germans were the most stubborn blocking force to the 
infrastructure proposals in the Council. This was partly due to their 
domestic departmental structure: the Ministry of Economics is respon­
sible for dealing with the ERDF but has only limited responsibility 
for infrastructure (it is only responsible for infrastructure directly 
linked with industry). This produced inter-departmental arguments with­
in West Germany on the infrastructure issue, since separate ministries 
were responsible for questions of, for example, social and transport 
infrastructure. Thus, the Germans were particularly sensitive on this 
issue but agreed to the amendment on the basis of an entry made in the 
Council's minuted, providing that within two years, the Commission 
would define the infrastructure measures eligible for aid.
The UK allowed West Germany and Belgium to lead the debate on the 
infrastructure issue in the knowledge that they would be satisfied 
with the aims of these two member states. On the other hand, the 
European Parliament adopted a particularly vigorous and determined 
attitude on the issue of the Council agreements. It took the view that 
the Commission should not have accented the fact that the Council had
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cut down the Ex-Quota resources so drastically. The Parliament 
voiced its disapproval during the statutory conciliation procedure 
which takes place between Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
The meeting of the Conciliation Committee was held on 24th July in 
Brussels, at which the European Parliament surprised the Council by 
its determined attitude, especially regarding the Ex-Quota section of 
the Fund. No agreement was reached at this meeting but the Council 
President stated that the Council would reconsider its position 
before a second conciliation procedure meeting which might take place 
in September 1978.
Between September 1978 and March 1979, two major issues became
involved in the regional policy debate and made the issue of the Fund's
regulation's renewal even more protracted and complex. These were the
arguments surrounding the ERDF's budgetary allocation for 1979 (see
Chapter 8) and the'transfer of resources' question in connection with 
53the EMS debate. Meanwhile, however, the conciliation procedure 
between the Council and the European Parliament resumed on the 7th 
October 1978 after the three months' 'cooling-off period, with the 
Parliamentarians still maintaining certain reservations about the 
Council texts.
The Council was prepared, without amending the texts themselves, 
partially to take the Parliament's demands into account, by statements 
recorded in the minutes along the lines of its requests. Thus, while 
the Ministers did consider it impossible to question the important 
points of the compromise which had been decided amongst the Nine with 
'considerable difficulty' concerning the global endowment of the ERDF, 
national quotas and the Ex-Quota section endowments, they did define 
a certain number of points of flexibility which partly, at least, 
responded to the concerns of the European Parliament. In particular.
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the draft Regulation provided that an eventual unused remainder from 
the Ex-Quota section would be re-allocated to the quota section; the 
Council now expressed a willingness to apply this principle only for 
the overall period 1978-80 and not annually as it had previously 
demanded.
The new phase of consultation between the Council and Parliament 
appeared to have achieved progress to the extent that an agreement now 
seemed in sight. Nevertheless, the Parliament called upon the Council 
to 'make a final effort' and allow the annual allocation of credits 
from the Ex-Quota section to be decided by a qualified majority. The 
Council President, von Dohnanyi, undertook to inform his colleagues 
accordingly and agreed to contact the President of the Parliament on 
the matter. It therefore seemed possible that the question would be 
settled quickly and that the new Regional Fund Regulations would come 
into force, enabling the Commission to administer the ERDF according 
to the new wider and more flexible criteria.
Sig;nor Giolitti, Commissioner for Regional Policy, pointed out 
the similarity between the views of the Commission and the Parliament, 
and stressed that, with the establishment of EMS, with parallel studies 
on the role of the Community budget and enlargement, regional policy 
was bound to assume an entirely new dimension which would inevitably 
require fundamental debates on the subject. Thus, he claimed that, 
at this stage, it would be absurd to quarrel over a few technical 
details.
In the final settlement, the Council rejected the Parliament's 
final claim for qualified majority voting for the Ex-Quota section, 
but the Parliament had won considerable ground during the conciliation 
procedure.
Despite the fact that, before Christmas 1978, a final settlement
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had been reached between the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament on the amendments to the ERDF Regulation, the French (at 
the time holding the Council Presidency) refused to allow the final 
adoption of the updated version until agreement had been reached on 
the other conciliation procedure taking place concerning Community 
aid to non-associated developing countries. It was not until 17th 
January 1979 that the French government agreed to break the link 
between the two issues. Thus the way was open for the new Regulation 
on the Community's Regional Policy.
The conclusions reached in the conciliation procedure were : -
1. The Commission was given more flexibility in the national 
quota system by being henceforth permitted to apply them 
over a three year rather than a one year period.
2. It was decided that the opinion of the Regional Fund 
Committee on a Commission decision to grant aid from the 
Fund should be given within 30 days.
3. In order to give the Fund greater flexibility, it was 
decided that the rule whereby any allocations not used 
from the Ex-Quota section should revert to the quota 
section would not be applied annually but over the three 
years of the Fund's existence (1978-80).
4. Whenever the Council took a decision which differed from 
the Commission's viewpoint, it undertook to inform the 
European Parliament.
5. When the time came for a further revision of the Fund 
Regulation - i.e. before the end of 1980 - the Council 
promised to pay particular attention to the views expressed 
by the European Parliament.
54The updated version of the text of the March 1975 Regulation,
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containing the new points of agreement and the amendments that had 
been made to the old Regulation was published in the Official Journal 
of 9th February 1979 and thus finally came into operation.
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CHAPTER 7 ; RENEWAL OF THE ERDF:
RADICAL CHANGE?
The debate surrounding the Fund's renewal and the amendments to 
the original 1975 Regulation was protracted and highly politicised 
(see Chapter 6). The question posed by the final outcome was whether 
the agreement would herald major changes in the Fund's administration 
or whether on the other hand the Fund was likely to operate along the 
same lines as during the 'first phase' between 1975 and the end of 
1977.
The Commission's Guideline proposals of June 1977 had been
ambitious in so far as they advocated a more global and comprehensive
approach towards regional policy at the Community level; they had
proposed certain innovations which would contribute towards a move in
this direction, including the introduction of a Regional Impact
Assessment (RIA)^ and the setting up of an 'Ex-Quota Section' for the
Fund (which would involve the deployment of a certain percentage of
the ERDF's resources - 13% was the original Commission suggestion -
outside the national quota system of distribution) which would enable
direct Commission action in the financing of 'specific Community 
2actions'. Moreover, the Commission had expressed a wish to see the 
regions and their representatives associated with Community regional 
policy.
The Commission had also proposed certain amendments to the methods 
of administering the Fund in the light of experience gained during the 
'first phase'. These included a broadening of the infrastructure 
eligibility criteria to cover projects contributing towards the develop­
ment of the region (thus dropping the need for projects to be directly 
linked to industry), measures to speed up the payment of Fund aid, to
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increase the efficiency of the Regional Policy and Fund Management 
Committees and the need for improving data analysis of the regional 
situation in the member states.
Thus in its Guideline proposals of June 1977, the Commission had 
not only suggested several amendments to the Fund Regulations aimed 
at increasing the efficiency of the ERDF, but also advocated a broad­
ening of the Community's horizons by stressing the need for a move 
away from the situation where the ERDF was acting in isolation, to­
wards the establishment of a comprehensive Community regional policy. 
The implication of the latter proposal was that account be taken of 
the regional dimension during the drafting of all Community proposals, 
in all policy-fields.
As had been the case during the debates preceding the ERDF's 
establishment in 1975, the issue became highly politicised, particu­
larly as far as the size and distribution of the new Fund were con­
cerned. However, despite the fact that the Commission consulted with 
organisations such as UNICE, the ETUC and the Standing Conference of 
European Chambers of Commerce during the drafting of its Guidelines 
and also received delegations from the member states' regions, these 
bodies were given no scope for influencing the outcome of the debates 
in the highly politicised environment of the Council of Ministers, 
as had been the case three years earlier when discussions had been 
taking place prior to the ERDF's establishment. Nevertheless, one 
significant difference from the discussions on the original Fund was 
the active and forceful role played by the European Parliament, a 
supposedly 'subsidiary linkage' in the Community decision-making pro­
cess (see below).
Whereas the debates on the size and distribution of the new Fund 
were of a highly politicised and sensitive nature, those Commission
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proposals which did not involve finance or increased Community 
involvement in domestic regional policies, do not appear to have 
been the cause of much conflict in the Council of Ministers. These 
proposals included the measures for increasing the efficiency of the 
Regional Fund: advance payment of aid, improvements in the working
of the Regional Policy and Fund Management Committees, regional 
impact assessment, etc. However, the Commission's proposal for con­
sulting with representatives of the regions on matters of Community 
regional policy was not even discussed by the Council of Ministers. 
Moreover, the proposals for broadening the eligibility criteria for 
infrastructure aid and for amending the percentage funding available 
for infrastructure projects were the subject of much contention in 
the Council debates. The root cause of the difficulties on this pro­
posal lay with the West German fear that increased flexibility in the 
Regulation might relax the link with genuine regional action. This 
exemplified the German wish to define precisely the scope and method 
of Community policies. Moreover, the fact that West Germany's 
domestic methods of regional policy administration proved difficult 
to reconcile with Regional Fund infrastructure aid, demonstrated the 
difficulties of operating a Community-wide Fund in an area where the 
Nine already operate nine different domestic policies, under nine sets 
of rules and priorities.
The difficulties encountered on the percentage funding for 
infrastructure projects and the way this became linked with discussions 
in the Agricultural Council of Ministers on agricultural infrastructure 
rates of grant, demonstrated how issues in different policy-areas 
often become linked in the process of arriving at a compromise agree­
ment in the Council of Ministers. This can lead to proposals which on 
the surface do not appear to be at all contentious, becoming crucial
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factors in the bargaining process, as was the case with the example 
at hand because of the fact that FEOGA resources, unlike ERDF aid, 
are not distributed according to a rigid national quota system. The 
linking of issues in different policy-areas can also be used as a 
delaying tactic by one or more member state; this was exemplified by 
the French Government's refusal to allow the final adoption of the 
new Fund Regulation for over one month between December 1978 and 
January 1979 despite the conclusion of the conciliation procedure 
between the Council and the European Parliament. The French success­
fully blocked progress by linking the final adoption of the new ERDF 
Regulation with the successful conclusion of the conciliation pro­
cedure on Community aid to non-associated developing countries.
The attitudes demonstrated during Council debates on the most 
sensitive and ambitious of the Commission's proposals, namely that an 
Ex-Quota system be established outside the Fund's national quota 
system, were indicative of the member states' general attitudes to­
wards the European Community. The Community-spirited Dutch and Luxem- 
bourgers gave the system their unreserved support. The Italians and 
Irish also favoured the EQS, though more for the reason that they were 
likely to benefit from it. In contrast to this, total opposition was 
demonstrated by the French who were completely against the potential 
direct Commission interference in regional policy, which they consid­
ered to be primarily a national matter. Their eventual acceptance of 
the system was based upon the pre-condition that their national quota 
share of the Fund be increased to provide aid for the French Overseas 
Departments and that the EQS be cut back from the Commission's final 
proposal of 8% of total Fund aid to the miniscule figure of 5% 
(£20,000,000 per annum for three years). This demand by the French, 
whereby they extracted a greater share of ERDF aid by refusing to
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accept the EQS unless their demands were met, typifies the tactics 
eî loyed by the majority of member states during the Council bar­
gaining process.
The West Germans again demonstrated their concern for precise 
definitions of scope and methods before agreeing to the EQS.. Finally, 
self-interest motivations were behind the British ambivalence towards 
the introduction of the system since it was unclear whether they 
would receive any aid from the EQS. Once the Commission produced 
working examples of the types of projects which they envisaged sup­
porting under the new scheme and included ship-building projects, the 
DK fear that the EQS would be primarily directed at the Mediterranean 
regions was somewhat appeased. Nevertheless, the British did not push 
hard for the introduction of the Ex-Quota section since it was still 
unclear whether they would gain more, in absolute terms, from a Fund 
covered entirely by the national quota system. This ambivalent 
position led to the British taking a back-seat position in the Council 
debates.
The Commission was faced with the inevitable task of mediating 
between the conflicting opinions expressed by member states in the 
Council and with coming up with a compromise formula for the EQS; what 
had originally appeared an ambitious proposal was whittled down to an 
insignificant proportion of total Fund resources (5%) . However, the 
Commission made a 'gain', in so far as the EQS was accepted albeit in 
a drastically reduced form. It was now up to the Commission to demon­
strate the advantages of such a system by choosing four or five pilot 
projects in the next phase of the Fund's administration and in this 
way show that the EQS, if provided with more resources, could become 
a worthwhile arm of the Fund. This tactic of gradually eroding the 
suspicion in some member states of innovations like the EQS providing
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a direct role for the Commission, .seems to offer a better chance of 
gaining Council acceptance for proposals than the submission of 
ambitious and sweeping plans by the Brussels bureaucracy.
The debate on the size of the ERDF cannot be discussed without 
considering the active role played by the European Parliament. The 
Parliament, while expressing an interest in the promotion of Community 
regional policy, also had broader interests in mind when stating its 
view. As part of the conciliation agreement drawn up between the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament at the time of the 
Fund's establishment in 1975, the Fund was to be classed as non- 
obligatory expenditure in the Community Budget from the end of the 
'first phase'. Thus the Parliament would have the final say on the 
level of the Fund in the Budget and the Fund would be fixed each year 
I according to the budgetary procedure. Moreover, the Parliament would 
, have the right to influence future debates on Community regional 
policy by entering into a conciliation procedure with the Council. 
Therefore the Parliament was now in conflict with the Council of 
Ministers over the size of the budgetary allocation and they also 
surprised the Council with their determined attitude in the concili­
ation procedure discussions on the new Fund Regulation.
As far as the latter conciliation procedure was concerned, given 
the context of the imminent Direct Elections to the European Parli­
ament and the Parliament's desire to win a meaningful role for itself 
in the decision-making process, there was obviously more at stake than 
the desire to influence the immediate debate. Indeed, the beginnings 
of a shift in the institutional balance away from the traditional 
Commission-Council dialogue, with the Parliament replacing the 
Commission as the 'European* arm of the relationship were in evidence; 
once the debate on the Guideline proposals began, it was the Parliament
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which denounced the manner in which the Commission acquiesced to the 
Council's intransigence and concentrated on achieving a compromise 
agreement, albeit low-key in nature. Moreover, it was the Parliament 
which won the concessions from the Council in the conciliation pro­
cedure which allowed for a more flexible operation of the quota 
system and the establishment of an ex-quota system and for the various 
other amendments to the general administration of the Fund. The 
Commission, in the person of Signor Giolitti (Commissioner for regional 
policy) was left with the role of trying to emphasise the similarity 
in the views of the Council and the Parliament in order to get the new 
Regulation off the ground. Thus, whereas the desire to compromise in 
order to achieve agreement, no matter the cost, in terms of sacri­
ficing the ambitions of its own proposals would appear to have been 
prominent in the Commission's actions, the Parliament was extremely 
forceful in the way that it impressed its views and demands upon the 
Council.
The same desire to extend the role and influence of the European 
Parliament was evident in the debate on the budgetary allocations for 
the new Regional Fund where Parliament used the issue as a test-case 
for asserting its authority in the Community budgetary procedure.
The fact that the Parliament succeeded in gaining an increase of 325 
lillion eua for the 1979 Fund allocation (the final agreement was 945 
jiillion eua compared with the 620 million eua figure set for 1979 at 
the December 1977 European Council meeting) and proved so intransigent 
In the face of the Council's counter-arguments to their case, proved 
that the Parliament was determined not to be bullied by the Council 
of Ministers and intended to hand over to the directly elected Parli- 
ment a meaningful platform on which to build.
Among the arguments countered by the Parliament, perhaps the
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most significant was the claim by certain member states, particularly 
France and West Germany, that because the European Council had set 
the global figures for the ERDF between 1977 and 1979, these could 
not be amended by the Parliament. This could obviously have set a 
precedent by asserting the 'sanctity* of other European Council 
decisions on Community finance, had the German and French claim been 
successful. Thus it was extremely important that the Parliament 
should succeed in carrying through its demands against these arguments 
in order to secure a significant role in the budgetary process. If 
the European Council had succeeded in imposing its figures for the 
ERDF upon the European Parliament, the budgetary power of 'last word* 
held by the latter institution on finances covered by the non- 
obligatory section of the Community Budget would have been meaning­
less .
Thus the question having been posed as to whether the final 
agreements on the ERDF and the amendments to the Fund Regulation consti­
tutes a radical change in direction for the Fund’s administration, the 
answer must be negative. Despite the fact that, on the European 
Parliament's insistence, the Fund would be appreciably larger than 
would otherwise have been the case and would operate under more flex­
ible rules than in the first phase of administration, and despite 
agreement having been reached on the introduction of an Ex-Quota 
Section and on the more flexible rules for the infrastructure eligi­
bility criteria, the Fund was going to operate largely on the same 
lines as hitherto; 95% of the Fund's resources would still be dis­
tributed by the national quota system of administration and would rely 
on close cooperation between national and Community levels. Moreover, 
the question of whether member states used Fund aid in strict adher­
ence with the principle of additionality would continue to be raised
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and the extent of direct Commission involvement in the regions of the 
member states would still be determined by national methods of Fund 
administration, and general attitudes towards EEC affairs and the 
European Commission.
Nevertheless, a certain change of direction was apparent; the 
question of the transfer of resources to the poorer regions of the 
Community had once more become a live issue in the context of the 
European Monetary System (the latest attempt to coordinate the Economic 
and Monetary Policies of the Community). It was hoped that this could 
add impetus to the Commission's aims of coordinating the Community's 
financial instruments. In this respect contradictions in the aims 
and operations of the various Community funds would be avoided and 
the regional dimension would be considered when drawing up all Community 
proposals. In addition, the successful operation of the EMS could mean 
an increased role for the European Investment Bank in the regions of 
the Community thus signifying an increase in the system of loans for 
regional projects to supplement the grants provided by the ERDF.
Finally, however, it must be remembered that because the imple­
mentation of the new Regulation was delayed by some 15 months, until 
March 1979, the Fund had to continue operations under the old rules 
of the original Regulation until this date. Thus despite regional 
authorities being aware of the proposed amendments it was impossible 
to make the appropriate adjustments in their project submissions until 
agreement had been reached. Moreover, the recent changes and innova­
tions in the Fund's operation, for example the Ex-Quota Section and 
the broader eligibility criteria for infrastructure aid, ran the risk 
of having little opportunity to prove their worth since the Fund 




1, Giolitti, the Commissioner responsible for regional policy, was 
already involved in the supervision of a 'task-force' whose aim 
was the coordination of the Community's financial instruments. 
The Guidelines proposed that this move be strengthened by the 
RIA through which DG XVI would assess the regional implications 
of all Community activities in all policy areas.
2. Defined as measures strengthening the application of other 
Community policies or aiming to correct any adverse regional 
effects which these may have.
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CHAPTER EIGHT : E.R.D.F. OPERATIONS 
UNDER THE AMENDED REGULATION (1979-82) 
AND PROPOSALS FOR A FURTHER REVISION OF 
THE FUND AND ITS OPERATIONS
The aim of this chapter is firstly to provide details of the 
budgetary conflicts in which the size of the ERDF became embroiled 
during the first two years of operations under the amended regulation. 
Secondly, the Fund's administration will be considered during the three 
years up to the beginning of 1982. Thirdly, the major issues at stake 
during this period will be discussed including the Commission's 
latest proposals for further revision and amendment of the Fund regula­
tion and ERDF administration. Finally, a critical analysis will be 
made of recent Fund operations, and the prospects for the future of 
the ERDF will be considered against the new Commission proposals and 
initial reactions to them in the Council of Ministers.
1. Budgetary issues at stake
Recent budgetary issues and disputes between the European Parli­
ament and the Council of Ministers are significant to the present 
discussion for various reasons and the Regional Fund has been used as 
a test-case by the European Parliament in its battles with the Council 
on various issues.
Firstly the fixing of ERDF appropriations has been at the centre 
of controversies concerning the size of the non-obligatory section of 
the budget (of which the Fund is a constituent part). Secondly, and 
linked with the previous problem, disagreements have arisen over the 
fixing of the margin of manoeuvre by which the original budgetary 
appropriations may be raised by Parliament during the budgetary pro­
cedure (see below). Thirdly, the Parliament successfully contested the
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right of the European Council to fix a three year appropriation for the 
ERDF. Finally, the hold-ups and uncertainties surrounding the annual 
budgetary allocations for the Fund have made an already difficult task 
for the Commission (in the sense that it is difficult enough to operate 
the ERDF effectively on the basis of annual Fund instalments) extremely 
arduous.
The belated agreement on the amended Fund regulation in February 
1979 had been reached amidst controversy over the size of the Community's 
1979 budget and more specifically amidst disagreements between the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament over the allocations 
for the ERDF for 1978-80 which had been laid down by the European 
Council meeting of 5th-6th December 1977: 1,850 million eua, including
580 million eua for 1978, 620 million eua for 1979 and 650 million eua 
for 1980 (see Chapter six).
The 1978 budget had been passed with difficulty and despite
vociferous dissent in certain quarters (see Chapter six). However, when
the draft budget for 1979 was forwarded to the European Parliament by
the Council of Ministers for its first reading, the Parliament voted
on over 300 amendments and added 850 million eua to the figures which
had resulted from the Council's first cut-backs in July 1978.^
2In November 1978, it appeared likely that the Council would prune 
most of the EP's increases, including the 480 million eua (£302 million) 
to a new total of 1100 million eua (£693 million).
Some ministers in the Council, notably the French and German, took 
the view that the amount of money earmarked for the ERDF for 1978-80 
had already been decided at the European Council meeting .of December 
197@. Thus the only body capable of amending the figures was the 
European Council.
Not surprisingly, the EP strongly challenged this argument since
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it would have meant that a major budgetary decision, possibly followed 
by others with financial implications, had been decided outside the 
normal Community budgetary procedure.
Nevertheless, despite the views of certain member states' ministers, 
the Budget Ministers collectively failed to agree during their second 
reading of the Community's draft budget for 1979 when they met in
3Brussels on 20th November 1978. This therefore meant that Parliament's 
amendment, proposing that 480 million eua should be added to ERDF 
commitment appropriations (198 million eua in payment appropriations) 
could not be rejected. Under a strict legal interpretation of the 
relative budgetary powers of the European Parliament and Council of 
Ministers (which requires that a qualified majority in Council is neces­
sary when voting on Parliament's increases to non-obligatory expenditure 
including the ERDF), the amendment should have been deemed accepted. 
However, the Council did not appear to place this interpretation on the 
matter.
The core of the dispute was the position adopted by most member 
states, that the Budget Council could not override the decision taken 
at the European Council on the amount to be placed at the disposal of 
the Fund. Nevertheless, two member states, Italy and the UK - each with 
10 votes - refused to vote against the Parliament's amendment, thus 
constituting a blocking minority, which under EEC rules should have 
meant the acceptance of the amendment.
4The issue raised another question, namely whether the Parliament's 
amendment could be rejected because the Council had failed to agree to 
raise the margin of manoeuvre (the amount by which the Parliament is 
legally allowed to increase the budgetary allocation) which stood at 
135 million eua and which had almost entirely been used up by Council 
acceptance of earlier parliamentary amendments. Thus the acceptance of
172
the ERDF amendment would have led to an increase above the permitted 
figure. Nevertheless, some delegations objected to this tactic since 
they claimed that (and were backed up by the European Parliament) the 
margin of manoeuvre could not be approved before the end of the budget­
ary procudure: i.e. at the Parliament's plenary session in December.
A vote was therefore taken in the Council on the issue but no qualified 
majority existed to increase the margin of manoeuvre which meant that 
the Regional Fund question was referred to the European Council in 
Brussels on 4th, 5th December 1978 with the Budget Ministers due to meet 
again on 6th December.
Meanwhile a unanimous decision was adopted by the EP's Budget 
Committee to the effect that there could be no doubt that the acceptance 
by the Council of Ministers of the European Parliament's amendment to 
increase the size of the Regional Fund for 1979 must, as a result, 
raise the amount by which the draft budget itself may be increased (the 
margin of manoeuvre).̂  The Council,on the other hand, took the view 
that although the amendment increasing the Regional Fund's size had been 
adopted with reservations, a quite separate decision on the rate of 
increase in the budget still had to be taken.
No progress was made on the issue at the European Council meeting 
(4th-5th December 1978)^ and despite meeting on the 5th December, the 
Nine's Budget Ministers were unable to reach any agreement on the two 
outstanding issues in the 1979 Community Budget: the increase in the
ERDF voted in its first reading by the European Parliament and the margin 
of manoeuvre.
Indeed on the 5th December there was no discussion on the ERDF 
since, according to the German Council President, Manfred Lahnstein, 
the Heads of State and Government had not made any changes to the sum 
(620 million eua) which had been agreed at an earlier European Council
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meeting.
On the other hand, there was a long discussion as to whether the 
Council could agree to an increase in the margin of manoeuvre which had 
previously been set at 135 million eua. Ministers agreed at the meet­
ing that Mr. Lahnstein, as Council President, should propose a small 
increase of about 50 million eua in the Parliament's margin of manoeuvre 
provided that the latter was prepared to back down and withdraw its 
amendment on the Regional Fund.
The European Parliament deemed this offer to be totally unaccept­
able and continued to maintain that since the amendment on the size of 
the ERDF for 1979 had not been rejected in the Council it should stand. 
Indeed the Parliament's Budget Committee Chairman, Erwin Lange (German 
SDP) stated:
The Council, intentionally or unintentionally, seems bent 
on pushing Parliament back to the position it occupied 
prior to the Luxembourg Agreement. This is quite unaccept­
able ... We have a duty to safeguard the rights we have 
acquired and to hand them over to our directly elected 
successors ...^
Thus, when the European Parliament met in plenary session (11th- 
15th December 1978) in Luxembourg, they decided to make no amendment to 
the Council's £9.2 billion budget for 1979. Hence, by adopting its 
version of the 1979 budget at its second reading on 14th December 1978, 
the EP clearly went against the wishes of the Council of Ministers.
MEPs made no changes to the draft budget agreed by the Nine's Ministers 
on 20th November 1978. Instead of a vote being taken on the budget, 
the Parliament's President, Emilio Colombo, declared that the procedure 
laid down in Article 203 of the Treaty of Rome should come into play, 
whereby the budget would be adopted if the Parliament failed to make any 
changes within 15 days of receiving it (fifteen days duly elapsed on 
14th December).
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Thus, the Community budget for 1979 was deemed adopted by the 
European Parliament. Indeed the legal services of the Council and 
Commission agreed that the 1979 budget existed and had done ever since 
the EP's President made his announcement on 14th December.
The Commission was now faced with the task of implementing the 
budget and the Parliament would obviously watch closely to ensure that 
it was executing matters effectively. On the other hand, it was 
possible that the Council or one or more of the member governments, 
would open proceedings in the European Court, challenging the validity 
of the budget. Therefore, the Commission adopted a non-committal line.
Initially, it was hoped that problems would be avoided because 
under the system of own resources, member states' contributions for the 
first month of the year are based on the twelfth of the expenditure 
contained in the draft budget adopted by the Council (in this case July
1978).
gAt the Council of Finance Ministers on 18th December 1978, it was 
agreed to make the January payments without commitments, in order to 
enable Council and Parliament to attempt to work out an acceptable 
solution. There was a desire shown at the Council meeting to dédrama­
tisé the situation and the French in particular opposed resorting to 
the Court of Justice in search of a solution, perhaps because they were 
due to assume the Council Presidency on 1st January 1979.
When the French assumed the Presidency in January 1979, the con­
flict was still, however, unresolved and only three weeks remained 
before the February contributions from member states, under the system 
of own resources, fell due. The French attitude, as holders of the 
Council Presidency, was going to prove vital and President Giscard 
d'Estaing made prospects for agreement appear gloomier when he was quoted 
in an interview with Der Spiegel as saying that the position adopted by
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the European Parliament on the Community Budget was 'legally and
9politically unacceptable'.
Thus by the beginning of February there was still no possible 
compromise formula in sight to bridge the differences between the two 
institutions. As expected, UK, France and Denmark paid their February 
contributions to the budget on the basis of the budget as approved by 
the Council in July 1978 after its first reading. On the other hand, 
the other six member states recognised the budget adopted by the 
Parliament in December 1978.^^ The three 'offending members' received 
a reminder about their contributions from the European Commission, which 
did not, however, amount to a threat to take legal proceedings under 
Article 169 of the Rome Treaty.
On the 16th February,the Commission forwarded a supplementary 
and rectifying budget for 1979 to the Council of Ministers which, if 
adopted, would increase Community expenditure by 237,776,800 million 
eua. This contained two major elements:
(i) A new chapter heading in which the Commission inserted 
the 200 million eua which the Heads of State and Govern­
ment had agreed in Brussels in December 1978 should be
at the disposal of the economically weaker countries
12which would be participating fully in the EMS.
(ii) The Commission resurrected many of the amendments
proposed in its original preliminary draft budget and
which secured the support of the European Parliament
in December, but had then been dropped for tactical 
13reasons.
In order to help pay for this increased expenditure, the Commission 
proposed in the rectifying budget that the Regional Fund should be cut 
from 1000 million eua to 945 million eua. In addition, it was suggested
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that the Ex-Quota section be reduced from 100 million eua to 45 million 
eua. The Commissioner responsible for the budget, Christopher 
Tugendhat, explained that the reduction in the Ex-Quota section of the 
ERDF was necessary under the new Fund regulation which laid down that 
no more than 5% of the total Regional Fund may be spent under this 
heading (i.e. 45 million eua). Thus, it was impractical to leave 55 
million eua under the section when it could not be used during 1979.
At a meeting of the European Parliament's Budget Committee in
14Brussels on 20th-21st February 1979, under the chairmanship of the 
German Erwin Lange, initial reactions to the Commission's supplementary 
and rectifying budget were found to be critical. Members objected in 
particular to the proposal to reduce the ERDF from 1000 million eua 
voted by the Parliament in December 1978 to 900 million eua.
In addition, the Committee criticised the Council of Ministers' 
decision to work out a text interpreting Article 203 of the Treaty, 
which sought to prevent any recurrence of the budgetary wrangle being 
experienced. The Committee thus adopted a resolution to be tabled at 
the Parliament's plenary session in March, stating that while the 
Council may fix its own internal rules, they should not have any exter­
nal repercussions on the powers of the Parliament since it is both the 
Council and the EP who share the Community budgetary powers under the 
EEC Treaties.
On the 6th March 1979^^ the Council and European Parliament met 
under the concertation procedure and despite their differences agreed 
to continue their dialogue in the search for an acceptable solution.
One of the major results to come out of the discussions was that the 
Commission's proposed supplementary and rectifying budget could provide 
the basis for a compromise. However, this was only an agreement in 
principle and details still had to be worked out.
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There appeared to be four major options open to the Nine:
(1) The Commission’s original proposals, whereby the ERDF, 
as voted by the EP in December 1978, would be reduced 
from 1000 million eua to 945 million with 55 million 
eua going towards paying the 200 million eua interest 
rebates under the EMS.
(2) A possibility favoured by Italy was that the 1000 
million eua would remain in the ERDF and the Community 
would have to raise an extra 200 million eua for the 
interest rebates. In this case, the Commission's 
budget would be purely 'supplementary*.
(3) A compromise put forward by the German government and 
supported by the UK, Belgium and Denmark followed very 
much the same thinking as the Commission's proposal, 
except that the 245 million eua for the interest 
rebates would come from the Regional Fund.
(4) The toughest line was taken by France, which was pre­
pared to accept that the Regional Fund, as voted by 
the Heads of State and Government, and not the 
Parliament, could be increased by only 100 million eua.^^
Eventually a virtual consensus was reached amongst the Nine by 20th 
March 1979 after extensive preparations by the French Presidency follow­
ing the previous Council meeting on 6th March. The agreement made was
that the ERDF should be fixed at 945 million eua for 1979, as the Com-
17mission had proposed. Nevertheless, there were still outstanding 
points on the draft Council Resolution aiming at clarifying.the Council's 
internal procedures for examining the Community's budget.
The supplementary and rectifying budget had to be approved by the 
European Parliament's plenary session, the next meeting of which was
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scheduled for April. It was thought that there would be little diffi­
culty gaining Parliament's acceptance although there was a possibility 
that they would oppose the statement written into the Council minutes 
setting out the internal procedure to be followed in the future by the 
Council when examining the Community budget. Indeed agreement on the
latter took a long time to settle at the Council meeting with the
18Dutch unable to go along with the final version agreed by the other 
delegations.
There appeared to be a strong feeling amongst flEPs that the whole 
issue surrounding the adoption of the 1979 budget had been dragged out 
long enough. However, the EP's Budget Committee felt that the state­
ment in the minutes of the eight delegations on the Community's internal 
budgetary procedures had no legal validity since the Dutch Government 
had refused to accept the agreement.
Nevertheless, the plenary session of the European Parliament, 
meeting in Strasbourg, adopted the supplementary budget on 25th April
1979. The general opinion amongst MEPs was that the interest subsidies 
under the EMS scheme would also help to contribute to the reduction of 
regional disparities in the Community and, coupled with the increased 
size of the ERDF, would amount in toto to more than the 1100 million eua
that had been originally proposed for the ERDF by the European Parlia-
* 19 ment.
Hardly had the 1979 budgetary allocation been resolved than conflict 
arose between the two budgetary institutions over the drafts for the 
1980 Community budget.
The Council had cut back the Commission's original draft budget 
figures enormously in September 1979: in the non-obligatory spending
section (about 30% of the budget), the Commission had proposed figures 
entailing a 43% increase in Commitment appropriations over 1979. The
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20Council decreased this to about 5.5%. With regard to the ERDF, the 
Commission had proposed an endowment of 1,200 million eua but the Coun­
cil cut this back to 850 million eua (a cut in comparison with 1979, 
therefore, when the final figure agreed had been 945 million eua).
When the EP's Budget Committee met to consider the Council's action 
it made several points which were adopted by the plenary session of the 
European Parliament in November and December 1979: firstly, it insisted
that the budgetary imbalance, whereby excessive amounts were spent on 
the price support system of the CAP, must be curbed. It noted, more­
over, that the situation was particularly grave in the dairy sector
where expenditure on milk products accounted for more than 33% of all
21Community spending in the Council's draft budget for 1980. Secondly, 
the Parliament expressed its disapproval at the consequent lack of 
appropriations for non-compulsory expenditure, especially for the ERDF 
and the European Social Fund. Moreover, the Parliament emphasised the 
imminent exhaustion of the Community's own financial resources. In 
addition, the European Parliament made clear its aim to see the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and all the Community's lending and borrowing 
activities included within the budgetary framework. In this way the 
Parliament launched an all-out attack on the Council over the budgetary 
issues at stake.
The EP thus rejected the Community budget for 1980 by 288 votes to 
2264 (1 abstention). The Commission was now called upon to present a
new preliminary draft budget and the process began again when the Com-
23mission did so on 14th February 1980. The new draft included cuts of 
nearly £520 million in farm price support expenditure (although more 
than 70% of the budget was to be allotted to agriculture in 1980).
1,200 million eua was again allocated for the ERDF, as in the original 
preliminary draft.
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Despite two last minute attempts to pass resolutions to reject the 
budget outright again, it was adopted by the European Parliament at its 
plenary session on 9th July 1980.^^
The rapporteur of the EP's Budget Committee for the 1980 budget 
25(Mr. Peter Dankert, a Dutch Socialist) issued a statement following
26the adoption of the budget in which he stated that the long struggle 
had marked some progress in the battle to reform the Community's budget 
in that it had permitted the Parliament to outline clearly the major 
elements in such a reform - the need to curb agricultural spending, to 
shift the balance in the budget towards social, regional and structural 
policies, to alert all the Community institutions to the imminent running 
out of own resources and the need for the European Parliament to play 
the fullest possible role in deciding with the Council on all major 
aspects of the Community budget. Progress had indeed been made but this 
represented only a small step; compulsory expenditure and notably 
appropriations for the CAP price support mechanism far outweighed the 
expenditure in the non-compulsory section of the budget.
Mr. Dankert also pointed out that as a result of the firmness dis­
played by Parliament a small but significant shift had occurred within 
the budget; whereas agricultural expenditure went up by approximately 
12%, the increase in the spending for social, regional and structural 
policies was in the order of 30%. Thus, as the Parliament had secured 
a 63% increase in the budgetary allocation to the ERDF in 1979 as a 
direct result of its insistence in the budgetary procedure, this defi­
nitely heralded a step in the right direction. Indeed, this became more 
apparent when it was revealed that the increase in spending for social,
regional and structural policies between 1976-79 had been approximately 
2715%.
With regard to the Community budget for 1981, the formulation of
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which began on the same day as the eventual conclusion of the 1980
budgetary procedure, a preliminary draft being submitted on 14th August
by the EP, the same kinds of battle were in evidence. The Parliament
reinstated Council cutbacks in the non-obligatory section, including
the ERDF,and stressed the need to cut back on agricultural expenditure.
Indeed, following a Counci1-Parliament meeting under the conciliation
procedure on 24th November 1980, John M. Taylor (Dem. UK), claimed that
28genuine progress had been made and that for the first time the Council
of Ministers had publicly recognised the need to decrease the level of
spending on the CAP.
However, when examining the preliminary draft budget for 1981, the
Council cut back the estimates prepared by the Commission by more than
820 million eua. These cuts mainly affected regional policy, social
29policy and the research and energy sectors. When the budgetary pro­
cedure reached the final stages during the December session of 1980, 
the European Parliament was considering simultaneously the second supp­
lementary draft budget for 1980 which proposed an addition of 100 
million eua for the Social Fund and for aid to the victims of the 
Italian earthquake disaster. Parliament added 266.4 million eua to this 
draft. Having made these extra appropriations available and aware that 
the money from the supplementary budget left unspent in 1980 could be 
spent during 1981, the EP voted a relatively modest package of additional
expenditure for 1981: 24.5 million eua for payments to be made in 1981
30with a further 30 million eua committed for future expenditure - most 
of which was destined for disaster aid to Italy. Thus payment appropri­
ations for the ERDF were set at 800 million eua with 1540 million eua 
designated as commitment appropriations. The Council did not modify 
these amendments and the President of the Parliament duly declared both 
budgets adopted on 23rd December 1980.
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2. The Fund's administration 1979-82
Despite the budgetary problems experienced by the Community 962
31million eua were committed for Regional Fund aid in 1979. 28% of
these commitments were dedicated to industrial and service projects (cf.
1975-79 : 32%) and leading, it was claimed, to the creation or mainten-
32ance of 79,000 jobs (cf. 1975-79 ; 340,000). 72% of commitments were
dedicated to infrastructure projects. Payments made in 1979 amounted
in all to 513 million eua.
1979 marked the first time that advantage had been taken, since
1975, of an interest rebate of 3 percentage points offered on loans from 
33the EIB. This was to assist with the installation of two groups of 
electricity generators and part of the linked system in the new elec­
trical power station at Kilroot near Belfast.
35Fund assets in 1980 totalled 1165 million eua, 58 million eua of 
which were allocated to the Ex-Quota section of the ERDF. The latter 
amount could not however be committed in 1980 because the implementing 
regulations for the five programmes which had been drawn up were not 
adopted by the Council of Ministers until the end of the year (see 
below).
Under the quota section, however, the Commission adopted decisions
36approving projects totalling 1126.38 million eua in 1980. 26% of aid
was allotted to projects in the industrial and service sectors, creating
60,000 jobs, and 74% of aid provided finance for infrastructure projects.
It should be remembered that the revised ERDF regulation of February 
371979 required a 70%:30% split for infrastructure and industrial aid 
respectively. Indeed, this ratio was achieved for the years 1978-80. 
However, several member states, including Denmark, Ireland and Italy,
38reduced the volume of assistance for industrial and service activities. 
This is partly due to the problems of additionality experience, in
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particular with industrial projects, but more importantly because in 
the present economic recession there is a shortage of available indus­
trial projects in the private sector (see below for 1981 ratios).
With regard to industrial projects, the average amount of finance
provided per project by the ERDF in 1980 for projects greater than 10
39million eua was 73.0 million eua. The corresponding figure for pro­
jects of less than 10 million eua was 2.0 million eua. When ERDF was 
divided by sectors of activity, it was found that for projects greater 
than 10 million eua, the motor vehicle industry and spare parts was in 
the lead followed by the chemical industry, and engineering and engin­
eering equipment. For projects of less than 10 million eua, metal con­
struction was in the lead followed by engineering and engineering 
equipment, the food industry, beverages and tobacco, rubber and plastic 
processing.
With regard to infrastructure projects, on the other hand, average 
investment per project in 1980 for projects of more than 10 million eua 
was 63.9 million eua and for the smaller class of project, the average 
volume of investment per project was 0.6 million eua. The majority of 
projects assisted concerned road infrastructure and water supply. How­
ever, the categories of infrastructure assisted vary between member 
states according to national policies and regional priorities. In this 
way, water supply takes the lead for large projects in Ireland, whereas 
in Italy this type of project is equalled by drainage projects and 
infrastructure for industrial estates. On the other hand, in France and 
the UK investment on road infrastructure is the most significant cate­
gory of assisted project.
It should be noted that the Commission policy towards large versus 
small projects has evolved over time. From providing encouragement for 
large projects in the 1979 amended regulation policy has switched again
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in recent discussions towards support being demonstrated for small and 
medium sized projects within the framework of the programme approach 
for Fund aid.
The table below shows the main features of the Fund for the years 
401975-80. Thus, since its creation,the Fund has taken 1,994 grant 
decisions corresponding to assistance for 11,745 investment projects 
representing a total investment of 33,908 million eua.
The Commission also maintained that contributions granted were 
3586 million eua of which 70% went to infrastructure projects and 30% 
to industrial and service projects. Moreover, 52% of grants went to 
projects of more than 10 million eua and 42% to projects of less than 
10 million eua.
In 1981 a process aiming at the remodelling of the Community's 
regional policy was begun in the context of the mandate of 30th May 
1980, subsequent new regional policy guidelines and priorities and the 
promised proposal for recasting the Regional Fund regulation. These 
will be dicussed later in the chapter. However, as far as Fund opera­
tions in 1981 are concerned, the allocation for the ERDF was fixed at
411,540 million ecu, 77 million ecu of which (5%) was earmarked for the 
Fund's Ex-Quota section. Appropriations for payment totalled 800 million 
ecu.
The number of investment projects receiving grants rose from 2,562 
in 1980 to 2,759 in 1981. These grants totalled 1,666 million ecu and 
virtually used up all the Fund's resources. However, some member states 
did not submit enough applications to exhaust their quota. Industrial 
and service projects accounted for 198.18 million ecu (19%) and infra­
structure projects for 1,467.50 million ecu (88%). These ratios were 
therefore well out of line with the regulation requirements of 70:30.
Fund assistance was provided to Greece for the first time (250.22 million
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Table 8.1 : Summary of decisions on grants 1975-80 Source : Sclccl" "A  €-CL S(ssi Okv 14 So.-8 I A L.
Member State Number 
grant 
decis.
Grants made Investments (A)Tots
(B) Indust. Infr. Indust. Infr.
Belgium 38
(232)
18. 51 32.83 286.90 124.58 5,206
Denmark 64
(342)
6.33 40.05 91.54 199.78 3,302
Germany 435
(1318)
152.75 132.01 3,917.88 638.29 54,255
France 426
(1755)
208.82 417.54 3,681.42 1,789.52 128,038
Ireland 81
(558)
78.81 148.95 1,630.79 1,372.71 35,083
Italy 363
(4506)
249.13 1,148.00 1,633.37 9,589.20 58,139
Luxembourg 5
(6)
- 3.43 - 24.03 -
Netherlands 21
(34)
12.51 58.54 133.45 345.99 1,155
U.K. 561
(2294)
348.41 535.10 3,771,51 4,976.51 112,368
1,994
(11,745)
1,075.27 2,510.45 15,146.86 18,760.92 397,546
(A) Maintained by inves. ind. services.
(B) Projects in brackets.
eua). 3% of aid to Greece was for industry and service projects and 97% 
to infrastructure projects. Payments amounted to 791.41 million ecu 
compared with 726.7 million ecu in 1980. Finally, 1,669 million ecu have 
been allocated to the ERDF in the 1982 Community budget.
However, investigation by the Court of Auditors revealed that in 
recent years, payments made under the ERDF have been significantly 
smaller than payments authorised, especially in 1978 and 1979, as shown 
in the table below.
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Table 8.2 : Percentage of Payment Appropriations used during 














^After non-quota appropriations have been deducted.
Source: Report of the Court of Auditors for 1979, OJ 0342,
31 December (1980).
It should be noted however that the corresponding figure for the
42utilisation of payment appropriations in 1980 was 96.2%, (726.7
million ecus, see above).
Despite the above improvement substantial sums of money have been 
carried forward in most years since the ERDF's establishment to be 
spent later as claims for payments caught up with commitments. More­
over, this situation has arisen in spite of the provisions of Article
8(3) of the 1979 revised ERDF regulation which relates to accelerated
 ̂ 43payments.
In addition, inspection of ERDF accounts for 1980 by the European 
44Court of Auditors revealed that a large concentration of commitment 
and payment appropriations occurred in the month of December. The table 
below demonstrates the position for 1980.
Table 8.3 : Concentration of commitment and payment operations
MEUA
'— ^.̂ _̂ Period During the financial of which in
Operation^ year 1980 December
Commitment 1,137.8 525.6 (46.3%)
Payments 726.7 349.5 (48.1%)
Source: OJ of EC, 31 December 1981, p.90
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Thus about half the commitment and payment operations were entered 
in the accounts during the last month of the financial year - a bunching 
effect which must obviously have a detrimental effect on the work of 
examining applications for assistance and reimbursement.
It would appear that this concentration can be traced back to the 
tardiness of the member states in applying for assistance or payment and 
the timetable of the work of the committees responsible for giving 
opinions on draft decisions to grant assistance.
In an effort to control and check the way in which its financial 
support has been used the Commission made spot checks on 841 projects 
(see Table 8.4 below) out of a total of 11,745 projects assisted between 
1975-80.^^ The Commission has aimed to inspect 10% of assisted projects 
annually but is having difficulty in continuing to do so because of 
the increasing size of the Fund and the limitations in available per­
sonnel in DG XVI.
In 1980 no control checks were made in Denmark, Luxembourg or the 
Netherlands because the number of inspections in previous years had 
been sufficiently high in relation to the number of projects aided be­
tween 1975-79. The French, however, have persistently refused the 
Commission permission to inspect their projects effectively. They have 
insisted upon visiting the chosen sites on their own prior to Commission 
inspections following which they have accompanied Commission officials 
on their visits. It can thus only be assumed that the French govern­
ment fears the possible uncovering of misappropriations of ERDF resources 
Moreover, by consistently refusing to allow the Commission to inspect 
French industrial projects in receipt of aid in a satisfactory manner, 
France is in contravention of the Rome Treaty. Article 5 states that 
member states shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
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institutions of the Community. This therefore applies to Article 9(3) 
of the ERDF regulation which gives the Commission the right to parti­
cipate in spot checks.
Thus the Commission has informed the French authorities that as 
from the financial year of 1980, outstanding Fund payments would remain 
in suspense for industrial projects to which access has not yet been 
allowed for spot checks and for which no control has been possible.
The Commission and the European Parliament also consider publicity 
provided for Fund activity to be of utmost importance because it makes 
the recipients fully aware of the benefits derived both to themselves 
and the region from the operations of the ERDF. The Commission noted 
that its press communiques on grant allocations were little reported in 
West Geimany and France (both member states opposing the identification 
of projects receiving ERDF assistance). By contrast, Ireland and Italy
and the UK report widely on grants, especially in the regional and local 
46press. Information hoardings on the sites of major infrastructure 
projects also provide an important means of publicity for the Fund's 
activities (see table below).
Table 8.5 : Installed Information Posters












Source: ERDF 6th Annual Report, p.70
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Article 6 of the ERDF regulation provides that investment may 
benefit from Fund assistance only if it falls within the framework of 
a regional development programme. (This must be of an indicative nature 
and specify the objectives and the means to be employed for the develop­
ment of the region concerned. Moreover, the aim must be to determine 
the priorities for assistance from the Fund.)
The limitations of the Regional Development Programmes and the
paucity of the statistics and indicators provided, have been mentioned
elsewhere in this study. However, an inspection by the Court of 
47Auditors of updated Information on seven programmes submitted during 
1980, still shewed room for improvement in the preparation of these 
documents.
It was claimed that presentation of the programmes varies greatly 
from one country to another and does not cover the same periods, does 
not contain a timetable for implementation and does not always indicate 
the regional impact of other Community or national policies. Further­
more, the connection between the investments financed and their antici­
pated effect is not systematically demonstrated: 'priorities are
difficult to discern and there is little attempt to put the objectives
of the measures into figures .
Finally, the analytical data on the regions are claimed to be 
inadequate, particularly with regard to relative losses and gains in 
jobs and income trends.
On the spot audits carried out during 1980 revealed various cases 
of projects whose connection with the programmes was considered to be 
dubious. For example, road projects financed in Campania as aid for 
the Aree Particolarmente Depresse (severely depressed areas) were found 
not to fit in with the overall scheme of works. In reality the various
commîmes concerned were allocated funds and given a free hsnd in the
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choice and execution of projects that they were to finance. The national 
authorities in Italy explained that the aid programme laid down general 
guidelines, their application being left to the local authorities. How­
ever, the piecemeal application of assistance and the lack of coordina­
tion have served to reduce the effectiveness of the projects: the
design of the roads (width, surfacing etc.) varies from one commune to 
another and in some cases the scale of the work has had to be subsequently 
reduced to offset an increase in costs.
The aim of coordinating the national regional policies of the
member states by means of the Regional Development Programmes was also
seen to be hindered by the apparent differences found by the Court of
Auditors in the method of calculating the number of jobs created by a
49particular project. Hence while the concept of a job itself is fre­
quently understood as corresponding to the actual occupation of one 
member of staff, in certain member states it may mean no more than the 
existence of a post in the organisation chart of the subsidised under­
takings,^^ even if that post has not yet been actually occupied and 
therefore only represents 'potential* in the fight against unemployment. 
Obviously this type of case is less easy to check and further removed 
from the ERDF's stated aim of providing a solution to structural under­
employment .
3. Major Issues at Stake (1979-82)
Leaving aside the day to day administration of the ERDF a number 
of significant issues and initiatives have affected Fund operations 
during the last three years and will give the ERDF a considerably 
different shape and character for the rest of the 1980s. These initi­
atives include firstly the drawing up of regulations for specific 
Community programmes to allow money to be spent from the Ex-Quota section
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of the ERDF. Secondly, with Greek entry into the Community in 1981, a
quota has had to be fixed for the Greek share of ERDF resources and
regional policy in the Community will in future have to respond to
Greek conditions. Finally, following the mandate of 30th May 198Q^^
and pursuant to the publication of the Commission's First Periodic
Report on the social and economic situation of the regions of the 
52Community, the Commission produced new Regional Policy Guidelines and 
Priorités for Regional Policy and subsequently published proposed amend­
ments to the regulation governing ERDF operations.
This section will assess the three issues and areas introduced
above.
(a) The drafting of regulations for specific Community 
Programmes to allow money to be spent from the Ex- 
Quota Section of the ERDF_________________________
When agreement was reached on the amended ERDF regulation in
February 1979, provision was made for 5% of total Fund resources to be
allotted to an Ex-Quota section (which as its title suggests would not
be subject to distribution under the system of national quotas). This
aid was to be used to finance specific Community regional development
projects and was seen as a further effort to a coordinated structural
and regional policy by recognising that Community actions in other policy-
areas could have adverse effects on the regional development of some
Community areas.
However, before any aid could be distributed from this section of 
the ERDF (the allocation was 220 million eua for 5 years) the Commission 
had to decide upon the problem areas where its meagre resources would 
be concentrated and then submit regulation-preposais to the Council 
which would permit th€; programmes to be implemented.
The Commission accordingly drafted five programmes to include:
(i) regions affected by enlargement (120 million eua.
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including 65 million eua for France and 55 million 
eua for Italy);
(ii) areas experiencing difficulties in the steel industry 
(43 million eua, including 35 million eua in UK, 6 
million eua in Belgium and 2 million eua in Naples);
(iii) areas affected by the crisis in the shipbuilding 
industry (17 million eua for the UK);
(iv) energy sources in Mezzogiomo (16 million eua); and
(v) new moves to develop tourism in Ireland and Northern
Ireland (24 million eua, including 16 million eua in
53Ireland and 8 million eua in UK).
Thus if the total expected gains for the five recipient member 
states are calculated Italy, not surprisingly, will receive 73 million 
eua but close behind in second place comes France (65 million eua), 
followed by the UK (60 million eua), Ireland (16 million eua) and 
Belgium (6 million eua). Once again the French appear to be doing 
exceedingly well without any relative economic justification.
Proposals for Council regulations for the five programmes were
submitted to the Council by the Commission on 15th October 1979^^ in
55which it was stated, in an explanatory memorandum, that it had been 
recognised that regional policy could not be limited to correcting 
imbalances, of which the less-favoured regions are victims, by way of 
ex-post subsidies, but rather it was necessary to take preventative 
steps by ex-ante measures, to avoid the perverse effects which may occur 
in regions as a consequence of Community policies which cannot always 
take full account of their regional impact. The Commission also stated 
their aim under the EQS of drafting overall programmes corresponding to 
the social and economic requirements of the regions (cf. quota section 
aid to individual projects). Moreover, the Commission aimed to provide
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aid for initiative: to develop and sustain any capacity for enterprise
which otherwise would be unable to be transformed into productive pro­
jects because of an unfavourable environment. Thus, measures concerning
small and medium-sized enterprises were: 'the most innovatory and of
56special importance'.
Finally, it was hoped that these 'pilot schemes' would encourage
the development of a new outlook for Community Regional Policy which
would entail a wider choice of financial instruments, more concentration
of limited resources and better coordination of Community intervention.
The UK government originally vetoed progress on the agreement of
the regulations which would have permitted the effective establishment
of the EQS. It adopted this negative stance for two major reasons:
firstly it made the point that the UK had no appropriate regional tier
of administration or government to draft the requisite programmes for
aid from the EQS and would therefore experience difficulties in this
respect. Secondly the UK government considered that the Commission's
proposals were weighted too much in favour of agricultural and rural
areas and accordingly pressed for some additional steel and shipbuilding
57closure areas to be included. However, this point of view attracted
little support in the Council of Ministers and the British government
finally accepted the Commission's proposals on the understanding that,
when the next set of measures were being prepared, the Commission would
bear in mind the needs of industrial areas suffering large job losses
and high unemployment.
Thus the Council did not grant its approval to the five regulations
58until 21st July 1980 and even then the agreement was 'ad. referendum' 
for two member states, namely UK and West Germany. Thus the agreement 
required confirmation and the final agreement permitting the Commission 
to go ahead with its proposals was reached on 7th October 1980 when the
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59Council adopted the appropriate regulations. The Commission's special
programmes were to be the subject of intervention by the Regional
Development Fund Management Committee where the Commission would take
account of any 'negative' majorities which might occur against any
60aspect of or any" particular programme as a whole.
Therefore, the Ex-Quota section of the ERDF had only just got off
the ground when the Fund regulation came up for discussion and amendment
(see below). No money was spent on projects in 1980 but in 1981, in June 
61and December, after consultation with the Fund Management Committee
the Commission approved four programmes from within the original five
62programmes cited above. The maximum contribution to these programmes
will be 166 million ecu over 5 years. Funds will be committed in annual
63instalments and, for 1981, commitments totalled 40.59 million ecu.
(b) The fixing of the Greek Quota for Fund aid 
from 1st January 1981_____________________
With Greece beaming a full member of the European Community on 1st 
January 1981 the Greeks had to be included in the arrangements for dis­
tributing the ERDF by a system of national quotas. Thus, the regulation 
governing the Fund had to be amended (Article 2(3)).
The Commission proposed that the Greeks should receive 15% of the 
ERDF quota section. However, the inclusion of Greece in the system of 
Fund quotas would inevitably raise the problem of altering the quota- 
shares of other member states accordingly. In this respect, the Commis­
sion had to take account of several requirements; on thê  one hand, the 
Commission considered it hard to imagine that acceptance would be gained 
for the 15% being allocated to Greece and charged to the member state 
quotas purely pro-rata to their relative size, by way of a simple linear 
distribution. This would involve the least prosperous states assuming 
the main burden percentage-wise. On the other hand, a method whereby
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too great a burden would be borne by member states with less serious 
regional problems would have emphasised unduly the tendency to concen­
trate the Fund almost exclusively in certain regions, thus adversely 
affecting the global character of Community regional policy.
The Commission finally decided upon a formula for distribution 
based upon the relative deviation of per capita GDP in the various member 
states from the Community mean. On the basis of the Commission propo­
sals for the 1981 Community budget the proposed new quotas would not 
cause a diminution in the absolute values of the previous quotas. More­
over, given that the whole of the Fund Regulation was due for review 
and revision by the Council on a proposal from the Commission during 
1981, this arrangement for Greece was intended to be purely temporary.
The following table provides the percentage quotas for the distri­














The Commission proposal was however the subject of much debate and 
controversy during the final months of 1980 with disagreement surround­
ing notably the eligibility of the Athens and Salonica Areas, the 
proposed percentage quota share accorded to the Greeks and the way in
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which the financial burden of a tenth quota should be distributed amongst 
the other nine member states.
The issue of how big a share of the ERDF quota section should be 
accorded to Greece and who should pay became involved with the debates 
over the 1981 Community budget between the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament. The Council cut back the Commission's original pro­
posal of a 37.34% increase in ERDF appropriations, involving an alloca­
tion of 1,600 million eua in commitment appropriations. This substantial 
increase had been made to take account of the inclusion of a 15% quota 
share for Greece. Thus, according to the Commission's draft, the actual 
amounts available to other member states would not be reduced to provide 
the requisite funds for the Greek quota. Having allowed for an infla­
tion rate of 9.6%, an ERDF of 1600 million eua would provide an increase
65in real terms of 7% over 1980.
However, the Council's first draft budget, produced in late 
September 1980, included significant cutbacks in non-obligatory expen­
diture. Hence the new figure for the ERDF was 1400 million eua which
entailed a reduction of 200 million eua on the Commission's figures and
66signified an increase of 20.17% on 1980 commitment appropriations.
Had the figure for the ERDF in the Council's first draft been
accepted, the nine member states would have experienced a reduction in
real terms in their ERDF allocations in order to finance the Greek quota.
The European Parliament accordingly reinstated the Commission's
original figure of 1600 million eua for ERDF commitment appropriations
in November 1980, and although the Council reduced this figure slightly
to 1540 million eua this was agreed by the EP at its second reading of
the 1981 budget in December 1981, an increase of 32.19% over commitment
67appropriations available to the Fund in 1980. Thus the original nine 
member states would not lose out financially from Greek accession as
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far as the ERDF was concerned.
68Therefore a final agreement was reached in December 1980 in the 
Council of Ministers and the agreed new ERDF quotas were:
Table 8.7











The Greeks were thus given a 13% share of the ERDF for 1981 (with
Athens and Salonica classed as ineligible for Fund aid) and no member
state losing out from the incorporation of Greece into the ERDF quota
system. This is surely a significant pointer to the future enlargement
of the Community and the increases in the size of the Regional Fund which
will be required to protect member states' quota-shares in real terms.
(c) Proposals for revision of the ERDF
The regulation governing the operation of the European Regional
69Development Fund was originally due for revision by January 1981.
Because of the complications of Greek entry, this review was postponed
for twelve months.
The Commission's new Guidelines and Priorities for Regional Policy
and the subsequent proposals for amendments to the ERDF regulation came
against the background of two other substantial Community documents.
70Firstly the Commission published, in January 1981, its First Report on 
the Social and Economic Trends in the Community's regions which indicated
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that regional imbalances during the 1960s and 1970s had widened despite 
the EC's growing prosperity during that period. Moreover, these im­
balances had been enhanced by the recession of the late 1970s. Secondly,
71the Commission's Report on the Mandate of 30th May 1980, requiring a
restructuring of the Community budget, included paragraphs on the ERDF
which stressed that reduction of regional imbalances must remain a
72'priority Community objective'. The Commission claimed that major
changes should be made to enhance the effectiveness of interventions
and increase its impact.
There is a strong case for greater concentration of 
the Fund's budgetary resources, which are and are 
likely to remain inadequate to cope with the develop­
ment problems that will increasingly face the 
Community as it continues to enlarge. ^
The Commission also maintained that the Ex-Quota section should be sub­
stantially expanded.
Thus the foundations had been laid for the radical proposals and 
Commission guidelines for changes in the organisation, distribution and 
administration of the ERDF which would shape Fund operations for the 
1980s.
In July 1981, the Commission published its new guidelines and
74priorities for regional policy which were discussed by the Council of 
Ministers in September and October 1981. These guidelines were intended 
to lay down general regional policy objectives which would be made more 
specific and then met by the revised ERDF regulation.
The guidelines stressed that regional disparities had persisted 
and widened in recent years and that they formed a major obstacle to a 
greater convergence of member state economies. Thus Community Regional 
Policy had to promote the integration of member state economies and 
regional policies in an attempt to alleviate the problem.
The guidelines claimed that at present Community Regional Policy
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instruments, especially the ERDF, could not realise their full potential. 
This was due to limited financial resources, a wide and thin spreading 
of these resources and inflexible operation procedures.
Top priority had to be accorded, in the regional policy field, to 
creating new, productive jobs. Regions in greatest difficulty would be 
those where structural unemployment is already high. In these regions 
regional policy measures must therefore be aimed at encouraging labour- 
intensive activities based on modem technology as well as services.
The First Report on Social and Economic Trends in the Community's 
regions showed that the main reason for the worsening of regional dis­
parities was the growing divergence of productivity trends. Thus a 
prime aim of regional policies, both at the Community level and in the 
member states, must be the raising of productivity by promoting the use 
of the right technologies for releasing indigenous development potential
Regional Development Programmes must therefore focus on the forms 
of development suited to the socio-economic characteristics of the less- 
favoured regions, in order to release and exploit their growth potential 
and adaptability. Regional and local representatives should be called 
upon to play an active part in the formulation of RDPs.
The guidelines further emphasised the need for an increased con­
centration of the Fund, expansion of the EQS and greater coordination 
between the ERDF and other Community policies and financial instruments. 
It was stressed that Community policies must be coordinated at three 
stages:
(i) at the stage of formulation and implementation of the 
principal Community policies (which involved the 
systematic Regional Impact Assessment of policies);
(ii) at the stage of adopting measures aimed at offsetting 
adverse effects of Community policies in a region
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(especially with regard to the CAP). These measures 
could be adopted under the policy in question or be 
implemented by means of specific operations conducted 
in parallel (e.g. the EQS measures connected with the 
restructuring of the steel industry);
(iii) at the stage of combining measures to serve common 
priorities (for example, for the development of 
alternative energy sources in less-favoured regions).
Finally, the guidelines stressed the need for increased coordina­
tion between the Community's Regional Policies and national regional 
policies. In this respect the RDPs must be improved by more partici­
pation on the part of local and regional authorities. Moreover, 
coordination would become more effective following the transition to a 
system of programme contracts which would also ensure a stricter 
adherence to the principle of additionality.
Thus the guidelines drew on the past experience of the Fund's 
administration and on the short-comings of past attempts to coordinate 
the regional policies of the member states and the various Community 
financial mechanisms. It drew all the problems, aims and priorities 
together and in this way formed the basis for the Commission's proposed 
revision of the ERDF regulation.
The Commission published its proposed revised ERDF regulation in 
75October 1981 and a Council of Ministers' Working Party began dis­
cussion of the document in December.
The main points contained in the Commission's proposed new ERDF 
regulation include a demand that ERDF resources should be expanded to 
meet the growing regional imbalances within the Community and a re­
affirmation of the need for increased concentration of the Fund's aids. 
This, it is proposed, should be achieved by the restriction of quota
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aid to the following areas, where there are particularly serious struc­
tural problems: Greece (excluding Athens and Salonica), the Italian
Mezzogiomo, Ireland, parts of UK (assisted areas as from August 1982 
located in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Northern and North West 
England), Greenland and the French overseas departments. The table 
below shows the proposed distribution of ERDF resources.
Table 8.8












Ex-Quota section up to 20.0
100.0
The table indicates the Commission wish to see the Ex-Quota section 
of the Fund expanded from its present level of 5% of total resources, 
with a maximum of 20% being devoted to it. Moreover, Ex-Quota aid would 
be restricted to regions adversely affected either by recent serious 
problems of industrial decline or by other Community policies.
The Commission has also set out stricter and more detailed require­
ments intended to achieve a greater coordination of regional policies 
between member states and of Community policies and financial instru­
ments affecting the regions. These relate to the preparation and 
revision of regional development programmes, a process which the Commis­
sion hopes will involve closely regional and local authorities. Moreover,
203
the Commission is aiming for more effective regional impact assessment 
of Community policies.
The Commission has advocated the phasing in over a three year 
period of programme contracts which will be the main vehicle through 
which ERDF is channelled to the regions. However, aid to especially 
large projects (exceeding 40 million ecus) could still be granted. 
Programme contracts will include infrastructure, industrial and service 
projects and would be negotiated with national governments. It has 
been suggested that regional policy measures should aim to encourage 
labour-intensive activities based upon modern technology and also that 
quota section aid should also be granted to small business, service and 
tourist ventures which hitherto have only been eligible for Ex-Quota 
aid.
The daunting problem of additionality is not tackled directly, 
although the Commission clearly hopes that revised procedures for pro­
gramme contracts and integrated operations, together with payment of 
Fund aid directly to the authorities concerned, will bring about increased 
additionality and a clearer perception of the gains made due to ERDF aid.
It was hoped that agreement might be reached on the revised ERDF 
regulation by April 1982. However, after much discussion both at Council 
Working Party level and in the initial Council session significant 
differences of opinion are still apparent in the stances adopted by the 
member states.
Whereas the Ten are unanimous on the need for ERDF aids to be con-
76centrated, most members wish to be included in the quota fundings.
The initial debate in the Council of Ministers on the regulation (27th 
April 1982) thus concentrated on two basic guidelines proposed by the 
Commission: the geographic concentration of the quota section and the
coordination of the regional policies of member states.
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With regard to the first topic, only West Germany was at this
stage willing to forego a national quota share. Indeed, the London
Summit of November 1981 is believed to have agreed that the Fund should
cover all regions meeting specified criteria rather than be restricted
77to named regions in selected countries. However, most member states 
were in agreement about a need to reinforce the Ex-Quota section of the 
Fund, though they could not agree on the extent of the increase proposed 
(20%). The UK government is concerned that parts of the UK would no 
longer be eligible for aid under the quota section (i.e. the South West, 
Yorkshire, Humberside and Corby). Furthermore, the British have 
remained ambivalent towards the prospect of an increased EQS: the
chief worry is that in absolute terms they may be worse off with a 20%
EQS. They are more likely to support an increase of up to 10% in the 
Ex-Quota section's resources which, it can be argued, would give a little- 
tried experiment time to prove itself before such a large shift in the 
balance between the quota and ex-quota sections of the ERDF was made.
As far as the proposed increase in the coordination of member 
states' regional policies is concerned, member states have acknowledged 
the need for this in principle but have still not agreed upon the detailed 
measures involved. Italy has, however, called not only for increased 
coordination of national regional policies but also for the coordination 
of Community Regional Policy with other EEC regional policies such as 
the CAP.
Judging from the previous delays in reaching agreement on ERDF 
regulations and in view of the considerable differences in opinion on 
the present issues at stake, it would appear likely that the ERDF will 
continue to operate under its present arrangements for some considerable 
time to come.
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4. Analysis of Fund Operations and
prospects for the future of the ERDF
The aforegoing assessment of events directly relevant to ERDF 
operations and the administration of the Fund between 1979-82 will be 
summarised below before prospects for the future of the ERDF are con­
sidered.
The budgetary crises which the Community faced in 1979 and 1980 
were highly relevant to ERDF operations in two ways. Firstly, the un­
certainty surrounding the size of future allocations to the Fund due to 
wranglefbetween the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers 
must in itself have hindered the effective and efficient administration 
of the Regional Fund. Secondly, however, the EP did succeed in gaining 
substantial increases in Fund resources as a direct result of its 
pressure on the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the Community budget 
as a whole remains dominated by the expenditure on the CAP and notably 
on the price support mechanisms. Thus, in 1980, Community budget pay­
ment appropriations for the ERDF represented only 2.57% of total
Community expenditure (though Commitment appropriations were almost three 
78times as large). Moreover, the ERDF is dwarfed by national spending 
on regional policy. For example in 1979 the UK received payments of 
about £107 million from the ERDF for industry and infrastructure pro­
jects; this compares with central government aid of over £500 million
to private sector industry alone in assisted areas in the financial year 
791979/80.
The relative paucity of ERDF resources was also made worse by the 
apparent delays in the payments of appropriations revealed in the above 
survey, although the situation has been alleviated more recently by the 
provision for accelerated payments. Moreover, the Commission's job was 
rendered more difficult by the disproportionately large percentage of
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applications for aid from the Fund received in the final months of the 
year.
Progress has also been poor in the attempts to achieve a better 
coordination of the national regional policies of the member states by 
means of the Regional Development Programmes. Naturally, effective 
coordination would further increase the impact and efficiency of 
Regional Fund aid. The recent RDPs are ineffective and, in the main, 
poorly presented. They reflect the different standards and criteria 
in force in the member states. In the same vein little progress has 
been made with the coordination of the Regional Fund activities with 
other Community financial instruments and policies. Two integrated 
operations, involving programmes of aid financed from various Community 
resources, have begun in Belfast and Naples (see Chapter nine) but little 
has been done elsewhere. Moreover, the RICAP study on CAP operations 
demonstrated that this policy has anti-regional policy effects by 
giving most aid to the rich farmers of Northern Europe.
Member states have varied in their desire and eagerness to publi­
cise the work of the Fund and to advertise on the sites of projects 
benefitting from ERDF assistance. Moreover, the French have refused 
the permission to effectively investigate assisted industrial projects 
in France, the need and justification for which is proscribed in the 
Fund regulation. One can therefore only assume that the French govern­
ment are administering the Fund resources in a less than straightforward 
way.
The operations of the Ex-Quota section of the Fund have only just 
begun after significant delays in the drafting and acceptance of the 
requisite programmes for assistance and the slow passage through Council 
of the implementing regulations. It is thus impossible to pass comment 
on the efficacy or otherwise of the measures involved but the delay
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itself is typical of the difficulty of achieving improvements of any 
kind in the Fund.
The fixing of the Greek quota was another example of the defensive 
attitude adopted by member states in the face of any redistribution in 
Community finances. The eventual agreement reflected this uncompro­
mising attitude in the form of the pro-rata basis on which the money for 
the Greek share was to be made up from the quotas of the other nine 
member states. Thus the heaviest burden was unfairly placed on the 
shoulders of the least-well off member states, even though no member 
state was worse off in real terms because of the final budgetary agree­
ment on 1981 ERDF Commitment appropriations.
Finally, the atmosphere in which the new guidelines for regional 
policy and the draft amendments to the Fund regulation have been pro­
duced is one which shows concern and recognition for the need to 
restructure the Community budget, to avoid excessive agricultural 
spending and the need to reduce continuing and indeed worsening regional 
imbalances before further progress can be achieved towards Economic and 
Monetary Union and total economic integration. The same goals and needs 
were, however, recognised at the end of the 1960s and at the Paris 
Summit of 1972 and led eventually to the establishment of the ERDF in 
1975. The major stumbling block towards the achievements of these goals 
has been and will, in all likelihood, remain the self-interest motiva­
tion of the member states and their unwillingness to cede enough control 
over the Fund to the Commission to allow it to be run according to truly 
communautaire priorities and considerations.
The Commission's recently proposed amended regulation is a bold 
document in that it expresses the objective need to concentrate 
resources in the least-developed areas and aims to increase substantially 
the more communautaire side of the Fund: the EQS. It also deals with
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the need to end national government domination of the Fund's adminis­
tration and to involve local and regional authorities in the compila­
tion of the Regional Development Programmes. Moreover, it hopes to 
improve the perennial problem of additionality by gradually moving over 
to a system of programmes for aid rather than individual projects.
The Commission has reinforced its arguments by claiming that it 
cannot continue with the present system of grant applications because 
of the staff constraints imposed by the Council of Ministers which has 
successively refused to permit increases in manpower in the Commission's 
DCs. Therefore the programme approach has been proposed to help alle­
viate the administrative burden faced by DG XVI which has increased due 
to the expanding Fund and the consequent rise in applications for Fund 
assistance.
Nevertheless member states are having difficulty in administering 
the programme approach as so far experienced under the EQS and are 
reluctant to bear the administrative cost that a total switch would 
entail. Some member states, moreover, (such as the UK) do not have an 
appropriate regional organisation or civil service through which to draw 
up RDPs or programme contracts.
The initial reactions voiced in the Council of Ministers suggested 
that member states had finally recognised the desirability of and need 
to make the changes cited above. However, it is typical that most 
member states agree that the Fund should be concentrated in the worst- 
off regions but that they all (except West Germany) consider that they 
should have eligible regional
Doubtless, the arguments and debates over the Fund's.renewal will 
be protracted and the inevitable compromise will be long in coming. It 
is unlikely that the final package will involve any significant increase 
in the powers of the Commission or the local and regional authorities
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vis à vis the national governments in the Fund's administration.
What seems certain is that the Commission's ultimate aim for the
ERDF: '... to correct the principal imbalances within the Community
resulting in particular from agricultural preponderance, industrial
80change and structural underemployment ' will remain a pipedream.
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CHAPTER NINE ; THE EFFECT OF EEC FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS IN THE LESS-DEVELOPED REGIONS OF THE COMMUNITY
This Chapter aims to assess Community financial instruments which 
have been significant for aiding less-developed regions and to compare 
these with the operations of the ERDF. The instruments to be dis­
cussed are the European Investment Bank, the New Community Instrument, 
European Coal and Steel Community financial assistance, the European 
Social Fund, and the Guidance Section of FEOGA. Furthermore, the 
implications of the Community's Competition Policy for the less- 
developed regions will be reviewed. Finally a survey will be made of 
recent Commission attempts at coordinating the Community's financial 
instruments described in the first part of the Chapter.
I. EUROPEAN INVESTDÆNT BANK
1. Origins and Objectives
When the EEC was established the founding of the EIB was incor­
porated in the Treaty of Rome; Article 2 of the Treaty endowed the 
Community with the task of progressively approximating the economic 
policies of member states by establishing a Common Market and of pro­
moting throughout the Community an harmonious development of economic 
activity, a continued and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, 
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations 
between the states belonging to it. In order to fulfil these tasks 
Article 3 provided for, inter alia, (section j) 'the establishment of 
a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic expansion of 
the Community by opening up fresh resources'. Thus the need was 
recognised for a substantial increase in investment in the EEC and 
for some mechanism to facilitate the mobilisation and transfer of
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capital from richer to poorer regions within the Community and to 
bring capital into the Community from outside its borders.
Article 129 of the Rome Treaty established the EIB with a legal 
personality distinct from that of the Community and laid down that its 
membership should consist of the member states of the EEC. Article 130 
defined the tasks to be undertaken by the Bank. These included con­
tributing (by having recourse to the capital market and/or utilising 
its own resources) to the balanced and steady development of the 
Common Market in the interest of the Community. For this purpose the 
Bank was to operate on a non-profit making basis and to grant loans 
and give guarantees facilitating the financing of the following pro­
jects in all sectors of the economy :
(a) projects for developing less-developed regions ;
(b) projects for modernising or converting undertakings or
for developing fresh activities called for by the progressive 
establishment of the Common Market, where these projects 
are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely 
financed by the various means available in the individual 
member states;
(c) projects of common interest to several member states which
are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely
financed by the various means available in the individual 
member states.
Thus the EIB was given no direct political function nor does it
issue directives or rulings.
It is a practical and operational body whose work 
is principally concerned with some of the realities 
of welding together different economies and with 




The EIB differs from a central bank in that it has no power to 
control the stock of money; it differs from a commercial bank as it 
does not directly accept deposits from the public. The Bank, being 
non-profit making, seeks only to cover its expenses and to set aside 
sufficient reserves to deal with possible losses from loan defaults. 
However, this is unlikely to occur as the EIB usually demands sureties 
from the state involved or from other financial institutions.
The head office of the EIB is in Luxembourg and it has external 
bases in several member states including a liaison office in London.
The Bank is composed of four organs: firstly, the Board of Governors,
which consists of Ministers designated by member states and whose 
tasks are laid down in Articles 9 and 10 of the Bank's statute.
These include the laying down of directives for the credit policy of 
the EIB and ensuring their implementation, deciding whether to increase 
the subscribed capital of the Bank and authorising special loans. 
Moreover the Board has the power to authorise by way of derogation 
(acting unanimously on a proposal from the Board of Directors) loans 
for investment projects carried out, in whole or in part, outside the 
European territories of member states. Finally, the Board of Governors 
approves the annual report of the Board of Directors and the annual 
balance sheet and profit and loss account and, acting unanimously, is 
competent to take any decisions concerning the suspension of the oper­
ations of the Bank and, should the event arise, its liquidation.
Secondly, the Board of Directors, which, with Greek entry into the
2European Community, consists of 19 directors and 11 alternates from 
the member states. The tasks of the directors are laid down in Articles 
11 and 12 of the Bank's statute and include granting loans and guaran­
tees and fixing interest rates on them. Thirdly, the Management
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Committee (Article 13 of the Bank's statute) which pursues the day 
to day business of the Bank and fourthly an Audit Committee, whose job 
is proscribed by Article 14 of the statute and is to verify annually 
the operations and accounts of the Bank.
The EIB has a close relationship both with the member states of 
the Community and with the Commission. The latter gives its opinion 
on loan applications and can be overruled only by a unanimous vote of 
the Bank's Board, a veto which has never been carried out.
3. Sources of Funds
The EIB's capital is derived from two sources: from that sub­
scribed by member states and from its borrowing on international capital 
markets. The bulk of resources come from the latter source, namely 
from public or private bond issues on national capital markets inside 
and outside the Community and on the international market. The EIB is 
one of the best known, highest credit-standing borrowers and its 
bonds are quoted on the world's major stock exchanges. The tables 
below show the Bank's present capital structure and its borrowing over 
the last twenty years.
Article 18 of the Bank's statute stipulates that the Bank's 
lendings should not exceed 250% of its subscribed capital. It does 
not, however, receive the full subscribed capital, but only the percen­
tage paid up, which is determined by the Board of Governors.
With the aim of increasing the EIB's capacity for lending, a 
doubling of the Bank's subscribed capital to 14.4 billion ECUs was 
approved, subject to national budgetary procedures, by the Bank's Board
3of Governors at its annual meeting in Luxembourg on 15th June 1981.
The decision was due to take effect from 31st January 1981.
219
Table 9.1 (A) : Capital Structure (as at 1 January 1981 in million ua)
Authorised Capital
Total paid in 
and to be paid in %
W. Germany 1575.00 202.50 21.875
France 1575.00 202.50 21.875
United Kingdom 1575.00 202.50 21.875
Italy 1260.00 162.00 17.50
Belgium 414.75 53.325 5.76
Netherlands 414.75 53.325 5.76
Denmark 210.00 27.00 2.925
Greece 112.50 14.46 1.563
Ireland 52.50 6.75 0.729
Luxembourg 10.50 1.35 0.146
Total 7200.00 925.71 100.0
N.B. The capital set to be paid in equals approximately 13% of 
the authorised capital: all or part of the remainder
could be called by decision of the Board of Directors 
should ever the Bank's obligation towards lenders require 
this.












Source : European Investment Bank Broadsheet, printed January 1981
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The part of the increase to be paid in by the member states is 
set at 540 million ECUs (7.5%) which will bring the total amount of 
the Bank's capital paid in or to be paid in to 1465.715 million ECUs.
The member states will pay in the 540 million ECJUs in eight half- 
yearly instalments, the first on 30th April 1984.
4. Applications and Eligibility for Loans and Guarantees
Applications for loans or guarantees may be made to the Bank
either through the Commission or through the member state on whose
territory the project will be carried out. An undertaking may also
apply direct to the Bank for a loan or guarantee. According to Article
21 of the EIB's statute:
Applications made through the Commission shall be 
submitted for an opinion to the member state in 
whose territory the project will be carried out.
Applications made through a member state shall be 
submitted to the Commission for an opinion.
Applications made direct by an undertaking shall 
be submitted to the member states concerned and 
to the Commission.
The member state concerned and the Commission must deliver an opinion
within two months otherwise the Bank assumes that there is no objection
to the project in question and the Board of Directors then rules upon
applications for loans or guarantees submitted to it by the Management
Committee.
The Bank may grant loans and give guarantees to private or public
4enterprises, irrespective of their legal status. The investments 
financed are usually carried out in the European territory of the 
member states but the Board of Governors can use its power of deroga­
tion to enable the financing of projects outside the Community where 
they are of Community interest. This provision has been applied to 
operations in countries in the Mediterranean region, including Portugal, 
to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and to the overseas
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countries and territories of France.
In 1980, operations outside the Community totalled 547.7 million 
eua compared with 512.9 million eua in 1979.^ 402 million eua were
channelled to the Mediterranean countries and 145.7 million eua to 
the ACP States. Projects aided include mainly those concerning oil 
and natural gas supplies and for the development of hydroelectric 
power. However, loans have been provided for other industrial and 
infrastructure projects.
The EIB normally finances no more than half the cost of a project 
In general it prefers not to lend less than a million u.a.s per pro­
ject, but it does however finance smaller scale projects by means of 
global loans to promote investments by small businesses.^
5. Regional Development Operations of the EIB
One of the founding aims of the EIB was to contribute towards 
the reduction of regional disparities. With this aim in mind, in 
December 1958 the EIB's Board of Governors issued a directive that the 
Bank: 'devote a substantial portion of its resources to the financing
of projects likely to contribute to the development of less developed
7regions, which is already one of the major objectives of the EEC.
Finance for regional development projects comes from the EIB's 
own resources and, since the establishment of the New Community Instru­
ment in 1978, from additional sources provided by the European 
Community within the context of the European Monetary System (see 
below).
In its lending to support regional development in the Community, 
the EIB respects the regional development priorities laid down by the
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appropriate national authorities and strives to focus lending on 
those regions with the gravest problems; since 1973 more than 75% 
of regional development financing has been channelled to projects in
gItaly, Ireland and UK.
In 1980, for example, almost two-thirds of regional development 
financing was channelled to projects in the Community's top priority 
areas: Ireland, the Mezzogiomo, Northern Ireland and Greenland.
Additionally, more than four-fifths aided regions with unemployment
9figures at least 25% above the Community average.
In 1980 lending for regional development totalled 1961.4 million
eua. (1815.7 mill, from own resources and 145.7 mill, from NCI): 47.4%
was given over to projects in Italy, 25.5% was given over the projects
in UK, approximately 20.0% was given over to projects in Ireland, just
over 7.0% was given over to projects in France, and lesser amounts to
10Denmark and Belgium.
The above funds were used to aid finance in industry, irrigation, 
water supply and sewerage treatment schemes, telecommunications, trans­
port infrastructure and other miscellaneous infrastructure.
In the UK, for example, two-thirds of the 499.5 mill, eua loaned 
was given over to infrastructure, in particular water supply, sewerage, 
sewerage treatment and disposal schemes (101.9 mill.), investment in 
telecommunications systems and road and rail transport infrastructure 
(135.2 mill.), equipment for the energy sector (25.2 mill.) and miscel­
laneous components of larger projects such as further water schemes 
and roads (70.5 mill.).
Lending to industry more than doubled in 1980 (166.7 mill., cf 
1979 - 64 mill.), the chief beneficiaries being the mechanical and 
electrical engineering sectors (43.6 mill.), foodstuffs (32.3 mill.) 
and non-ferrous metals (26.4 mill.). There was also an agency loan
223
and contract of mandate and guarantee with the British government 
geared to providing sub-loans to small and medium scale industrial 
ventures in various disadvantaged parts of the country.
Funds in the UK went for investment projects in the assisted 
regions, notably Scotland and Northern Ireland, the North West, the 
North, Wales, Yorkshire and Humberside, and the South West. There 
were also two projects offering benefits to a number of regions: high
speed trains to run on the North East/South West route and water 
schemes in the Severn and Trent Valleys.
In January 1981,^^ the European Investment Bank made a global 
loan of £5 million (8.5 mill, ua) to Finance for Industry Ltd. This 
is to be used by the group's subsidiary Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation (ICFC) to make sub-loans of between £15,000 and 
£50,000 to support a wide range of investments chosen in agreement 
with the EIB.
12Moreover, in April 1981, the European Investment Bank concluded 
its first global loan to a UK clearing bank in the form of a £5 million 
contract with the Midland Bank to help finance small scale industrial 
ventures in assisted areas of England and Wales. The EIB is making 
the funds available in the form of a global loan to Midland Bank 
Industrial Equity Holding Ltd. and the proceeds are to be on-lent 
through the local branches of the parent company, for a series of 
small investments (£15,000 to £50,000) chosen in agreement with the 
EIB.
The above two recent global loans complement a scheme already in 
operation in the UK to help finance small scale industry; this con­
sists of a mandate arrangement whereby the Department of Industry's 
regional offices in England, Scottish Economic Planning Department, 
Welsh Office Industry Department and Northern Ireland Department of
224
Commerce act as EIB agents in using funds provided by the Bank to lend
13amounts of between £15,000 and £2.5 million. By the end of April 1981 
the mandate scheme had been used to help finance some 125 ventures 
involving the creation or safeguarding of about 10,250 jobs.
6. The New Community Instrument (NCI)
This is another new mechanism which is of significance for less
developed regions and which includes a major role for the EIB. It was 
14set up within the context of the European Monetary System (EMS) having 
been agreed upon in principle in December 1977 by the European Council. 
It came into operation in October 1978 after the European Parliament 
and ECOSOC had delivered their opinions.
The Council decision creating the instrument empowers the Commis­
sion to contract loans of up to 1000 million eua, and to on-lend the 
proceeds for the purpose of financial investment projects contributing 
to priority Community objectives with regard to energy, industry or 
infrastructure. Thus the Commission has to decide on projects eligible
for assistance and the EIB, acting in accordance with its general man-
15date, will vet applications and grant loans. As part of the agree­
ment of the EMS projects financed in Italy and Ireland may be accorded 
a 3% interest subsidy. Within the framework of implementing the EMS, 
the Council adopted on 3rd August 1979, a Regulation to give interest 
rebates to investments carried out in less prosperous member countries. 
The volume of loans to receive interest rebates is fixed for five years 
at 5000 million eua, distributed in annual instalments of 1000 million 
eua. The volume of interest rebates is 1000 million eua distributed 
in annual instalments of 200 million eua. It was decided that Italy 
and Ireland would benefit from these measures and that interest rebates 
would be allocated one-third to Ireland and two-thirds to Italy.
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In 1979, the first full year of the NCI's operation, the con­
tracts jointly signed by the European Commission and the EIB for 
investment projects within the Community totalled 277 mill eua.^®
These were carried out by the EIB on behalf of and at the risk of the 
EEC. 105.3 mill eua were invested in the UK towards the construction 
of Dinorwic hydroelectric power station in Wales (79.4 mill eua) and 
for water supply and sewage schemes in the Lothian Region of Scotland.
85 mill eua were invested in Italy and 86.7 mill eua in Ireland.
17In 1980, loans granted from NCI resources totalled 197.6 mill 
eua: 137.8 mill eua were provided for investments in Italy, 41.7 mill
eua for Ireland and 18.1 for Denmark. Apart from one project in Italy 
all the others received, in addition, loans from the Bank's own 
resources.
7. Comparison with ERDF Operations and General Conclusions
When the EEC was established in 1958, the economic climate of 
the time was one of general prosperity. Despite this, however, there 
were regional disparities of 6:1 between the richest Community regions 
in North Germany and the poorest in Southern Italy. Nevertheless, 
the majority view of the time was that the advantages accruing to 
market forces in an environment of increased competition, produced by 
the creation of the EEC, would benefit both poor and rich regions 
alike. Thus there was no specific instrument of regional policy intro­
duced by the Treaty of Rome; the EIB was established as an additional 
source of capital and aid to those already operating in member states, 
with the aim of accelerating the process of reducing regional dispa­
rities .
In other words, its establishment did not represent an attempt 
to provide a regional policy but to provide a source of finance to
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assist, inter alia, regional development.
If a comparison is made between the operations of the EIB and 
those of the ERDF as described in the preceding chapters, it can be 
seen that the EIB is less politically charged than the Regional Fund; 
it has been endowed with a distinct and separate personality from 
the Community institutions, and in this way, although' there is some 
Community involvement in its operations (and despite its clear link 
with the EEC) member states see it as an a d d i t i o n a l  b »oUicU.
happens to operate at the European level (and also operates outside 
the Community’s territory). It does not have the potential supra­
national connotations often linked with other Community sources of 
finance.
Thus whereas the operation of the ERDF constitutes part of a 
conscious Commission attempt to achieve a measure of coordination of 
national regional policies and to become involved (albeit in a com­
plementary fashion) in regional development through such requirements 
as the regional development programme, EIB finance presents no such 
incursions into the economic policies of unwilling member states.
The setting up of the ERDF itself was a highly charged political 
decision which produced an agreement on a quota system spreading the 
Fund's already small resources thinly amongst all member states, with 
72% of total aid allocated to the three countries UK, Italy and Ire­
land with the worst regional problems (prior to Greek entry). On the 
other hand, no political compromises of this sort have been involved 
in EIB operations and since 1973 at least 75% of the Bank's regional 
development resources have been lent for projects in the three poorest 
member states. If lending from the EIB under the heading of its two 
other aims (projects of common interest, and modernisation and conver­
sion of undertakings), a proportion of which takes place in less
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developed regions, is added, then the total percentage of EIB loans 
going to Italy, Ireland and UK is about 90%.
Moreover, the ERDF Fund Regulation (Article 4) states that 
individual investment projects must exceed 50,000 eua (approx. £27,500) 
in order to be eligible for Fund aid. By contrast, the EIB facility 
of global loans for small-scale investments, means that more help can 
be offered to small and medium sized enterprises, as was the case 
this year with the loans made to financial institutions in the UK 
(for on-lending) to assist projects valued at between £15,000 and 
£50,000.
On the other hand, it would appear that the offer of loans and 
guarantees is not as attractive to potential recipients of aid as are 
investment grants as provided by the ERDF. In this respect it is 
significant to note that whilst the Regional Fund has been consist­
ently oversubscribed since its inception in 1975 (see annual Fund 
reports), the provision under Article 4 (2b) of the ERDF Regulation, 
whereby assistance is offered in the forms of an interest rebate of 
3% on an EIB loan over a period of years, has only been taken up once 
(by the UK for a project in Belfast to develop an electrical power 
station).
In addition demand for EIB loans in the UK dropped in 1980 as 
compared with 1979 (éî^-O million eua in 1980, 508.1 million eua in 
1979), again demonstrating the relative unattractiveness of loans, at 
least in the UK. (Loans in Ireland and Italy did increase in 1980 as
against 1979.) Indeed, during a recent review of the ERDF's opera-
18tions , one commentator directly involved with the formulation of 
Fund aid applications suggested that this was the case. Despite the 
fact that EIB loans are normally made in mixed currency form, thus 
allowing a lower interest rate to be charged than for a loan entirely
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in sterling, he claimed that the cost of covering foreign exchange
risk eliminates almost all the advantage of paying the lower interest 
19rate. More importantly, it was thought that the value of an ERDF 
grant is greater if received as a lump sum early in the life of a 
project rather than spread thinly in the form of interest subsidies 
over a number of years.
In conclusion, it is impossible to compare the relative sizes of 
the EIB's resources and those of the ERDF. The former operates as a 
financial institution, raising capital on the market and demanding 
authorised capital from the member states. The size of the latter on 
the other hand, is fixed annually by the Community Budget procedure.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the EIB has made a signi­
ficant contribution to regional development in the least prosperous 
areas of the Community, despite the apparent unattractiveness of 
loans vis à vis grants: at the end of 1980 (including NCI resources)
the Bank had lent 17,833.1 million eua with around 90% of this figure 
having been directed to the Community's worst-off areas. Between
1958-80 the EIB lent 3,316.1 million eua (23% of resources) to UK
20projects and 688.0 in 1980 (25% of resources). This compares with
21ERDF grants to the UK of 655.78 million eua (1975-79) and 260.31
miH i  on eua in 1979. sec. 4 ;:L ]
II. THE ECSC : FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
1. Origins
The Community's industries of coal, iron and steel have been 
amongst the hardest hit by conversion to other sources of energy, 
cheaper imports from abroad and general economic recession. Moreover 
since these traditional industries are regionally concentrated in the 
old industrial areas of the EC, the problems of unemployment and social
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deprivation are all the more acute.
Thus alongside Community efforts to rationalise the coal, iron 
and steel industries, loans and grants have been accorded under the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris (1951) which governs the operations of 
the ECSC.
According to Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Paris:
The Community shall progressively bring about 
conditions which will of themselves ensure the 
most rational distribution of production at the 
highest possible level of productivity, while 
safeguarding continuity of employment and taking 
care not to provoke fundamental and persistent 
disturbances in the economies of the member states.
To this end, the ECSC may grant long-term loans to firms for investment
22purposes and may also make grants.
2. Scope
Chapter III of the Treaty of Paris lays down the provisions and 
scope for loans to eligible projects (Articles 49, 54 and 56). The 
ECSC only assists investment projects and does not provide general 
cash requirements or working capital. Eligible projects include 
industrial projects, including investment in the coal and steel 
industries, in line with Community policy on the industries (para 1, 
Article 54 of ECSC Treaty), for example in capital goods and buildings, 
supply installation or environmental protection. Additionally, support 
may be given to works and installations which contribute to increasing 
the production, reducing production costs or facilitating the marketing 
of coal and steel products (para 2, Article 54). (These include power 
stations fired by Community coal, and port installations for the ship­
ment of raw materials used in the steel industry.) Recipients of 
loans granted for these schemes need not be coal or steel undertakings.
The second major area eligible for ECSC financial assistance
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concerns conversion schemes. These include investments to facilitate 
the creation of new and economically sound activities or the trans­
formation of undertakings capable of reabsorbing into productive 
employment, workers who have been, or are about to be, made redundant 
(see Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty). These schemes have almost all 
involved industries providing for former coal and steel industry 
workers.
The ECSC also provides finance for subsidised housing and the 
ECSC housing subsidy scheme has operated since 1955. The legal basis 
of housing aid is Article 54 of the Treaty of Paris and it takes the 
form of reduced-interest loans and aims to ease the cost of financing 
housing by adding the funds lent by the Community to resources pro­
vided nationally.
Grants of long-term 1% interest-rate loans to the responsible 
national bodies are made available. Moreover the Commission decision 
of 29th June 1979 on the 9th subsidised housing programme (1979-83) 
allocated 30 million eua for the first phase of the programme (1979- 
81). An additional 1 million eua has been allocated for 1981 to cover 
any additional requirements such as those which might arise as a 
result of Greek accession to the Community.
The scheme is intended to subsidise the following projects:
(1) housing linked with industrial reorganisation in the 
traditional steel centres and in those coalfields where 
production is to be increased;
(2) housing for labour transferred to the new coastal steel 
works ;
(3) specific solutions for migrant workers, employees with 
special skills and persons employed in arduous tasks;
(4) housing to be modernised as part of urban renewal in steel 
and mining districts.
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The number of dwellings subsidised by means of ECSC loans stood,
noon 1st January 1980, at 1,65,511.“
The Commission also provides grants to encourage technical 
research in the coal and steel industry (Article 55 of the Treaty of 
Paris) and to contribute to workers' redeployment and retraining.
Table 9.3 Loans granted^ under Art. 56 of the ECSC Treaty^
million eua
1961-76 1977 1978 1979
Belgium 36.67 (12) - - -
France 135.55 (49) 85.54 (4) 9.50 (5) 94.48 (9)
West Germany 104.17 (54)3 22.41 (3) 63.70 (1) -
Ireland 2.00 (1)4 - - -
Italy 69.02 (18) 10.30 (1) - -
Luxembourg - - 2.49 (1) 1.69 (1)
Netherlands . 46.82 (38) - - -
United Kingdom 92.48 (10)4 3 1.5 (1) 124.96 (5) 103.95 (15)
Community 486.71 (187) 119.75 (9) 200.65 (12) 200.12 (25)
NB: ^Based on commitments
^Figures in brackets refer to number of loans granted. 
^Including 1 loan under Arts. 54 and 56 of the ECSC Treaty. 
41973-76.
^Account being taken of the cancellation in 1979 of a loan 
granted in 1976.
Source: Thirteenth General Report of Activities of EC (1979)
February 1980, p. 132, Table 13.
24In 1980 total loans granted amounted to 1,026.9 million eua, 
with the following breakdown:
(1) 756.88 million eua for industrial projects (595 mill eua in 1979)
(2) 265.47 million eua for conversion programmes (59 mill eua in 1979)
(3) 4.55 million eua for subsidised housing (22 mill eau in 1979)
The following table gives figures for ECSC loans paid out in


























ECSC finance is provided, both by raising money for loans on the 
capital market and by its own resources as expressed in the annual 
Budget of the Community, the amount being raised by a levy of 0.31% 
and by income from investment interest and from loans granted against 
non-borrowed funds or from commitments that have been cancelled out.





Interest Relief Grants on 
Investment and Conversion Loans 32
Aid to coking coal 6
^This does not include financial support for 
temporary measures to help steel workers 
(early retirement, short time working).
Source: ECSC 14th General Report
3. Conclusions
The loans and interest rebate schemes available under the ECSC 
have helped to attack one aspect of one of the Community's major 
regional problems, namely the decline of regionally concentrated tradi­
tional industries. However, it obviously has no relevance for, or 
effect upon, underdeveloped backward agricultural regions, or for that 
matter the social problems of overdeveloped conurbations and cities.
Since joining the Community, the UK has been the major beneficiary 
of the loans available under ECSC schemes, which is hardly surprising 
since they are directly applicable to the causes and nature of the 
British regional problem. Thus, in relation to other member states, 
the UK has received significant levels of aid, but in absolute terms
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too, a significant contribution has been made, with loans worth
690.84 million eua having been given over to the UK since 1973 (see
above tables) and 367.95 million eua for 1980 alone compared to
grants of 655.78 million eua to UK projects (1975-79) from ERDF
25resources and 260.31 million eua in 1979.
France has also derived major benefits from the ECSC loans, for 
her traditional industrial areas of North and North-East France (600.54 
million eua since 1961), as have the West Germans (319.33 million eau 
since 1961) and to a lesser extent the Belgians (134.46 million eua 
since 1961). Italy has also benefitted to the tune of 219.08 million 
eua since 1961, but these loans will have been concentrated mainly in 
the North of the country and have had no effect upon Italy's major 
regional problem in the Mezzogiomo where the problem is one of under­
developed and inefficient agriculture.
III. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND
1. Origin
The European Social Fund (ESF) was established in 1958 under the 
Rome Treaty as a training fund to provide assistance to economically 
disadvantaged workers. 50% of ESF resources were to be committed to 
the Community's problem regions and 50% to assist migrant labour, 
persons leaving agriculture, persons working in the textile industry, 
young people, women, the handicapped and those industries where employ­
ment suffered at the hands of technical progress. The Fund was entrusted 
the task of '... rendering the employment of workers easier and of 
increasing their geographical and occupational mobility within the 
Community ...' (Article 123, EEC Treaty of Rome, 1957)
The rules governing the Social Fund's activities and operations 
came into force in 1960 and have since been amended several times.
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26The first reform of the Fund was carried out in 1971 when its areas
of intervention were substantially extended. The operating rules
adopted then were reviewed at the end of 1977 in an endeavour to make
27the Fund more effective.
The Fund can take action when the employment situation is affected 
or in danger of being affected; either by special measures adopted 
by the Council in the framework of Community policies or by jointly 
agreed operations to further the objective of the Community. Alter­
natively the ESF embraces calls for specific joint action to improve
the balance between supply of and demand for manpower within the 
28Community.
The Fund can also take action to assist operations which are 
carried out in the member states as part of their employment policy 
and which are:
(a) aimed at solving problems which arise in those regions which, 
because they are less developed or there is a decline in 
their main activities, suffer a serious and prolonged 
imbalance in employment ;
(b) aimed at facilitating the adaptation to the requirements 
of technical progress of those branches of economic 
activity in which such progress gives rise to substantial 
changes in manpower and vocational knowledge and skill; or
(c) undertaken because of substantial changes in the conditions 
of production in the distribution of products in groups
of undertakings carrying on the same or connected activities 
which are thus forced to cease, reduce or transform their 
activities permanently;
(d) of concern to the entry or re-entry of the handicapped into 
economic activity.
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For each financial year, at least 50% of the appropriations 
available for assistance from the Fund pursuant to the above Article 
5 are reserved for operations aimed at eliminating long-term structural 
unemployment or underemployment in the regions referred to in the 
Article.
Assistance from the Fund is granted having regard to the magni­
tude of the employment problems and to the economic capacity of the 
regions in which the operations are carried out. Fund assistance 
amounts to 50% of eligible expenditure in support of operations by 
public authorities, bodies governed by public law and joint social 
institutions entrusted with tasks in the public interest. Assistance 
is also granted in respect of operations by bodies or other entities 
governed by private law (in member states where the concept of private 
law is unknown an equivalent entity applies) on condition that the 
public authorities of member states guarantee the completion of such 
operations.
When operations are carried out in regions where there is an 
especially serious and prolonged imbalance in employment (the classi­
fication of absolute priority region under the terms of the ERDF is 
used here), on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, the amount 
of Fund assistance is raised by 10%.
The scope of Social Fund interventions includes aid for persons 
leaving agriculture, resettlement and retraining aid for workers in 
the textiles and clothing sector and integration measures to facilitate 
the settlement of migrant labour. Moreover, assistance is offered for 
the training of teachers and welfare workers. Help is also available 
for young people, for the training of young men and women and special 
employment aids are offered for first-time job seekers. The Fund also 
provides money to help safeguard and promote employment in sectors
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undergoing technical progress resulting in substantial changes in 
manpower, vocational knowledge and skills. Likewise assistance is 
given for retraining persons employed in groups of firms forced to 
cease, reduce or transform their activities permanently as a result 
of substantial changes in production or distribution. The handi­
capped are also eligible for Social Fund money to assist their re­
entry into a working role and pilot schemes and preparatory studies 
which consider possible new forms of Social Fund assistance are 
financed from the Budget. Finally, under Article 5 of the Social 
Fund, one of the main priorities is the provision of aid for backward 
or depressed regions as defined by the areas eligible for ERDF 
assistance (see below).
2. Size of the Fund
In 1979 the European Social Fund was endowed with 660 million eua
in the Community Budget and was of considerable importance in pro-
30Viding aid for regions eligible for ERDF assistance: 85% of totally
budgetary resources were dedicated to operations in these regions and
293 million eua (37.8% of ESF resources) was spent in the five top
31priority regions of the Community. (The corresponding figures for
1978 were 79.4% and 37.6% of the Fund.)
In 1980 the Budgetary authority allocated 909.5 million ecu to the
32Commitments Budget of the ESF. With the addition of appropriations
33of 112.4 million ecu carried forward (consisting mainly of refunds 
available too late in 1979, for recommitment within the same year), 
the total amount available for commitment in 1980 was thus 1,021.92 
million ecu (19.4% more than in 1979).
The volume of applications for 1980 totalled 1,625.55 million ecu 
(an increase of 23% over 1979) and meant that the Fund was over­
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subscribed to the tune of 59%.
To solve this problem, and according to the guidelines for the
management of the Fund which were issued in 1978,^^ applications are
grouped, as regards their priority, relative to the various fields of
Fund intervention, ranging from a scale of first priority to fifth
35and finally non-priority applications.
In 1980, apart from the migrants section of the Fund, first 
priority applications were met without reduction and there was an 
overall reduction in the volume of weighted reductions, which totalled 
234 million ecu or 13.8% of total priority applications, as against 
levels of 30%-32% of previous years.
In 1980 Social Fund payment appropriations amounted to 933.86 
million ecu (13% te on 1979) and were made up as follows:
Table 9.6
million ecu
Provided by the Budgetary 
Authority at the beginning of 
the year 374.30
Carried forward from 1979 233.16
Provided by the Budgetary 
Authority in a supplementary 
budget (No. 2) at the end of 
the year 326.40
933.86
Source: 9th Report on the Activities of the ESF: COM(81)343 final
There has been a continued improvement shown in the volume of 
payments from the Social Fund; payments had reached 607.46 million 
ecu by the end of November 1980, the original budgetary allocation and 
the carry-over from the previous year having been fully utilised. It
240
was also possible to make payments amounting to 127,72 million ecu
by the end of the year from the supplementary Budget. Thus payments
effected amounted to 100% of appropriations available at the start
of the year and almost 80% of total credits for the year.
This improved payments situation reflects increasing use being
made of the advance payments system for Fund aid; two-thirds of all
advance payments in 1980 related to commitments entered into in the
same year and about 29% of the commitments made in 1980 were paid
36within the same year. Moreover Commission Decision 78/706 EEC 
prescribes an eighteen month deadline from the end date of the opera­
tions, for the submission of the final payment claim. This has had 
a beneficial effect on clearing arrears.
3. ESF operations in the regions
The volume of applications submitted for Social Fund aid concerning
workers in less-developed or declining regions under Article 5 of
37Council Decision 71/66, EEC amounted to nearly 600 million ecu in
1980 (a 12% increase on 1979).
The total provision for the fields of regions, technical progress
and groups of firms, which have hitherto been combined for budgetary 
38purposes, was 395 million ecu (cf 326 million ecu in 1979), an 
increase of 21% over 1979. As had been the case in previous years, 90% 
of the combined budgetary provision (355.50 million ecu) was devoted 
to programmes under Article 5 (lA) (regions) of the above decision.
When account was taken of refunds from 1979, total volume of appropri­
ations available for commitment under Article 5 (regions) in 1980 was 
455 million ecu (cf 354 million ecu in 1979), a 28.5% increase on 1979. 
Programmes classified in the first four priority levels were, as in 
1979, fully financed, while 34% of eligible allocations with fifth
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priority status were aided.
When Social Fund grants approved in other areas of intervention
are taken into consideration, the total ESF assistance destined for
ERDF regions in 1980 was 825 million ecu (25% above the 1979 figure);
of this amount 334 million ecu were allocated to operations in the
five ERDF absolute priority regions, the average per capita aid in
these regions totalling 42 ecu in 1980 (cf average for Community as
39a whole in 1980 equalled 10.2 ecu).
4. Comparisons with the ERDF and general conclusions
The European Social Fund has proved to be an extremely important
arm of Community aids to backward or depressed regions ; about 85% of
ESF appropriations have been regularly dedicated to operations in the
regions eligible for ERDF aid, and a considerable proportion have
gone to the top priority regions (see above). Moreover, the total
amounts available to the European Social Fund and the European Regional
Development Fund were comparable in 1979 and 1980: in 1979, 660
million eua were available for commitment under the ESF and 945 million
eua under the ERDF. In 1980, the respective figures were 1021.92
million ecu for the ESF and 1200 million ecu for the ERDF.
If the apparent improvement in the speed and efficiency with
which ESF aids are paid is taken into account (see above), this must
be compared with the situation relevant for ERDF aid. Although an
advance payments method has also been recently introduced for ERDF
payments, criticism has been levelled at the Commission for the delay
40in distributing ERDF grants ; delays occur during the submission of 
applications for aid, during the claims for payments from Brussels 
once the project has been accepted and in the final receipt of payments 
Despite ESF aid being disbursed more efficiently than ERDF assistance.
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it is open to question whether the Fund’s operations adhere strictly 
to the principle of additionality. This involves the idea that 
Community contributions to projects in member states should be added 
to and not substituted for what member states would have spent any­
way. This is to ensure that Community funds are used to further the 
aims of the Community and that such aid can be observed as a genuine 
Community contribution.
A recent parliamentary report on the European Social Fund in the 
UK stated:
The prime intention of the European Community in 
making grants available through the ESF has been, 
and is, to stimulate activities in the member states 
beyond those which would otherwise have occurred 
... Whether governments have in fact responded in 
this way is a hotly debated issue. If the Fund 
directs its resources towards activities which are 
currently not well performed by member states and 
developments subsequently occur, then the Fund can 
be seen as a spur and an instigator. An example 
might well be the attention it has given in recent 
years to improving training opportunities for women.
On the other hand, if governments simply offset ESF 
grants against their own expenditure intentions, it 
is not clear that, in the last resort, any money is 
actually forthcoming for training schemes other than 
that which would have been provided by governments 
had the Fund never existed and the principle of 
additionality is breached.41
As far as the Social Fund's spending in the UK is concerned, 
approximately 95% is paid to the Manpower Services Commission (MSC).
The remaining recipients are mainly training boards, private companies 
and voluntary organisations - where a large measure of additionality 
can be presumed. It is highly unlikely, however, that the budget of 
the MSC would be smaller than at present without the ESF contributions.
Whereas the ERDF aims to bolster ailing industries in the back­
ward or depressed regions, or to encourage the setting up of new 
enterprises in these areas, the ESF directs its attentions specifically 
to helping the workers affected by adverse economic conditions in
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problem regions. These two aims are obviously complementary and 
recent attempts have been made to combine operations, not only of 
these two Funds, but also of the ECSC and EIB. (See below: section
on integrated operations.) Nevertheless, the major stumbling block 
to effective coordination of the two Funds is bureaucratic in 
nature; the organisation of the European Commission, with Directorates 
General responsible for different policy-areas, with a different 
Commissioner at their head, and with a rigid and complex multinational 
distribution of posts, leads to difficulties of communication between 
departments.
Therefore, it must be concluded that the European Social Fund 
operations are important in their own right in the ERDF regions and 
that attempts to coordinate the distribution of ERDF and ESF must be 
lauded. At the same time, however, the Funds remain separate entities 
organised and run by different departments, between which communi­
cation is fraught with problems because of the Commission's organi­
sation and multinational nature.
42IV. FEOGA - GUIDANCE SECTION
The aim of this section is to describe the establishment of a 
structural policy for agriculture within the framework of the guidance 
section of FEOGA, to consider the scope and achievements of such a 
policy and finally to take account of claims that the operations of 
the CAP as a whole have produced consequences which have had an anti- 
regional policy effect.
FEOGA is divided into two sections as the name suggests: the
guarantee section, which supports the market by helping to guarantee 
prices, and the guidance section, which is designed to help improve 
farm structures.
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1. Establishment of a structural policy for agriculture
Moves towards the setting up of a structural policy did not get 
firmly under way until 1972 when the Mansholt Plan (named after the 
then Vice-President of the Commission with responsibility for agri­
culture) was drawn up. The Council of Ministers subsequently adopted 
three basic directives on the reform of the CAP.^^ These aimed at 
developing modem farms capable, through the adoption of rational 
methods of production, of assuring a fair income and satisfactory 
working conditions for persons engaged thereon.
The directive aiming to provide an incentive to farmers aged
between 55 and 65 to leave agriculture has affected 37,000 people,
44freeing about 500,000 hectares. It should, however, be noted that 
a recent study has shown that the directive on aid to assist the mod­
ernisation of farms has provided three times more aid in the richer 
farming regions than in the poorer less-developed areas. Moreover, the 
aforementioned study demonstrated that the countries where the agri­
cultural population is the oldest have been the least affected by the 
directive.Finally the study points out that little use has been 
made of the third directive and none at all by Italy and Ireland.
The directives operate on the basis that because of the diversity 
of their causes, nature and gravity, structural problems in agriculture 
may require solutions which vary according to region, which are 
capable of adjustment over a period of time, and which, furthermore, 
should contribute to the overall economic and social development of 
each region concerned.
In 1975 a further directive was adopted by the Council concerning 
mountain and hill farming in certain less favoured areas. This provides 
for the payment of a special allowance to farmers in certain regions 
in order to compensate them for the natural handicaps with which they
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are confronted. Since the inception of this directive at the end of 
1979, 86.0 million eua has been provided to farmers in the UK (40.4% 
of total of 213.1 million eua), 53.9 million eua to France (25.2%),
34 million eua to West Germany (16%) and 30.9 million eua to Ireland 
(14.5%), and lesser amounts to other member states except Holland.
In 1977 and 1978, a number of structural measures were adopted
by the Council which aimed at removing the handicaps (see above).
47These specific measures included a regulation on common measures to 
improve the conditions under which agricultural products are pro­
cessed and marketed, and a series of common measures undertaken in 
the context of the Mediterranean Programme, which aimed to aid improve­
ments in irrigation in the Mezzogiorno and Corsica, the reconversion 
and restructuring of certain French Mediterranean vineyards, protection 
against flooding in certain French areas, and improvements in infra­
structure in Mediterranean regions.
2. Guidance Section: relative importance 
and recent developments______________
Because of the limitation of available resources, the development 
of a Community structural policy for agriculture has only had a weak 
regional impact. In terms of the total budget available to FEOGA, 
the share of the Guidance Section moved from 15% in 1964 to 3% in 
1978, figures which fall a long way short of the original aim of 
dividing the Fund 75%:25% between the Guarantee and Guidance Sections 
(see table below).
Thus despite the innovations in the field of farm structural 
policy in the 1970s, it must be remembered that the financial resources 
available to the Guidance Section of FEOGA are a small fraction of 
those available to the Guarantee Section. In 1979 they amounted to 
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49Recently it yas decided that the sum of 3,600 million eua 
should be allocated to the Guidance Section over a period of five 
years, beginning on 1st January 1980 (an average of 720 million eua 
per year).
Most of the measures financed by the Guidance Section are common 
measures decided by the Council with a view to achieving the aims set 
forth in Article 39(1)(a) of the Treaty of Rome: 'to increase agri­
cultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring 
the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour*. The 
remaining measures, which are tending to decline in relative importance, 
are individual projects for the improvement of agricultural structures 
pursuant to regulation 355/77/EEC (which replaced 17/64/EEC), special 
measures for the launching of producer groups in the fruit and vege­
table and fisheries sector and the measures to expand Community produc­
tion of citrus fruits.
The Guidance Section finances common measures in two different 
ways. The majority of such measures are financed through the reimburse­
ment of part of the eligible expenditure by the member states (indirect 
measures). This category includes the four socio-structural directives 
cited above and most of the market related measures. By contrast, the 
other measures are financed by direct subsidy for projects (direct 
action). Such direct subsidies are granted for the common measures, 
which accounted for the largest share of appropriations committed in 
respect of 1978 and 1979. (In total, 133.6 million eua was granted 
to 370 projects in 1979.)^^
Second in terms of financial cost was directive 75/268/EEC on 
mountain and hill farming in certain less favoured areas: payments
for 1979 amounted to 82.5 million eua.
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Expenditure for introducing a system of premiums for the non­
marketing of milk and milk products and for the conversion of dairy
herds^^ comprised the third most important expenditure in 1979. The
52Community contributes 40% from the Guidance Section for this measure
and 59.5 million eua were paid out during 1979.
53Expenditure on the modernisation of farms almost doubled over 
1978 and reached 54.3 million eua in 1979. Smaller amounts were 
dedicated to expenditure on restructuring the inshore fishing industry 
(5 million eua), eradicating brucellosis, tuberculosis and leucosis 
in cattle (7.1 million eua) and a programme to accelerate drainage 
operations in the West of Ireland (3.8 million eua).
Finally, during 1979, the last decisions to grant aid under 
Regulation No. 17/64/EEC (replaced by 355/77 - see above) took place: 
sums totalling 115 million eua were granted to 371 individual projects
On 18th February 1980, the Commission approved three common 
measures in the wine sector within the context of the Mediterranean 
Programme. These concerned firstly the granting of temporary and 
permanent abandonment premiums for certain areas under vines and of 
premiums for the renunciation of replanting. Secondly, they included 
the introduction of a system of premiums for the cessation of wine 
growing in France and Italy, and thirdly collective projects for the 
restructuring of vineyards.
One of the persistent problems of the Guidance Section has been 
the low proportion of available appropriations that has actually been 
used. In 1979, although the rate of use of appropriations for pro­
cessing and marketing measures was almost 100%,^^ it was much lower 
for structural and social measures to assist agriculture proper (for 
production structures, the rate hardly exceeded 50% - see table below) 
Moreover, according to the recent study on the regional impact of the
:49
Table 9.8 : Breakdown of EAGGF Guidance Section appropriations 
____________for 1979 according to the field concerned_________
Commitment appropriations
1979 Budget from 
& appropriations 









Measures 208.2 141.1 68%
2 Production 
Structures 301.3 171.5 57%
3 Marketing and 
Processing 145.5 136.7 94%
4^ Disasters - 12.1 -
Totals 655.0 461.4 70%
The arrangements for incorporation in the Budget and the necessary 
appropriations were contained in Supplementary and Amending Budget 
No. 3 of 13th December 1979.
Source: 9th Report on Guidance Section Activities, op cit, p.2.
55CAP, this problem has been most acute in Italy and Ireland. This 
suggests that the regulations covering the structural and social 
measures are inappropriate, since there is an obvious lack of eligible 
projects which qualify for structural improvement aids in areas of 
greatest need. Moreover, it suggests that the bureaucracy and paper­
work involved discourages would-be applicants, particularly small- 
scale farmers in Ireland and Italy; the percentages of appropriations 
actually committed are far from satisfactory.
3. Conclusions on the effect of CAP on regional disparities
Despite efforts to redistribute income in agriculture and to 
achieve a coherent structural policy aimed at making agriculture more 
efficient and the consequent changes required in certain regions
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easier to bear, the recent report on the CAP’S regional impact demon-
56strated the effects of CAP operations was Just the opposite. The 
report showed that the richer regions of northern Europe, where farms 
were of a larger scale producing milk, cereals and sugar, enjoyed 
higher income levels and were gaining at the expense of the poorer 
Mediterranean areas. It claimed that the regional gap in farming 
incomes has widened in the past decade and that agricultural workers 
in one of the EEC's five wealthiest farming areas (Schleswig-Holstein, 
the lie de France, Holland, the Champagne area and Lower Saxony) earn, 
on average, seven times more than workers in the five poorest areas 
(Umbria, Molise and Basilicata in Italy, and Donegal and the West of 
Ireland). Climate, poor soils and outdated farming techniques take 
some of the blame but the Report maintains that the CAP has made 
matters worse.
Most of the Community's farm spending is devoted to supporting 
high market prices (see above). Moreover, a 'Community index of farm 
support' was calculated in the Report to show the destination of CAP 
finances. It was claimed that if the average level of EEC support was 
taken as 100, then the Paris Basin, Central and South East England, 
and Northern Germany receive support amounting to 125% of the average, 
whilst the Mezzogiorno, Northern Italy and the South of France receive 
less than 80%. The problem was considered from a different angle, 
namely through the volume of EEC agricultural spending per work unit, 
and the picture appeared far worse; on this basis Northern Germany, 
Benelux and Denmark were 50% above the Community average whilst a 
third of Italy was 50% below the average figure. Thus in 1979, milk, 
sugar and cereals accounted for more than 75% of the 9.7 billion ecu 
(£5.4 billion) dedicated to farm support spending.
The apparent bias against Italy occurs because of the type of
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food supported by the CAP's Common Market Organisations; North European 
products such as milk, sugar beet, cereals and beef have profited from 
generous guaranteed prices and open-ended intervention guarantees.
By contrast, fruit, vegetables and wine, the staple crops of the 
Mediterranean regions, have suffered from weak price support and low 
levels of protection from the World market.
The Report also demonstrated the relative paucity of the FEOGA 
Guidance Section resources vis à vis the money available for price 
support under the Guarantee Section (see above). Moreover, the struc­
tural policy aid under the Guidance Section, to help poorer farmers 
move into more profitable crops and to modernise, has also flowed 
largely northwards: farmers who already have capital have been more
ready to put forward projects to receive EEC funds.
It must be concluded that, despite some success in developing 
secure food supplies for the Community along with the promotion of
stable farm incomes and food prices, the CAP and its operations have
severely aggravated regional income disparities amongst those engaged 
in agriculture in the member states.
In order to alleviate this problem steps must be taken to amend 
the operations of the price support and market mechanism to take more 
account of the regional situation of Community agricultural products. 
Moreover, a shift in the balance of price support to the South is 
required. Until such measures are taken the operations of the CAP will 
continue to aggravate the regional problem in a way that the meagre 
resources available to the Guidance Section, or indeed to the ERDF 
(in 1979, when 75% of the 9.7 billion ecu dedicated to farm support 
spending went to milk, sugar and cereals, it should be remembered that 
945 million ecu were available to the ERDF), can do nothing to counter­
act .
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Recently the European Parliament has added its voice to the 
57criticisms of the CAP. Whilst agreeing that the three central prin­
ciples of the CAP - common prices, Community preference and financial 
solidarity - must remain the basis of European policy, and accepting 
that the CAP has promoted significant agricultural expansion in some 
fields, especially the dairy sector, it has however led to increased 
disparities in income between sectors, with the northern farmers and 
their produce gaining at the expense of the smaller scale, less 
efficient, southern farmers. For these reasons the European Parliament 
is now advocating a revision of the price support system to help create 
the conditions for the long term development of efficiency in European 
agriculture and to provide stable incomes for all farmers. As far as 
agricultural structural and regional policies are concerned the EP 
proposes, inter alia, the creation of a rural fund to embrace both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities. It has called for a 
Community agricultural policy based on 'regional programmes' to be 
backed by all Community financial instruments, not just the Guidance 
Section of FEOGA.
V . COMPETITION POLICY
Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome states that:
for the purposes set out in Article 2 (the need to 
create harmonious development of economic activity 
throughout the Community, continued and balanced 
expansion, increased stability and an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living) the activities of 
the Community shall include ... the institution of a 
system ensuring that competition in the Common Market 
is not distorted.
Therefore the economic system envisaged in the Treaty of Rome
requires Competition to be undistorted and to provide '... economic
circumstances under which producers and users enjoy a certain amount
58of liberty in their choice of what, where and how to produce or to buy. ̂
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Such liberty requires free movement of goods in the whole Community; 
the setting up of the customs union led to the disappearance of tariff 
barriers for intra-Community trade and non-tariff barriers are in the 
process of being dismantled. However, the EEC Competition rules aim 
to prevent the establishment of new obstacles to free trade between 
member states.
Nevertheless, Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome talks of the need 
to create harmonious development and balanced economic expansion in 
the European Community, aims which the European Regional Development 
Fund and other Community financial mechanisms, operating in depressed and 
backward areas, strive to achieve. Thus it is necessary to strike a 
balance in an effort to ensure that the common market operates in a 
manner which maximises efficiency and minimises market distortions.
In this respect. Article 92 of the Rome Treaty on state aids forbids 
aids to be granted by national governments which threaten to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings, or the production of 
certain goods, in so far as they affect trade between member states. 
These are deemed incompatible with the common market idea. However, 
exceptions are laid down permitting aids of a social character, for 
example, and which promote the economic development of areas where the
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious under-
4. 59 employment.
Thus, by providing for exemptions from the fundamental Community 
principles of market unity and optimum utilisation of resources, it 
is recognised in the Treaty that considerations of a social or political 
nature may override the concept of economic efficiency with respect to
regional aids. As the Court of Justice pointed out in the judgement
in the Europemballage and Continental Can versus Commission case: the
Treaty allows 'restraints on competition under certain conditions
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60because of the need to harmonise the various objectives of the Treaty’.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of Directorate General IV of 
the European Commission to ensure that regional aid is allocated on a 
pro-rata basis to the areas of greatest need and that in the alloca­
tion of such aid, the detrimental effects on competitive forces are 
minimised. Under Article 93 of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission is 
entrusted with the task of keeping all systems of aid operating in 
member states under constant review and of proposing to the latter 
any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or 
functioning of the Common Market. In this way, the Commission has, 
subject to the legal control of the Court of Justice, the exclusive 
right to administer the exceptions to Article 92 of the Rome Treaty.
To this end member states are obliged to inform the Commission of any 
'plans to grant or alter aid' (EEC Article 93(3)) in sufficient time 
to enable the Commission to submit its comments (two months according 
to the Court of Justice). If the Commission considers such aid to be 
incompatible, it will initiate a formal procedure thereby preventing 
the member state in question from putting the proposed measures into 
effect.
One of the major problems in the effort to make the aims of 
Community competition policy compatible with those of achieving a 
balanced economic expansion and a reduction in regional disparities, 
is that these two policy-areas are the domains of different directorates- 
general.
Hence the two policy-areas operate according to different stan­
dards and aims and attempts at inter-departmental communication and 
coordination of policy objectives suffer from the problems of compart- 
mentalisation inherent in the Commission's structure and discussed in 
Chapter two of this study.
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Nevertheless, in June 1971^^ the Commission recognised the need
to make aid systems more transparent, to make territorial and sectoral
aspects more specific and to slow down outbidding by fixing ceilings
of aid intensity, limiting the amount of aid which a member state may
grant to an investor in the 'central regions' ('those parts of the
Common Market which are industrially developed but face structural
62problems in adapting to current economic conditions' ) to 20% of the 
total net value of the investment.
On 20th October 1971, the Council of Ministers passed the 'First 
Resolution on General Regional Aid S y s t e m s a n d  the member states 
agreed to abide by these principles in applying regional aid systems.
As from 1st January 1972 the Commission applied these principles to 
general systems of regional aid already in force or due to enter into 
force in central regions of the Community'.
In addition to the 20% limit on investment aid in 'central regions' 
the resolution on general regional aid systems requires that assistance 
3s characterised by 'regional specificity'. Consequently, it must be 
established that the region is in need of assistance compared to the 
other regions in the same country and in the Community as a whole and 
that the proposed aids do really constitute an incentive to regional 
development. Thus the Commission must establish these facts on the 
basis of information received from the interested member state and in 
this way becomes more and more involved with the economic policies of 
the member states.
A Commission communication to the Council on 28th June 1973^^ 
incorporated the new member states and their problem regions into the 
system: Ireland was classified as all peripheral; in the UK, areas
receiving regional aid, except Intermediate Areas, were given the same 
status (i.e. Special Development Areas and Development Areas); and in
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Denmark, Greenland and some of the islands and the Special Development 
Area in Northern Denmark, were granted peripheral status.
When the table below is considered, the small percentage of aided 
investment and planned public aid accounted for by ERDF expenditure 
becomes apparent. Moreover, the size of DG IV's vetting task can be 
appreciated, a task which goes beyond the investment aid granted by 
the Community financial instruments to incorporate all regional aid 
schemes in operation in the member states. Moreover, the task is made 
more difficult by the fact that each member state pursues its national 
regional policy according to its own priorities and economic goals, 
within the constraints laid down by DG IV. These differing priorities 
can be seen if the high number of projects assisted by West Germany 
(and the high proportion of these projects receiving ERDF funding), 
is compared to the lower number of assisted investments in the three 
member states with the most serious regional problems: UK, Italy and
Ireland. In France and Ireland, a high proportion of aided investment 
receives ERDF assistance whereas the figures are lower for Italy and 
UK. Finally, the job creation and maintenance figures need to be 
treated with special caution but the low figures for Italy and Ireland 
(cf West Germany) indicate that more emphasis is placed on the pro­
vision of basic infrastructure in the relatively underdeveloped 
economies.
VI. COMMISSION ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE THE FINANCIAL 
MECHANISMS OF THE EEC__________________________
In 1977, the Commission accepted the need for a more global and
comprehensive view to be taken of EEC regional policy because of the
differing criteria on which the various Community financial instruments
cited above o p e r a t e d . T h e  Commission also recognised the need to
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too limited and could well act in conflict to one another (see above 
details of FEOGA and ERDF). At the same time the importance of 
coordinating the regional policies of the member states was stressed 
and it was confirmed that the Regional Development Programmes should 
be the appropriate framework for ensuring such coordination. In 
addition, a system of regional impact assessment was proposed in an 
attempt to take account of the regional implications of other 
Community policies. (The details behind these proposals and the sub­
sequent debate and agreement in the Council of Ministers have been
discussed in depth in Chapter six.)
Agreement on the amended ERDF was reached in February 1979. 
Therefore the new mechanisms described above are at a relatively early 
stage. The Regional Impact Assessment has been criticised because of 
the lack of Commission resources in DG XVI allocated to the exercise 
while the Regional Development Programmes have been criticised for 
being inadequately prepared by the member states.
Nevertheless attempts have been made by the Commission to take 
account of imbalances in regional development through a certain number 
of Community policies.
Within the framework of the EMS the Council adopted on 3rd August 
1979 a Regulation to give interest rebates relating to investments 
carried out in less prosperous member states. It was decided that 
Ireland and Italy would benefit from these measures and that the 
interest rebates would be allocated one-third to Ireland and two- 
thirds to Italy.
With regard to the further enlargement of the Community, the
Commission communicated its view to the Council in April 1978 that
this could endanger the development of a certain number of weak 
Community regions, principally in the Mezzogiorno and South-West France
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Thus adequate corrective measures would be required and the Commission 
proposed the reinforcement of regional development measures in these 
areas in the field of agriculture (see above) in the form of a 
Mediterranean Programme. Additionally, many of the specific measures 
under the ex-quota section of the ERDF, concerning further enlarge­
ment, fall into the same category (see Chapter eight).
Despite recognition by the Commission of the inherent problem for 
backward and depressed Community regions and their attempts to counter­
act the adverse effects of certain Community policies in these areas, 
the preponderance of agricultural spending in the Community Budget and 
its apparent anti-regional policy effects, dwarfs efforts to take 
account of the regional impact of Community policies. Moreover, 
because of the relatively small size of financial instruments such as 
the Social Fund, ECSC loans and indeed the ERDF, the increased pro­
portion of spending from these sources in the less-developed regions 
can have little overall effect.
Nevertheless, in 1979 the Commission continued to develop the idea 
of regional development integrated operations, involving the coordi­
nation of aid from ERDF, Social Fund and the Guidance Section of 
FEOGA, EIB loans and loans from the ECSC and the New Community Instru­
ment (NCI).
According to the European Commission,
an integrated operation should take the form of a 
consistent and coordinated group of measures and 
direct public and private investment designed to 
promote economic and social development in a defined 
geographical area; national and local authorities 
will contribute to implementing these measures as 
will the Community through the various financial 
instruments for structural policy purposes.®®
The Commission also stressed that areas subject to an integrated 
operation should be covered by regional development programmes and have
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particularly serious development problems. Moreover they should be 
in receipt of substantial financial aid from the national authority 
and should possess features to render them eligible for aid from 
several Community financial instruments. Increasing emphasis has 
also been placed upon the principle of additionality, and the need 
to adhere to the concept.
It is the Commission's aim that integrated operations should form 
a frame of reference within which the various decision-making bodies 
concerned could cooperate and integrate their operations. However, 
this will not alter the distribution of responsibility amongst the 
authorities responsible for measures in the area in question. Thus 
the Commission's responsibility for the operation will be vested in 
the Commissioners responsible for the various Funds and instruments 
through which they could intervene. Funds for the operations should 
derive from the ordinary budgets of the institutions concerned.
The first areas chosen for integrated operations were Naples and
Belfast. In Naples, a working group was formed in October 1979 at a
70meeting of those politically responsible for the operation. The 
Commission's departments taking part in the working group were the 
Directorates General for Regional Policy (ERDF), Agriculture (FEOGA, 
Guidance Section), Social Affairs (Social Fund), Economic and Financial 
Affairs (NCI-EMS). Additionally the EIB sent an observer to the 
meetings.
A general programme has been drawn up for the Naples operation 
which involves projects costing approximately 4,500,000 million Lira 
(£2,700 million), of which some 70% are for basic infrastructure.
Other sectors involved relate to productive investment, vocational
training and scientific research.
71The Commission has claimed that the integrated operation has
261
promoted increased coordination between central government, the 
Campania region and the Naples Commune. Moreover, all Community 
financial instruments have now become involved in the operation, with 
the ERDF and ESF having had a particularly significant impact. The 
Commission maintains that the impact on the region produced by the 
operation will benefit from the synergy effect (it will produce 
results greater than the sum of improvements gained by individual pro­
jects carried out in isolation).
The working document for the Belfast integrated operation was
prepared by the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland and
was sent for consideration by DG XVI in May 1980. Projects chosen are
in the transport sector, aids to restructure the port and to control
the water level of the River Lurgan by means of a dam. Additionally
projects for constructing houses and for providing water supply and
social services have been included as have measures for industry such
as erecting industrial premises, providing incentives to investments
and vocational training programmes. The total cost of these measures
to be included in the integrated operation is estimated at £375 million
72over five years (1980-84).
The Secretary of State for the Department of the Environment for
73Northern Ireland has created 'the Belfast Coordinating Committee' 
and two working groups: 'the Belfast Housing Group' for housing prob­
lems and the 'Belfast Areas of Need Working Group' for social problems.
With regard to the Housing Programme for Belfast, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution on 19th June 1981, declaring its inten­
tion of granting substantial long term aid to Northern Ireland, and 
in particular to the city of Belfast. In its recommendations the EP 
urged the Commission to make a special study of 'housing stock renewal 
and renovation of accommodation in certain areas (particularly Belfast)
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is a matter of urgency, since job-creation must be linked with improved 
74living conditions’.
Belfast's housing problems have been described as the worst in
îurope by the Commission and despite ten years of work by the Northern
75Ireland Housing Executive, the problem has remained intractable.
The Commission has insisted that the aid must be provided for
ipecific projects and not used by the Treasury or the Northern Ireland
iff ice simply to 'balance the books' . Indeed in its resolution of
7619th June 1981 the European Parliament stated that, as far as addi-
ionality is concerned:
EEC aid ... is often kept by the government of the 
UK to assist its own high expenditure in Northern 
Ireland instead of being paid over as clearly iden­
tifiable additional outlays ... Compliance with the 
principle of additionality is the key to genuine 
economic and social assistance from the Community to 
Northern Ireland.
The operational documents for integrated measures were submitted 
:o the Commission by the Under Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
in the UK Northern Ireland Office on 14th May 1981.
Certain projects within the programme could be eligible for 
finance from the ERDF quota and ex-quota section and from the EIB and 
ICI. Also, there are vocational training programmes, which could be 
iligible for finance from the ESF. However, given the urban character 
of the area it is unlikely that FEOGA financing will be involved.
Commission attempts to strengthen vertical coordination between 
local, regional, national and European bodies and horizontal coordi­
nation between the various Commission DGs responsible for the Community 
financial instruments will doubtless be enhanced by these integrated 
operations. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the Community 
regional problem will be solved by these ad hoc attempts at combining 
fonmunity finances.
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Thus in spite of the trend towards coordination present in the 
Commission's thinking, the organisation is plagued by the obstacle 
of inter-departmental compartmentalisation (see Chapter two). More­
over, national regional policies have achieved no real measure of 
coordination in the Community; Regional Development Programmes have 
so far been ineffective and heavily criticised. There can be no hope 
for a thorough and efficient European Regional Policy whilst incom­
patible aims and priorities exist at the national level compared 
with EC level, though it must be recognised that 'the regional problem' 
is different in nature in the north and south of the EEC.
However, ; the most serious and insurmountable problem
facing the Community is that of the CAP price support system, its 
domination of the budget and overshadowing of the Guidance Section of 
FEOGA and indeed other Community financial instruments at work in the 
problem regions of the EEC.
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CHAPTER TEN ; CONCLUSION
The final chapter of this study will firstly draw together and 
summarise the conclusions reached in previous chapters regarding the 
characteristics of the European Regional Development Fund, its adminis­
tration and evolution since its establishment in 1975. Secondly, an 
attempt will be made to provide general conclusions relevant to the 
Community decision-making process on the basis of the findings of this 
thesis, and these findings will be related to the different ideas and 
claims of academic integration-theorists, which were described in Chapter 
one. Thirdly, an assessment will be made of the prospects for the 
establishment, at the Community level, of an effective Common Regional 
Policy on the basis of the recent Commission proposals for an amended 
Fund regulation and in the light of the developments of the last seven 
years.
1. Summary of Previous Conclusions
(a) The Treaty of Rome and lack of progress
in the regional policy field during the 1960s
No specific mandate for the establishment of a Community Regional 
Policy was provided by the Treaty of Rome. It must moreover be remem­
bered that the basis of the Treaty setting up the EEC was a mutual agree­
ment between the French and German governments in a relatively prosperous 
economic climate, whereby France would provide agricultural products 
for West Germany and the latter would sell its industrial goods in 
France. In addition, it was generally assumed that the setting up of a 
European Economic Community of six member states, with the concomitant 
removal of trade-barriers and larger market, would produce increased 
economic growth from which all regions of the Community would benefit.
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No progress was made in the regional policy field during the 1960s 
whilst the period of relative economic prosperity persisted and when 
the timetable for the removal of tariff-barriers and the establishment 
of Treaty mandated common policies, such as the CAP and the Competition 
Policy was pursued. Furthermore, this lack of progress was unaffected 
by various Commission calls for a specific regional policy and their 
insistence on the need for a fund, whose main aim was the reduction of 
regional imbalances in the Community.
However, following the merger of the executives of the three 
Communities - EEC, ECSC and EURATOM - DG XVI was established within the 
ranks of the European Commission with specific responsibility for 
regional policy.
(b) Background to the proposed establishment of the ERDF
The first major push factor in favour of the establishment of a 
regional fund came with the commitment made to the achievement of 
Economic and Monetary Union (to be reached by 1980) at the Hague Summit 
in 1969. It was recognised that this task would be rendered more diffi­
cult, if not impossible, without the necessary reduction in regional 
disparities.
The second push factor was provided by the imminent enlargement of 
the EEC in the early 1970s to include UK, Ireland and Denmark. These 
three new member states would bring an added dimension to the Community 
regional problem, in the form of the old industrial areas of the UK and 
a further backward, mainly agriculturally based, economy in the Irish 
Republic. Moreover, the increased economic pressure aside, the entry 
into the EEC of the UK provided significant political pressure for the 
setting up of a regional fund; the British public and the Heath Govern­
ment were well aware and mistrustful of the large net budgetary contri­
butions to the CAP which the British would incur through EEC membership
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and fearful of the peripheral position of the UK in the EEC. Therefore, 
the political significance behind the ERDF's establishment, set up to 
appease British dissatisfaction with the overall budgetary situation, 
must not be underestimated; the Fund was seen by the British government 
as an attractive selling point and trade-off in the face of a sceptical 
domestic electorate.
It was also significant that a British Commissioner, George 
Thomson, should be given the post of head of DO XVI on the accession of 
the UK to the EEC in 1973. He was quick to stress the links between EMU 
and regional policy and indeed between the further development of the 
Community as a whole and regional policy. Responding to the call of the 
Paris Summit to take the appropriate measures to set up a Regional Fund, 
he produced his Report on the regional situation in the EEC and stressed 
three basic reasons behind the need to establish a Community Regional 
Fund. Firstly for moral reasons: regional policy would demonstrate a
common will to assist those in relatively poor areas of the EEC. 
Secondly, there was an economic need to put the poor regions on a more 
equal competitive footing. Thirdly, steps must be taken to alleviate 
the physical poverty of the poor regions of the Community. Thomson dis­
tinguished between three types of regional problem which suffered from:^
(i) a preponderance of agriculture with the consequential 
effects of low incomes and under-employment;
(ii) areas of structural unemployment with high outward 
migration and lack of infrastructure;
(iii) areas with declining industries, slow growth rates 
and h i ^  unemployment.
(c) The search for agreement: The Commission's tactics
In the search for an agreement in the Council of Ministers on a 
policy to solve the above problems, Thomson and the Commission pursued
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a policy of gradualism and realism. Thus no sweeping moves were pro­
posed to replace the various national regional policies already in 
existence by a Community Regional Policy. The stress was rather upon 
the need to coordinate these national regional policies and the differ­
ent Community policies and financial instruments already in operation. 
Despite calls from ECOSOC and the European Parliament for the concen­
tration of the ERDF’s resources and despite the initial rejection by 
the Commission of the principle of juste retour, Thomson fully recog­
nised the political importance of a nine-nation fund and put up little 
opposition to the Council of Ministers' insistence upon the setting up 
of a fund based on a fixed national quota system of sharing out the 
resources between all the member states.
Thus Thomson gradually built up agreement in the Council of 
Ministers for his Regional Fund proposals; he won support for his 
eligibility criteria before generating more conflict by publishing his 
list of proposed eligible regions. Moreover, his stance typified 
Commission attempts to mediate and compromise diverging viewpoints held 
by the different member state representatives in the Council forum.
His policy was one of openness to all shades and areas of opinion and 
he not only visited all the national capitals but received reciprocal 
visits in Brussels from local, regional and national representatives to 
discuss his proposals. He also heard the opinions of the European 
umbrella organisations such as UNICE, ETUC and the Standing Conference 
of European Chambers of Commerce. Thomson's actions contrasted starkly 
with those of the highly politicised and secretive Council meetings and 
debates.
The eventual agreement which emerged in March 1975 (some 15 
months late according to the timetable envisaged by the 1972 Paris Summit 
Meeting) produced a small fund of 1300 million ua for three years.
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According to the communique of the Paris Summit of December 1974, the 
Fund was designed 'to correct the principal regional imbalances in the 
Community, notably resulting from agricultural predominance, industrial 
change and structural unemployment'. Indeed this was a mammoth task 
for such a poorly endowed financial mechanism. Nevertheless, the ERDF 
was never designed or intended to be a substitute for domestic regional 
policy but rather to complement national expenditure and operations.
From the outset of the debate surrounding the establishment of 
the ERDF, therefore, three issues have been dominant; these concerned 
the size of the Fund, the distribution of the resources between the 
member states and their regions, and finally the administration of the 
ERDF. The conclusions reached in previous chapters will therefore be 
drawn together under these headings.
(d) The size of the Fund
The ERDF was established in March 1975 and endowed with a paucity 
of resources for the task with which it was charged: 1,300 million
units of account for 1975-77 (300 million ua 1975, 500 million ua 1976 
and 500 million ua 1977).
Since 1975 the size of the ERDF has increased steadily and in 1981 
total ERDF resources amounted to 1540 million eua in commitment appro­
priations. In 1982, the corresponding figure is 1,759.5 million ecu 
(S9G6*S million). The table below shows the growth of the ERDF since 
its establishment.
The Fund has expanded faster than the Community budget as a whole;
in 1975 the Regional Fund was equivalent to 5% of the total budget,
2whilst in 1982 it accounts for 7.5%. However, the relative increase 
in the Fund's resources has been far from uniform as the table for the 
1980 Community budget expenditures below demonstrates.
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Source : House of Lords Select Committee on the EC
Session 1981-82, 12th Report, p.VII.
Table 10.2 : EC budget expenditures (%) by broad category (1980)
%









Repayment to members 5.0
Other 5.5
100.0
Source : European Parliament Secretariat : Europe Today :
State of European Integration, 1980-81, Luxembourg 
(1981).
Note: The above table refers to budget payments only and not to 
budget commitments.
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Much of the responsibility for the increase in ERDF aid available 
must be accorded to the European Parliament, which has consistently 
increased the figures proposed in the budgetary procedure by the Council 
of Ministers with some significant measure of success.
However, if the size of the ERDF is compared with domestic expen­
diture on regional policy in the member states, then the resources 
appear very meagre and the scale of ERDF operations would seem relatively 
too small to merit the debate and conflict which they generate. Even 
so, in times of recession any additional source of finance is welcome 
to member state governments.
When the size of ERDF resources is further compared with that of
those provided for the operations of the CAP, the potential effect of
the Fund on the regional economic problems of the Community seem further
diminished; the operations of the CAP and mainly of the price support
system for agriculture have almost always accounted for at least 70%
annually of total Community budget resources. In addition, the price
support system has been shown to favour the relatively rich Northern
farmers and their produce at the expense of their poorer Southern counter*
3parts and thus to have had an anti-regional policy effect.
The problem of the relative paucity of ERDF resources was increased 
in recent years by the fact that payments from the Fund have been signi­
ficantly smaller than the payments authorised. As demonstrated in 
Chapter eight, the percentage figures were as low as 32.7% for 1978 and
433.1% for 1979. However, there was a significant improvement in the 
utilisation of payment appropriations in 1980: 96.2%^ which must in
part at least be accorded to the establishment of the system of acceler­
ated payments.^
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(e) The distribution of the Fund's resources and attempts to
improve the coordination of member state regional policies
The potential impact of the Fund's limited resources have been 
further restricted and limited by the fixed national-quota system which 
has governed the distribution of ERDF aid. Although over 70% of aid 
was destined for the regions of the three worst-off member states: UK,
Italy and Ireland, under the original Fund regulation, each member 
state had at least one region eligible for Fund assistance. Hence a 
ceiling was imposed on the extent of money available from Brussels to 
aid projects in the regions of any one member state.
In order to qualify for Fund assistance an area had to be desig­
nated as eligible for assistance under the domestic regional policy of 
the appropriate member state. Thus no account was taken of 'black 
spots' or 'pockets of economic problems' in the relatively well-off 
regions of the member states, such as inner-London. In addition, some 
regions in the richer member states, for example West Germany, were 
eligible for Fund aid despite enjoying a per capita GDP greater than 
certain ineligible regions in the less well-off member states such as 
the UK, which remained ineligible for ERDF assistance. This situation 
arose because of the rules governing the respective domestic regional 
policies in the UK and West Germany and the Fund's reliance upon nation­
ally-designated assisted areas as a guideline for the fixing of its own 
eligibility criteria. Thus, within the framework of German regional 
policy the areas of Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen would be eli­
gible for ERDF aid although they enjoyed a per capita GDP greater than
7all the regions of Italy, Ireland and the UK.
8Recently a Commission official argued that one of the main reasons 
behind the need for a European regional policy and fund was that regional 
problems do not necessarily look the same from a national and supra-
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national standpoint. The official cited the example of the German
Bayerischer Wald being economically backward by German standards but
prosperous in European terms when compared with the Mezzogiomo or
Northern Ireland. This is a valid point but the Commission's ability
to force governments to appreciate the European scale of their regions'
problems has been severely restricted by the close links forged between
9ERDF operations and national regional policies.
In 1977, the Commission published guideline proposals for regional 
policy and a protracted debate ensued before the ERDF regulation was 
amended in February 1979.
The Commission recognised that regional imbalances had not been 
reduced and were indeed sharpened by the effects of the economic crisis 
of 1973 and the subsequent recession. Thus, the aim of the amended ERDF 
and Community Regional Policy would be the reduction of existing 
regional imbalances and the prevention of new imbalances, caused by the 
changed world economic climate or by the adverse effects of Community 
policies in the weaker regions. In this respect, the Fund was to be 
divided into two sections: firstly a quota section, which would deal
with the underdevelopment of regions and those regions experiencing 
industrial or agricultural change and therefore problems of reconversion 
and redevelopment. Secondly an Ex-Quota section would be set up to deal 
with problems of a specific. Community nature, caused by changes in the 
world's economic structure or by the operation of existing Community 
policies. This section would also concern itself with border areas, 
especially in Germany. The agreement reached established a ratio of 
95%:5% for the quota and Ex-Quota sections respectively.
When the agreement was reached in 1975 on the ERDF regulation, it 
was stipulated^^ that assistance from the Fund could only be granted to 
projects falling within the context of a Regional Development Programme
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to be submitted to the Commission by the member states. In 1979 when 
the regulation was amended the RDPs were confirmed as the most appro­
priate framework for coordinating national regional policies and of 
assessing the geographical impact of the main Community policies.
The RDPs drawn up by the member states have been generally very 
poor and sketchy in content and can hardly be said to have formed a 
satisfactory basis for the distribution of Fund aid.
The UK has had particular problems in this respect because it does 
not have a regional level of government. The Regional Studies Associ­
ation^^ has commented that 'perhaps not surprisingly, countries opera­
ting a decentralised administrative structure such as Germany or Italy, 
present a better account of the spatial dimension of resource allocation' 
Moreover, there are several central government departments in the UK 
with regional responsibilities. The Department of Industry thus claims 
that 'the preparation of regional development programmes necessitates
the creation of an administrative layer which has no other purpose than
12to produce programmes for the ERDF*. At the same time local authori­
ties claim that they have had little opportunity to influence the 
United Kingdom RDPs and the authorities of Yorkshire and Humberside
were so dissatisfied that they prepared their own regional development
13programmes.
Finally, the practical value of RDPs has been limited by a number
14of factors. Firstly, member states were only required to submit pro­
grammes for regions which were in receipt of positive measures of 
national regional assistance. A second limiting factor occurred because 
ERDF assistance could only be granted to individual projects submitted 
by the member states. Thus although the regional development signifi­
cance of the projects was supposed to be justified by the RDPs, there 
was no requirement for them to be mentioned in the RDP document itself.
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'This extremely loose relationship between RDPs and the individual 
projects meant that in practice almost any investment project could be 
"justified” by reference to the relevant RDP'.^^
(f) The administration of the Fund
The problems of the small absolute and relative size of the ERDF 
and of the national quota system and lack of effective coordination 
between national regional policies, have been compounded by the proce­
dure fixed for the administration of the Fund's resources.
Responsibility for the ERDF's administration was placed firmly in 
the hands of the member state governments. The latter exercise control 
over the submission of project applications to Brussels. Hence it is 
the appropriate national government department which initiates the for­
warding of any project proposal to Brussels. Moreover, no formal pro­
cedure was laid down in the Fund regulation for the effective partici­
pation of local and regional authorities in the decisions taken on 
project applications.
Thus, in the UK and other member states, as far as industrial 
projects are concerned, firms play no active role in the submission of 
requests for aid (see Chapter five); the procedure is simply a book­
keeping exercise. With infrastructure projects the situation is slightly 
better but the national government level and not the Community level is 
still the major and decisive hurdle for applicants. Indeed officials 
in the Department of the Environment considered it to be a waste of 
time for local authorities to establish direct contact with the European 
Commission and the French government has expressly forbidden this. The 
Commission itself has recognised that it has no control over decisions 
on projects taken at the crucial initial stage and that it would be 
more appropriate for local authorities to lobby national governments in 
support of their applications.
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Hopes were entertained by many local authorities and regional 
government bodies, especially in France, that direct elections to the 
European Parliament would pave the way for the Community's regions 
excercising more influence on the national governments in the Fund's 
administration. These hopes, however, have not been fulfilled. The 
European Parliament has continued to fight, and with considerable 
success (notably in 1980), for increased resources for the ERDF. Never­
theless, it has been reluctant to become too involved in the details 
of the Fund's administration; the Regional Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament, for example, refused to make an own initiative 
report in 1980-81 expressing its views in detail for the Commission on 
the forthcoming revision of the ERDF regulation.
A House of Lords investigation into the ERDF's activities'^
raised the question during an interview with a Department of ZrwAuskrg
official as to whether a straight cash transfer to national governments
would be easier without projects being named at all. The answer
returned was that it would indeed be a simpler procedure but would not
17really give a Community policy or image to the Fund's operations.
However, the question which has troubled officials of the European 
Commission and commentators on the activities of the European Regi<mal 
Development Fund probably more than any other is that of whether 
Community contributions to projects in member states have been added to 
and not substituted for what would have been spent anyway, namely the 
problem of additionality.
It is a political decision whether one believes the claims of the
national governments that they do indeed adhere to the principle of
additionality, especially in a time of economic recession, and it is 
impossible to prove conclusively if such be the case.
Successive reports by the House of Lords Select Committee on the
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European Communities Have, for example, discussed the importance of and
inherent difficulties in demonstrating that the size of each member
state's regional aid programme is larger as a result of the ERDF and
X8have suggested that the situation was unsatisfactory.
The enquiry conducted in the 1980-81 session of the House of Lords 
maintained that no evidence had come to hand during the Committee's 
enquiry which showed that the UK government adhered to the principle of 
additionality. The report claimed that disrespect for the additionality 
principle throughout the Community called into question the value of the 
ERDF. Indeed it makes a mockery of any attempt to establish a specific 
Communautaire regional policy financial instrument.
19The bulk of Regional Fund aid (approximately 70% per annum on 
average) has been provided for infrastructure projects. In the UK, 
this aid is passed on to local authorities, in the form of reductions 
in their borrowing requirement, and thus more tangible benefits are con­
ceived than with industrial aid which merely tops up the Treasury coffers 
However, infrastructure aid makes an uncertain contribution to the 
economic development of a region, at least as far as long-term job 
creation is concerned. Moreover, criticism has been levelled at the 
Fund regulation for being too vague in its eligibility criteria for 
infrastructure aid and for not providing finance for replacement invest­
ment such as decaying inner city sewage systems, one of the major prob­
lems of the old industrial areas. The Fund regulation also stipulates 
that small infrastructure projects of less than 50,000 units of account 
are ineligible for assistance. Some local authorities cannot generate 
projects above this threshold and therefore lose out in terms of Fund 
receipts.
Regional Fund operations have also been hindered by a problem of 
compartmentallsation and a lack of coordination between the operations
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and policies of the Directorates General comprising the Commission's 
structure. Since 1977 DG XVI has made some attempt to overcome this 
problem by the setting up of a task force under Commissioner Giolitti 
to strive to coordinate the financial mechanisms of the EEC. In addi­
tion an effort is being made to coordinate the regional policy objec­
tives of the various Community policies and a system of Regional Impact 
Assessment has been established for non-regional policies. Two major 
problems have been encountered in this venture; firstly DG XVI has 
been denied necessary manpower and resources to carry out such a huge 
task effectively because of Council restrictions, and secondly some 
DGs, notably DG VI (Agriculture) and DG IV (Competition) have resisted 
the incursions of DG XVI, emphasising the separate legal basis of their 
policies.
Various other Community financial instruments and mechanisms have 
employed the bulk of their resources in the depressed regions of the 
EC (see Chapter nine). However, the basic problem once again has been 
one of the effective coordination of aims and resources. Since 1979, 
the Commission has been working on an experiment which launched two 
integrated operations in Naples and Belfast. These operations combine 
several sources of EC finance which are managed by committees of repre­
sentatives of all the relevant Community, national, regional and local 
authorities, thus making the effective implementation, coordination and 
administration of these operations difficult to achieve.
(g) Summary
To summarise, it has been shown that the decision to create the 
ERDF was hindered by the lack of the specific Treaty mandate and was 
eventually agreed more in response to political rather than economic 
pressures in the wake of the imminent enlargement of the EEC to include 
UK, Ireland and Denmark and the need to provide a trade-off for the
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British to compensate for heavy net payments to the CAP. In addition, 
the aspirations towards EMU also provided a boost for the ERDF, although 
by the late 1970s the goal of EMU had faded.
The ERDF since its creation has increased steadily in size but 
the effectiveness of these increases has been overshadowed. Firstly,
70% of the Community's resources have been spent on a price support 
mechanism for the CAP which has been shown to have an anti-regional 
policy effect. Secondly, there are grave doubts as to whether the 
Fund's resources are in fact used additionally to member state regional 
expenditure. Thirdly, there have been delays in the payments made by 
the Commission from the ERDF.
95% of the Fund's resources are still distributed according to 
the fixed system of national quotas which spread the resources thinly 
over the regions of the member states. There have been delays in agree­
ments upon the drafting of special programmes required to permit the 
implementation of aid grants under the EQS. Thus assistance contributing 
towards the solving of problems of a 'specific Community nature' have 
only just begun.
The administration of the Fund is firmly controlled by the national 
government level and because of the methods adopted for Fund payments 
and the submission of project applications, little scope is afforded 
for interest articulation at the local and regional level.
One UK County Council official claimed:
By submitting only marginally more schemes than necessary 
to ensure that the UK receives the full amount of its 
grant entitlement it eliminates any question of European 
priorities. The government operates its own rationing 
system. England receives 40% of ERDF aid, Scotland 25%,
Wales 20% and Northern Ireland 15%. Priority is given to 
SDAs and DAs at the expense of Intermediate Areas. Any 
European dimension is i g n o r e d .
Progress towards the, effective coordination of national regional
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policies has been poor because of the poor quality of RDPs and coordi­
nation of the Community's financial instruments has been rendered 
difficult because of the compartmentalised structure of the Commission 
bureaucracy and the consequent problems of communication between DGs.
The recent experiments with integrated operations in Belfast and Naples 
are still in their initial stages and it is still an open question 
whether they can overcome the administrative barriers that give rise to 
this compartmentalisation. Finally, Commission attempts at setting up 
a Regional Impact Assessment of other member state policies have been 
hampered by the lack of manpower resources in DG XVI and the lack of 
cooperation from other key DGs such as DG IV and DG VI.
Xn 0 one of the major problems facing ERDF operations is the
fact that it embraces two major and contrasting economic problems in 
regions whose aspirations and needs are polarised. The problem divides 
geographically into the old, industrial urban areas of Northern Europe 
and the underdeveloped, backward, agricultural regional of Southern 
Europe. Officials in such areas as Merseyside have argued that the Fund 
places too much emphasis on undeveloped rural regions and does not pro­
vide sufficient support for the regeneration of older industrial areas. 
The converse of this argument is naturally a valid one and begs the 
question of whether it would be more appropriate for the Community to 
have two separate and distinct funds to deal with the urban and rural 
regional problems. The urbanrrural problem will be aggravated by the 
further enlargement of the Community to include Spain and Portugal.
From the British point of view this will increase the problem of a larger 
share of the Fund being allocated to backward agricultural-regions. In 
this respect, it may well be in British interests to press for two 
separate and distinct funds. However, the Council of Ministers set a 
precedent when agreeing upon the Greek quota, in so far as no member
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State was worse off after the incorporation of Greece into the quota 
system: the budgetary allocation of the ERDF was increased sufficiently
to take account of this.
2. The Community decision-making process
In the first two chapters of the study the evolution of the 
Community decision-making process and the integration theories of 
academics observing the development of the EC were considered and 
assessed. It was concluded that the traditional idea of a Council- 
Commission dialogue, in which the latter proposes an initiative and the 
former takes a decision on the basis of this proposal, was not suffi­
ciently detailed to describe the actual Community decision-making 
process. This was said to be merely the tip of the iceberg. Indeed 
this study of the regional policy-area has borne out the claim. On 
the member state side of the decision-making arena COREPER has played 
a decisive role with its consideration of Commission proposals and its 
drafting of Council working documents and positions on points of detail 
concerning firstly the establishment of the Fund and then proposed 
amendments to its size and administration. However, when disagreements 
have persisted at Council level it has been the European Council of 
Heads of State and Government which has been asked to pronounce, from 
above, upon issues such as the size of the ERDF (in December 1977),
confirming the highly politicised nature of the Fund and the extent of
national jealousies concerning its finances and administration. Thus 
the representative of the European interest and the defender of the
Treaty provisions, the European Commission has been faced .by an increa­
singly powerful, well-organised and determined bargaining 'partner'. 
Indeed on the very issue of setting up a Regional Development Fund, it 
was the European Council or summit meeting in 1972 (in Paris) which
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instructed Thomson to take the necessary steps to establish the Fund, 
thereby effectively superceding the Commission's basic right of initi­
ating Community proposals.
Thus, the Commissioners responsible for regional policy, firstly 
George Thomson and subsequently Antonio Giolitti, have had to put 
forward realistic proposals which might have a chance of providing the 
basis for a compromise proposal in the Council of Ministers. In this 
way, the Fund was established with national governments still in firm 
control of its administration and the discretionary powers of the 
Commission severely circumscribed. The Commission has with each 
successive debate on amendments to the Fund regulation increased the 
'European' element in its proposals; in its 1977 guidelines it intro­
duced the need for a more comprehensive approach to regional policy.
Hence a small ex-quota section was established to alleviate regional 
problems of a specific Community nature and a system of Regional Impact 
Assessment of other Community policies was introduced. Furthermore a 
task force was set up under Giolitti to encourage the coordination of 
the EC's financial instruments. Despite the basic difficulties faced 
by such initiatives they do represent gradual steps in the right direc­
tion as far as the Commission is concerned and a pragmatic and piece­
meal construction of a European Regional Policy. The Commission has 
taken its proposals one step further in its recent proposals for a 
revised regulation which will be considered below.
The more subsidiary linkages in the decision-making chain have also 
been active in the field of regional policy. In this respect the study 
has revealed the publication of numerous documents in support of a 
Community regional policy from national and European organisations such 
as the CBI, TUC, Chambers of Commerce at the national level and UNICE, 
ETUC, European Standing Conference of Chambers of Commerce, the
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International Union of Local Authorities and the Council of European 
Municipalities. The Commission has granted the latter two bodies (con­
jointly) informal status but there is little scope for the defence and 
furtherance of local and regional interests under the existing Fund 
arrangements (see above) and the Commission has avoided giving any pre­
text to national government fears about contacts with local and regional 
authorities. National bodies such as the CBI and TUC consider the 
issues surrounding regional policy from a national viewpoint and the 
European umbrella organisations, which often lack cohesion in their 
structure, are confined to broad and general statements, usually in 
support of Commission proposals. Thus the actual influence upon the 
outcome of a debate at the Community level is minimal.
The Economic and Social Committee of the EC, which has a right to 
pass non-binding opinions on Commission proposals, has also generally 
backed the Commission wholeheartedly. However, again it is a mere 
light-weight when pitted against the might of the Council framework.
It has been the European Parliament which has scored most triumphs 
against the Council of Ministers in the field of regional policy.
Indeed the Parliament has on occasions criticised the Commission for 
not being ambitious enough in its proposals. The EP used the Regional 
Fund budgetary appropriations as a test-case in its conflicts with the 
Council over the control and fixing of non-obligatory expenditure and 
went so far as to reject the EC budget of 1980. The Parliament has 
been instrumental in achieving significant rises in the ERDF appropri­
ations and notably defended itself against the European Council's 
fixing of a three year provision for the Fund in December -1977. The 
Parliament also exercised its right to voice an opinion and exert an 
influence upon the Council in the framework of the conciliation pro­
cedure over the discussions preceding the agreement on Fund regulation
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amendments in 1979. Thus the European Parliament has been a useful and 
forceful ally of the European Commission on budgetary issues concerning 
the ERDF. It has, however, shied away from becoming involved in 
details concerning the Fund's administration and recently declined to 
make an own-initiative report on the Commission's latest proposed 
amendments to the regulation.
Therefore the study of the establishment and development of the 
ERDF has demonstrated that the idea of a Commission-Council dialogue is 
far too simplistic to describe the decision-making process of the EC.
On the one hand there is the open-ended policy of the European Commis­
sion and the input from the local, regional, national and European 
subsidiary linkages. On the other hand this side of the scales is 
counterbalanced and indeed outweighed by the strength and intransigence 
of the member state representatives in COREPER, the Council of Ministers 
and the European Council. In addition the member states have exercised 
control over the Commission through their representation on the Fund 
Management and Regional Policy Committee which consider and control the 
decisions taken on project applications in Brussels. This provides a 
further example of the restrictions and limitations of the Commission's 
power. These institutions cannot be considered as the mere sum of their 
constituent members. Each member represents the tip of nine (now ten) 
domestic political icebergs and account must be taken of the need to 
compromise and appease inputs of different shades of opinion. This 
makes the Commission's task of gaining agreement for its proposals all 
the more difficult because of the rigidity of member state stances on 
an issue once they have been formulated in the national capitals as a 
result of domestic political interactions.
Finally, the European Parliament has carved itself a more impor­
tant role than the other subsidiary linkages in the Community decision-
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making process. Certainly it has acquired legitimacy from its direct 
elections and has exerted a sizeable influence upon the Council budget­
ary issues. Nevertheless, it has no legislative role and no right of 
initiative and thus no control or way of controlling the administration 
of the ERDF, except indirectly through the Court of Auditors.
The Court of Auditors has been a rising force in the Community 
decision-making process. It can be conceived as an ally of the 
European Parliament in so far as its examinations of Community finances 
question whether the Community is getting 'value for money'. Neverthe­
less the Court could also be considered to be an ally of the Council of 
Ministers by pointing out where the Commission has beenC«reifcss in its 
administration.
21Richard Mayne posed several questions of the status of the 
nation-state at the end of the second world war and concluded that in 
continental Europe it was at such a low ebb that the conditions were 
ripe for the setting up of a different political entity, perhaps on a 
supranational scale. Events in the field of regional policy seem, how­
ever, to have reaffirmed the status of the nation-state. Regional 
policy is in a particularly problematic position with regard to the 
establishment of a common policy because of the regional implications 
of other Community policies and because the national level has remained 
dominant in the ERDF's administration and in the field of regional 
policy.
Integration theorists emphasised different paths and end products 
in their attempts to describe, explain and predict the course of 
European integration. It was shown in Chapter one that these can be 
classified into theories emphasising socio-economic variables and those 
stressing political variables as being crucial along the integration 
path, and those which emphasised the emergence of some kind of state
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model as opposed to those laying stress on a Community model as the end 
product of the integration process. It was, however, concluded that 
no one theory provided a satisfactory scenario for discussing the 
politics of the EC but each had a contribution to make.
Intergovemmentalists rejected the claim that the national politi­
cal, economic and social systems had become so interdependent and 
penetrated by the Community that governments cease to be sole arbiters 
of Community affairs. They argue that, conversely, governments define 
their own position in rigid terms in the Council of Ministers and adopt 
an uncompromising stance in defence of their interests. This claim is 
certainly home out by the long protracted debates in the Council when
discussing Regional Fund issues in search of a compromise agreement.
22Ralf Dahrendorf claimed that the Commission's stature would 
decline as Europe gains in importance and that as European matters 
become proportionally more important to member states the latter would 
be more defensive and resistant to the integration process. Certainly 
this would appear to have been true with regard to attempts to estab­
lish a structural policy to aid the depressed and backward Community 
regions. This step along the road to positive integration entailing 
Commission involvement in the economic policies of the member states 
and the control in Brussels of significant resources to be distributed 
in the regions according to Community-wide indicators and criteria, has 
been repeatedly resisted by the member state representatives in the 
Council of Ministers.
Stanley Hoffman, another intergovemmentalist, drew the distinction 
between high politics and low politics. High politics included areas 
such as defence and foreign policy where member states would be expected 
to defend their own interests. By contrast low politics involved more 
technical, economic issues which would generate little conflict in the
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Council of Ministers. The latter area would thus incorporate regional 
policy, a potentially ideal policy-sphere in which integration could 
be generated. However, this study and the protracted disputes, debates 
and conflicts and the jealous guarding of national government control 
over the regional policy area, have demonstrated the failure of Commu­
nity politics to slot into such clear-cut classifications. Any issue 
involving member state contributions and potential Commission involve­
ment in domestic policies can be elevated to the position of 'high 
politics' which Hoffman reserved for defence and foreign policy.
The antithesis of intergovemmentalist arguments is provided by 
Federalists. Proponents of this viewpoint stress that such a political 
Community would balance size and uniformity with smallness and diver­
sity. Thus the efficiency of the central bodies at the European level 
would be complemented by the democratic element provided by local de­
centralised political organisations. In this way, the concept of the 
nation-state would be superceded by the European and regional levels. 
Obviously regional policy would be of particular relevance and signi­
ficance in such a political structure. However, the ideas and ideals 
behind such a system are in complete contrast to the organisation of 
ERDF administration which is totally dominated by the national govern­
ments .
One proponent of the federalist argument, the Italian Communist, 
Altiero Spinelli, claimed that the Council of Ministers has been 
suffering from increasing laxness and paralysis since the completion of 
the transition period. The events and debates in the regional policy- 
area would certainly back up this claim and would also give credence 
to Spinelli's assertion that there is an increasing trend to transfer 
difficult matters up to the European Council from the Council of Ministers, 
It has certainly been shown that this is the case during the conflicts
291
over the establishment and amendment of the ERDF regulations.
Neofunctionalists would maintain that political integration is 
the result of the interaction of political forces, interest groups, 
parties, governments and international agencies seeking to exploit 
pressures and pursue their own ends. Haas recognised that this was 
bound to be a frail process and that the notion of spillover (see 
Chapter one) would depend upon self-motivation and self-interest. In 
the regional policy-field this has equalled the self-preservation and 
self-defence of national government interests which have proved dominant 
in interactions with other bodies. Thus national governments, in neo­
functionalist terminology, have not seen their interests to be best 
served by the delegation of national decision-making to a new supra­
national body.
Haas also recognised that events external to the immediate debate 
could influence progress in a particular policy-area. This was proved 
true in a positive sense for regional policy with the push-effect of 
the 1973 enlargement of the Community and of the aspirations for Economic 
and Monetary Union in the early 1970s. Conversely, 1974 witnessed the 
blocking of progress towards the ERDF's establishment owing to the two 
UK elections of 1974 and the subsequent renegotiation issues, the elec­
tion of Giscard d'Estaing as President of France in May 1974 and the 
appointment of Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor of West Germany in the same 
month.
Neofunctionalists would argue that it is very difficult for 
political actors to adjust to the behaviour and goals of negotiating 
partners when defending their own interests. This has been borne out 
in debates surrounding the Regional Fund where rigid, uncompromising 
positions have been seen to be the norm and have rendered the Commission's 
mediating task more difficult.
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Lindberg defined political integration as 'the emergence or 
creation over time of a collective decision-making process'. Thus 
political institutions would evolve to which governments would delegate 
decision-making functions to European authorities, or with which they 
would decide jointly via the more familiar intergovernmental negoti­
ation. The latter is the case for the regional policy-area and thus 
according to Lindberg's definition political integration could be said 
to be evolving. Furthermore, in Lindberg's terminology events in the 
regional policy-area would appear to be somewhere between his two 
extremes of 'action and success' and 'inaction and failure'. Initial 
steps have been taken towards the adoption of a comprehensive approach 
to regional policy according to European standards, in the form of the 
Ex-Quota section. Regional Impact Assessments, Regional Development 
Programmes and the attempts to coordinate the financial mechanisms of 
the Community. Although varying degrees of success have been achieved 
in this respect, initial steps have been taken. Nevertheless as Krause 
pointed out (see Chapter one) the negative integration of the EC is 
still incomplete and numerous non-tariff barriers still exist such as 
the failure to harmonise professional standards. He continues by 
claiming that there needs to be a collective political will on the part 
of member states to render political integration possible. Economic 
integration alone will not provide sufficient pressure for political 
integration. Indeed, this will has been shown to be generally lacking 
in issues concerning the ERDF.
Transnationalists have argued that nation-states share the inter­
national arena with multinational companies, international, pressure 
groups and organisations. Therefore due to the increased economic and 
technological interdependence and increases in global communication and 
transport and movement of finance, governments must increasingly modify
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policy formulation to take account of the views held in other member 
states.
Regional policy debates by contrast have shown national govern­
ments to be uncompromising and the appropriate forum still to be con­
ceived as the national level. Keohane and Nye saw the establishment 
of transnational non-governmental alliances as significant. However, 
bodies such as UNICE, ETUC, d M  and lULA have been seen to be powerless 
against the might of the national governments.
In conclusion, the intergovemmentalist attitudes of member 
states have shown through in debates in the regional policy-area. How­
ever, each of the other theories or frameworks considered have provided 
relevant conclusions. Thus the national governments dominate dis­
cussions, no moves have been made towards the establishment of a 
federalist structure and the self-interest motivation of national 
actors in the regional policy-field has been one of self-defence and 
the preservation of national control over regional policy. In addition, 
increased technological and economic interdependence have not encouraged 
the construction of a supranational policy.
Nevertheless, by having established such a dominant position of 
control over the Fund's administration, the national government repre­
sentatives in the Council of Ministers leave themselves open to attack 
by the Commission, the European Parliament and local and regional 
authorities. The system of financing individual projects from ERDF 
resources has been tried and discredited and the Commission is now 
proposing a three year transition to a programme approach to Regional 
Fund spending. This would involve the active participation of two of 
the most vociferous critics of the Fund, namely the local and regional 
authorities, both in the drafting of programmes of aid and in the com­
pilation of Regional Development Programmes which would constitute the
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coordinating framework of ERDF operations.
At the same time, the Council has repeatedly blocked any increases 
in Commission staff because of national government reluctance to sanc­
tion higher administrative expenditures generally coupled with fears of 
potential increases in the Commission's powers. Yet the size of the 
ERDF has been continually increasing, mainly due to the insistence of 
the European Parliament, and a system of Regional Impact Assessments, 
for other Community policies and proposals, has been established. 
Therefore, the limited manpower resources in DG XVI have been severely 
stretched both because of the increased size of the Fund, the corres­
ponding rise in the number of project applications for the Fund, and 
because of attempts to assess the regional implications of other 
policies. Staff constraints have thus become a powerful lever for 
changing the whole ERDF administrative system.
In conclusion, therefore, although intergovemmentalist attitudes 
have shown through in debates in the regional policy-area, and although 
national governments have completely dominated the Fund's administra­
tion, this very domination coupled with the pursuit of national 
jealousies has placed them in a position where they are open to consid­
erable pressure to change the status quo. Moreover, cracks have begun 
to occur within the Council of Ministers itself during recent discussions 
of the future administrative arrangements for the ERDF (see below).
3. Prospects for Community Regional Policy
In 1981 the Select Committee of the House of Lords called for a
large increase in the ERDF's resources as a precondition of the Fund
23making a significant impact on the Community's regional problems.
The Commission has also called for a disproportionate growth in the
24Fund's resources relative to the EC budget as a whole. Furthermore,
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member states agreed at the November 1981 summit meeting in London that
ERDP resources should grow faster than the real increase in EC reve- 
25nues.
As stated in Chapter eight, the Commission has proposed to
increase the impact of the limited ERDP resources by distributing the
quota section (at least 80% of the total Pund) in only six areas of the
26Community which suffer from structural underdevelopment. There
appears to be little opposition in the Council of Ministers to the
principle of concentrating ERDP resources. However, the London Summit
of November 1981 is believed to have agreed that the Pund should cover
all regions meeting certain specified criteria rather than be restricted
27to named regions in selected countries.
The Commission has proposed that the Ex-Quota section of the Pund 
be increased to up to 20% of the total resources and that it should be 
distributed only to regions adversely affected by industrial decline or 
by other Community policies. Two problems arise in this respect: the
Commission has only just paid its first instalments to programmes under
the EQS and so has gained little experience with which to back up its 
arguments. In addition, member states making a net gain from the quota
section of the ERDP such as the UK will calculate the size of EQS which
would suit them best in terms of their total receipts from the Pund.
At present it appears that the British government would favour an ex­
quota section of 10% on the grounds that the UK's total receipts would 
be greater than would be the case with a larger EQS.
The Select Committee of the House of Lords among others has 
repeatedly been critical of the UK procedure for distributing aid to 
industrial projects. The Commission is now proposing to switch the 
allocation of Pund aid gradually, over a three year period, to a pro­
gramme as opposed to an individual project approach except for very
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large projects.
These programmes, under the quota section, could contain a mix­
ture of infrastructure, industrial, commercial and service projects.
The New Regional Policy Guidelines have also suggested that regional 
policy measures should aim to encourage labour-intensive activities 
based upon modem technology as well as services. Quota section aid 
should now also be granted to small business, service and tourist 
ventures.
The gradual introduction of a programme approach for Fund aid 
over a three year period is partially an attempt to involve local bodies 
more directly in ERDF affairs. Thus programmes will be drawn up by 
member states and local and regional authorities. They should have a 
life-span of at least three years and be agreed by the Commission.
These programmes would also be closely related to RDPs submitted by 
member states and ought to lead to some simplification of administra­
tive procedures. This proposal is likely to meet with opposition in 
the Council of Ministers: programmes have yet to be proved to be of
greater value than individual projects and, more significantly, national 
governments may be concerned that this approach could provide the 
Commission with more discretionary powers, possibly enabling them to 
lay down special conditions for the implementation of programmes.
Discussions in the Council Working Groups considering the Com­
mission's present proposals have revealed that certain member states, 
notably the major net-contributors to the ERDF, such as West Germany
and the Netherlands, favour the transition to the programme approach
28for distributing ERDF aid, at least in principle. They .are insisting, 
however, that the principle of additionality must be clearly demonst­
rated by such an approach and that the decision-making procedures for 
such a method of finance are clarified. Moreover, the Germans and the
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Dutch are pushing for a more precise definition of the eligibility 
criteria for infrastructure aid than the requirement that projects con­
tribute towards the development of the region in which they are located. 
Thus the net-financers of the Fund are striving to tighten their grip 
and control over the way in which their contributions are spent. They 
seem to be growing tired of merely topping up the treasury coffers of 
the member states who make a net-gain from the ERDF. To an important 
extent the member states who are net-contributors to the Fund have be­
come allies of those European institutions and outside observers who 
are seeking a more effective and integrated vehicle for EC regional 
priorities.
Some academic authorities even claim that a switch to the programme
29approach would be advantageous for the following reasons :
1. The approach would increase the effectiveness of ERDF
assistance by concentrating aid within a coherent set
of measures rather than in individual and sometimes 
disconnected investment projects.
2. It would reduce the administrative problems of assessing 
a large number of individual projects.
3. It would increase the possibility of securing the 
'additional* character of the Fund by involving 
Community institutions in the formulation and implemen­
tation of the programmes.
4. The change would allow for more participation by local
and regional authorities in the operations of the ERDF.
5. The programme approach, in which some projects would be 
wholly financed by the Community, would, because of the 
more active role envisaged for local and regional bodies, 
guarantee that the ERDF would be more openly in the public eye.
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Therefore, in an attempt to ensure greater respect for the prin­
ciple of additionality, the Commission has also proposed that member 
states be mandated to consult, if not work together with, local and 
regional authorities when preparing RDPs, when submitting programmes 
eligible for ERDF aid (see above) and when planning 'integrated opera­
tions'. This should permit more surveillance by sub-national authorities 
of the national governments' commitment to additionality. Secondly, in 
most cases, the regulation will specifically require member states to 
demonstrate how additionality is to be achieved. This proposal is bound 
to meet stiff opposition from the more centralist governments in the 
Council of Ministers. Nevertheless this opposition will be countered 
by the attitude of the Fund's paymasters (see above) who are seeking to 
tighten their grip on the administration of Fund aid.
Thus there are major disagreements in the Council of Ministers 
over the proposed amendments to the Fund regulation. This adds a 
further dimension to the picture presented, that the administration of 
the ERDF has been dominated by the national governments; the Council 
of Ministers cannot be considered as a homogeneous unit enforcing a 
blanket control over the Fund. This follows on from the occasion in 
1980 when there was no qualified majority in the Council on the budget­
ary vote (see Chapter eight), which led to the ultimate rejection of 
the document by the European Parliament. The Council could not unite, 
on the issue of the size of the Fund appropriations for 1980, to a 
sufficient extent to overrule the proposed increases and does not now 
have sufficient unity to reject a major reform of the ERDF that might 
substantially erode their control of the Fund.
Thus although the issues surrounding the ERDF are still dominated 
by the member state governments and by intergovernmental attitudes, the 
argument must be qualified by the potential and evident chinks in the
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Counci1's armoury.
The Commission has also insisted, in its latest proposals, upon 
the presentation by member states of more specific and coherent RDPs 
in an attempt to achieve greater coordination of Community and national 
regional policy measures. In addition it has made clear its intention 
to make extended use of RIAs for vetting and analysing current 
Community policies and proposals.
The new Commission proposals launched in October 1981 represent 
a major attempt by the Commission, having adopted a gradualist policy 
vis à vis the Council of Ministers, to expand its present foothold, to
align Community regional policy to its objectives.
30One local authority official in the UK has claimed that:
If implemented the proposals would go much of the way 
towards removing some of the criticisms made of the 
current effectiveness of the ERDF. Particularly wel­
come to local authorities will be the proposals on 
achieving closer relationships with the Commission.
Local authorities in the UK have felt strongly that 
the current regional development programmes were 
inadequate. The proposal that these should be drafted 
in close association with regional authorities will be 
very welcome.
Brooke argued that the redefinition of Community level criteria 
for distributing Fund aid would be more rational than accepting member 
states' priorities. Nevertheless he warned that the data used to cal­
culate the two criteria used for deciding the regions in which ERDF aid 
should be concentrated were outdated, referring as they did to 1977 
(GDP for the regions and long-term unemployment). He claimed that were 
1981 statistics used, because of the recent rise in UK unemployment, 
areas such as Yorkshire and Humberside would preserve their right of 
access to Fund aid.
Thus the debate in the Council of Ministers in the coming months 
will be crucial for the shape of Community regional policy in the 1980s.
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In addition the establishment of an effective Community regional policy 
will be vital for further progress along the path of economic and 
political integration. A recent study undertaken at Cambridge Univer­
sity, financed partly by the Commission and partly by the Department of 
31Industry on centrality, peripherality and EEC Regional Development 
demonstrated conclusively that the EEC's central and peripheral regions 
differ markedly in their economic structure, performance and evolution. 
In particular a set of inter-related economic characteristics were 
identified which together rendered the inhabitants and firms of the 
Community's peripheral regions - in Italy, France, UK and Ireland - 
economically significantly disadvantaged relative to their counterparts 
in central regions.
Thus peripheral regions experienced higher aggregate and youth 
unemployment rates, a growing concentration of unemployed young workers, 
lower output and regional income per head and per employee, proportion­
ally fewer job opportunities in manufacturing and producer services, 
with a greater dependence on agriculture and consumer services. Peri­
pheral regions also experience unfavourable and deteriorating manufac­
turing structures and a bias towards economic activities which are 
declining or growing only slowly at the Community level. Furthermore, 
there is in these areas an increasing relative inaccessibility to 
economic activity because of faster growth in central regions. Even 
apparent relative improvements in peripheral job opportunities and 
female activity rates were found to be related to the growth of marginal 
consumer services or to the moving to certain peripheral regions of 
older, traditional manufacturing industries whose long-term prospects 
are likely to be poor.
Judith Marquand also stressed the point that:
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to the extent that it [the Common Market] truly 
operates as a unified market, it appears that several 
spatially biased factors - peripherality, urban struc­
ture, the spatial aspects of technological adaptation 
- will all operate to help the areas which are already 
richest to grow the fastest. In particular, Germany 
is favoured, and the UK, Italy, Ireland and the three 
applicant countries will have continuing difficulty 
in catc^^ng up, especially in a period of low overall 
growth.
Thus the more advanced EEC countries are faced by an almost impos­
sible policy dilemma; how to aid the new members (Greece since 1981 and 
Spain and Portugal later in the decade) to improve their competitive 
position while simultaneously dealing with the regional impact of the 
recession on their own economies.
The expansion of the EC from nine to twelve members will have 
serious implications for the overall character and severity of Community 
regional problems. Apart from parts of industrial Spain and Athens and 
Salonica, most regions in Spain, Portugal and Greece are relatively 
underdeveloped and largely agricultural-based economies. Moreover, in 
times of economic recession these structurally weak areas will be worst 
affected, and once trade barriers begin to be removed these regions will 
need protection against the competition of the more prosperous regions 
in order to prevent regional disparities from being further increased.
Thus there are pressing economic needs for the establishment of 
a cohesive, comprehensive and effective Community regional policy. How­
ever, two fundamental blocking points stand between the Commission and 
the achievement of such a policy. The first problem concerns the 
swamping of the Community budget by the CAP and its price support mech­
anism, made worse by the anti-regional policy effects of the system.
The second, perhaps more basic, problem is that of the self-interested 
approach taken by national governments in the Council of Ministers. It 
has been shown that this tier of government dominates the administration
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of the Fund and each member state strives to pay as little into, and 
txtrAicifcri as much as possible from, a very shallow pool of resources, 
whilst ceding as little administrative power of decision as possible, 
either to the European Commission or indeed to regional and local 
bodies. There is no doubt that this is a question of the political 
will of the member states to make a Community Regional Policy effective 
and significant.
In the last couple of years member states have come to appreciate
seme of the absurdities of the Community's present budgetary priorities
However, the Community is a long way from the federal budget proposals
33of the MacDougall Report, under which it was claimed that 2% of the
Community's GDP could be redistributed at Community level with a very
significant impact on the less developed regions.
A group of experts headed by Sir Donald MacDougall^^ studied the
35role of public finance in five federations, including its contribution 
towards the reduction of regional disparities in income. The findings 
were compared with the situation in the Community's member states and 
potential effect of an increasing role for public finance at the Com­
munity level was assessed.
Public expenditure by member states of the Community in 1975
36equalled 45% of the GDP of the area as a whole. By contrast expen­
diture by all Community institutions was 0.7%. Whereas the redistri­
butive power of public expenditure in the countries considered was up 
to 40% , the Community's power of redistribution was a mere 1%.
Thus MacDougall maintained that if Community public expenditure, 
in a pre-federal phase, was raised to between 2-2&% of GDP. at the
37Community level regional inequalities could be reduced by up to 10% 
provided that substantial expenditure was invested in the area of 
structural, cyclical, employment and regional policies.
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Politically speaking, with the extent of discretionary powers of 
decision that would have to be transferred to the Community level, even 
at this 'pre-federal' stage, there would seem little chance of such a 
scheme getting off the ground in the foreseeable future. Despite the 
completion of the customs union and the progress made on reducing non­
tariff barriers there has been a lack of commitment to accept moves 
towards positive integration and total economic and monetary union.
Thus economically, and certainly politically, it would be misguided to 
consider that the EEC has reached a pre-federal stage.
Unless there is a noticeable shift in the attitudes of member 
state governments, the Community will have no effective regional policy, 
only Community finance for national regional policies with differing 
objectives, an approach which has already been discredited, even in the 
eyes of many member state governments, especially those who are not 
principal beneficiaries of the ERDF.
The Fund operates at present in a political environment where the 
major priorities and goals revolve around trying to pay as little as 
possible towards the cost of the ERDF whilst gaining the maximum possible 
financial advantage. These attitudes are futher reinforced by the 
general unwillingness to cede any more control of national economic 
policy to the Commission than is necessary to maintain the Fund along 
its present unsatisfactory lines. In such an environment, the prospects 
for the establishment of a Common Regional Policy at the Community level 
do indeed seem bleak, even if power within the Community's decision­
making processes is more widely distributed than many authorities have 
so far recognised.
Finally it is questionable whether the ERDF is worth all the 
political arguments and conflict which it generates, particularly given 
its small size, both in absolute and relative terms, and the dubious
304
adherence by member states to the principle of additionality. The 
Community certainly needs to spend money in its problem regions, both 
for political and economic reasons. Moreover, the cost-effectiveness 
of the ERDF may well be improved if the Council accepts the Commission's 
recent proposals, albeit in a watered-down form. However, in the 
absence of genuine additionality there could well be pressures to 
convert to a system of interest subsidies and/or loan schemes. This 
could be a way of financing more projects and of overcoming some of 
the difficulties encountered at present by the Community in administer­
ing the distribution of ERDF grants. Such a change could nonetheless 
run counter to present attempts to concentrate Fund aid since interest 
subsidies would distribute the Fund's resources more widely. Moreover, 
a Fund operating under such a system would lose its political impact 
in the Community's regions since local and regional authorities would 
be less aware of assistance received.
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